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No motive

It was a clever plan. A 17-year-old carpentry-apprentice waited patiently until the target client purchased furniture from his employer, who in return tasked the young man in particular with delivering the furniture to the target’s rented apartment. Just when he made sure that no one was around, except for the landlord of course, the master-mind behind the plot charged and stabbed the victim with a screw-driver-turned-into-a-weapon. The victim quickly reached for his gun and fired a round of shots in the air that killed both the young attacker, and the innocent bystander (landlord). The failed attempt was politically motivated, as intelligently clarified by the law enforcement authorities of the screw driver victim’s country. Yes, the 17-year-old planned all of this to get out an important political message. No one shall be safe…furniture shops will serve as a breeding ground for young political criminal wannabes.   The whole incident, sarcasm-free, occurred a week earlier

Picture Perfect

         In an insightful  op-ed , political analyst Fahd Al Khitan criticised the newly approved instructions developed by the Greater Amman Municipality regarding the professions that can be run from one’s own home. These professions range from intellectual activities, services, and food production. His criticism to these instructions is valid, but fails to address a number of key issues that are of equal – if no exceeding – importance.   His argument that the conversion of buildings into small shops will create disturbances, tarnish the public appearance of residential areas, and contribute to further chaos and disquiet in already poorly planned neighbourhoods is pertinent to the problem at hand. Mr Khitan’s shift to the associated economic problems that will arise as a result to probable tax evasion, misuse of buildings’ infrastructure, and business- generated dregs is also understood, and so is his concluding paragraph and main argument that the decision will eventuall

What Common Cause?

             President Donald Trump is on an international tour that was kicked off with a visit to Saudi Arabia. It was followed by a trip to Israel, which was subsequently followed by expected mess, confusion, and poor strategic vision. Trump opened his first visit to Israel by saying that he sees growing recognition among Muslim nations that they share a ´common cause´ with Israel in their determination to counter Iranian threats. The opportunity was ripe for a peace deal, he said. Reading this statement could be interpreted in only one of two ways: continued American arrogance and determination to fuel sectarianism, or stupidity. The latter option – as appealing and convincing as it may sound – might not be the sole motor behind the actions and the statements of the American president. His lack of experience is compensated for by the shrewd and wise insights received from veterans in diplomacy - such as Jared Kushner- and therefore, we need not to worry about that.

Wind of Change

The results of the French presidential elections   were unusual:   the failure of the two main parties (Socialist and Republican), who have been hogging the French scene for more than six decades came as a shock. The elections envisaged for May 8, will see Marin Le Pen, leader of the extreme right-wing party, and Emmanuel Macaron, leader of the centre Party, head to head. The traditional left-wing Socialist and Republican parties have failed in recent years to address the problems facing the French society, which is suffering from an accumulated economic crisis and high unemployment, especially among young people. They also failed to instil a sense of security in the French society which has suffered from painful blows in the past years by terrorists. In the first round, Marie Le Pen's victory came as a shock to the ruling class; it represented an extreme right-wing party. Therefore, immediately after the results, the political leaders of the traditional parties col

Belgian Sweet Solution

S even months into the tenure of the Jordanian 18 th Lower House of Parliament, no miracles have yet taken place. The parliamentary elections were celebrated in September 2016 under a new election law that changed the electoral system into a fully proportional system under which candidates and political parties participate in open electoral lists at the district level. Under the new system, candidates must register through lists on the district level with a minimum of three members on each list. The number of candidates on the list cannot exceed that of the available seats in the respective district and is generally topped off at ten. Voters can cast their vote for the whole list as such, for different candidates on one list or for all candidates from the chosen list. Through the open list system, there is thus competition between the different lists as well as between the candidates of each list. It must be underlined however that voters can cast their vote for only one list – a

Kaftar

Muaawiya Bin Abi Sufyan was the first Umayyad Caliph, who ruled as a just and jovial leader until his death in 683 AD. Known for his sense of humour and his love for women, Abi Sufyan was famous for a story that took place in his own harem. While escorting a woman for the Khorasan region in modern day Iran, a beautiful woman entered the harem and mesmerised the Leader of All Believers. With his pride in his manhood and prowess in the bed arena, Abi Sufyan did not hesitate to engage in a brazen and manly sexual act in front of the Khorasani woman, who was patiently waiting for her turn. After he was done, he turned victoriously to his first concubine and asked her how to say ‘lion' in Persian - in a direct analogy to his sexual performance.  The Khorasani woman, unamused, told him slyly, that lion is kaftar in Persian. The Caliph went back to his Court ever so jubilant and told his subjects – repeatedly – that he was one lucky kaftar. His subjects started gi

Polite separatism or uniform unity?

An article published in Political Theory Journal in January 2017 discussed the moral versus procedural aspects of deliberative democracy. The article analysed different theories and positions of renowned theorists, including the two preeminent post-WWII philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas regarding the role of reason in political accord. The author, Dereker Barker, suggests that deliberative theory sees politics as an integrative model, and seeks to locate the process of public will-formation on formal processes that adhere to certain rule, rather than a sense of collective identity. Collective identity, whether considered in its most individualist or communitarian form forms a baseline for public reasoning in a general and broad sense, and not a representation of individualist sense of morality. Haberman refuses – as quotes in Three Normative Models – that political questions be reduced to the type of ethical questions we ask ourselves regarding who we are and who we

تعليق: لا للمنطق

نسخ من مقال نشر في صحيفة الغد 'كا نت جملة رجال الدين المسيحي والإسلامي في العصور الوسطى يعتقدون أن الفلسفة والمنطق عدوان للدين، وأن تعلمهما يجعل الفرد يشك في صحته، أو يكفر به ويرتد عنه. وقد شبه رجال الدين المسلمون في حينه تعلم المنطق بتعلم الزندقة، فقالوا: "من تمنطق فقد تزندق". غير أنه لما كان غير ممكن منع التفلسف والتمنطق بحكم الدهشة وحب الاستطلاع والمعرفة عند الإنسان، فقد اضطر رجال الدين إلى تعلّم الفلسفة والمنطق وتعليمهما، للدفاع عن الدين والتصدي للمجدفين والمهرطقين والمارقين. ولما بلغت الحضارة العربية الإسلامية أوجها في القرن الرابع الهجري؛ نتيجة انهيار السلطة المركزية وتفشي الانقسام السياسي، وتنافس الدويلات المسلمة المستقلة على رعاية الفلسفة والآداب والعلوم والفنون، رأيت الفلسفة والمنطق يزدهران، والمناظرات بين الفلاسفة تنتشر في كل مكان، ما اضطرهم إلى وضع قواعد للمناظرة: "اجتمع متكلمان (فيلسوفان إسلاميان) فقال أحدهما للآخر: هل لك في المناظرة؟ فقال: على شرائط: أن لا تغضب، ولا تعجب، ولا تشغب، ولا تحكم، ولا تقبل على غيري وأنا أكلمك، ولا تجعل الدعوى دليلاً،

Erdogan Abelhamid II

The Ottoman constitution of 1876 was the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, drafted by the Young Ottomans when Sultan Abedlahamid II acceded to the throne. However, Abdelhamid’s iron-fist rule meant that the Constitution was only in effect for two years, from 1876 to 1878 during the First Constitutional Era, and Empire’s hopes for political opening were shattered. For years, the Sultan exercised absolute power and controlled a ring of a ruling oligarchical elite. The Constitution was reinstated in 1908 following the Young Turk Revolution. The Constitution allowed for the respect of minorities and their right to be represented in regional assemblies, democratizing the Ottoman institutions and ceding representative rights to the disenfranchised. What Abdelhamid II planned to carry out with his absolute monarchy and autocratic rule by burying the Constitution was trumped by the courage, vision, and justice of the Yong Ottomans.   It is important to revert to this histo