Win - Win

Elections in Jordan are due on September 20^th  - anyone driving down a Jordanian street will notice the dozens of posters hanging on electrical poles, which blaze with flaring slogans and ambitious, one-line promises that would bring peace, equality, democracy, prosperity, and justice to the country and its citizens. Candidates are grouping in national lists and are harmonising their programmes and electoral promises. Under the new Election Law, promulgated in 2016, which introduced a proportional system based on open-lists, candidates are no longer subject to the limitations imposed on them by the former system of “single un-transferable vote”, imposed since 1992.

The new Election Law has been praised as a step towards political development and party involvement. The scope of this article is not meant to analyse the law – which in no way empowers parties – but to discuss what the new elected parliament can do when elected in September.

Back to the slogans. Irrespective of the agendas and programmes of the candidates (independent or partisan), the soon-to-be member of parliament (MP) has one of the two goals (or both, or none): live up to the promises made to the electorate which were made through the numerous speeches/banners/interviews/lunch feasts, or appease the government and support its policies, which would require strict and blind support to anything proposed by the government/palace. Some might try to do both, but their credibility by both the street and the regime will be jeopardised. Some might do neither, and no one will notice.

Under these two potential behavioural scenarios, the question to ask is the following: how can MPs demonstrate that they are pushing for policies which emanate from street-petitions or those which are government-designed?

Friedrich (1937) referred to the ‘rule of anticipated reactions’, whereby one actor shapes their behaviour to conform to what they believe are the desires of another. This means that MPs usually change their behaviour and demonstrate that they are conforming to the desire of the government or the street, and attempt – at the same time- that somewhere in the middle, MPs are exercising some influence. It should be noted, as Benton and Russell (2009) argue, that “Influence is also associated with the perception of relevant actors; this is sensitive to anticipated reactions, but may conflate reputation for influence and actual influence”. They also propose that ‘there is no “Parliament”, in a collective sense, at all’.  This means that it all boils down to the behaviour of a group of MPs during the tenancy of the parliament and how they demonstrate their influence to either the street or the government, irrespective of its level, strength, and credibility.

In light of the fact that party representation will be minimal in the upcoming parliament (not to break habit), MPs who actually want to influence policy or take part in policy making (irrespective of who this policy serves) must attempt to act collectively and portray an image of unity before the street and the government. Parliamentary blocks might be a good starting place, but given their history of continuous break-ups and disaccords, MPs must think of a new mechanism to show the street that they are indeed fighting for policies, or to show the government that they can obstruct, influence or facilitate policy making.

Ambitious and unrealistic as this proposal might be, a demonstration of power might be indeed be achievable through the following: the parliament can be divided into two opposing powers. On one side, there is a clear group of MPs who support the government’s policies but can obstruct it should the government not yield to certain demands. This will keep the government in check. One the other side, there is a clear and semi-cohesive group which does not necessarily need to portray opposition, but to represent the general demands of their electorate. This group must portray to the street that they do exercise influence over policies and that it can change the course of events based on the street’s demands.

In both cases, one side will win, and it is clear which side it is. But this is not a zero-sum scenario: the fact that the one side lost indicates to the street that there was indeed a battle, and to the government that the battle was one thanks to the support of the loyal half of the parliament. What is being proposed here is not a reinvention of the wheel: it is merely the way that the Westminster Parliament functions. Despite the fact that the electoral system has changed and that the party system is different, Jordanian MPs can apply this system to their parliament if they ever want to get ahead in the realms of policy making.

Irrespective of the differences between the various political currents and ideologies that will be represented in the parliament, there is one common notion that binds all MPs: survival depends on strength, and strength must be demonstrated. Should the elected representatives not learn how to “perform” in parliament and reveal to the public and to the government that they can actually shape and influence policy in the Kingdom, the political scene in Jordan will forever remain trapped within the glorification of one’s personal attributes concealed behind a loyal disposition to abide or to sulk.