Belgian Sweet Solution

Seven months into the tenure of the Jordanian 18^th Lower House of Parliament, no miracles have yet taken place. The parliamentary elections were celebrated in September 2016 under a new election law that changed the electoral system into a fully proportional system under which candidates and political parties participate in open electoral lists at the district level. Under the new system, candidates must register through lists on the district level with a minimum of three members on each list. The number of candidates on the list cannot exceed that of the available seats in the respective district and is generally topped off at ten. Voters can cast their vote for the whole list as such, for different candidates on one list or for all candidates from the chosen list. Through the open list system, there is thus competition between the different lists as well as between the candidates of each list. It must be underlined however that voters can cast their vote for only one list – a comment that seems evident and redundant, in electoral terms, but will explained at the end of the article.

In all, 1252 candidates ran in 226 lists in the elections. The Islamic Action Front formed a list that included tribal, nationalist and Christian figures, participating under the National Coalition for Reform (NCR). Other parties also campaigned under party lists, or mixed lists. Out of the 50 political parties that are currently registered in Jordan, 39 presented candidates in the elections. Nearly 18% of candidates  who participated in the elections are party members, and 99 out of the 226  competing lists include at least one party member as a contender.

The results came at no surprise; the Islamic Action Front won 10 seats; the Zamzam Islamic party won 5 seats; the centrist National Current Party won 4 seats; the Islamic Centric party won 5 seats; the centrist party Justice and Reform won 2 seats; while the Baath (nationalist), Communist (left), National Union (left) and Awn (centrist) parties won one seat each. In total, 30 seats out of 130 seats. Not a bad figure in light of the history or marginalisation of parties in Jordan. Nonetheless, and again no surprises expected, parties did not form any strong coalitions in the Parliament, nor decided to merge into bigger and stronger parties that would have greater weight and influence. No; Jordan needs 50 parties, which form no majority and which win no more than 10 seats each.

The problem remains in the Election law and the formula chosen to distribute the votes, whereby the insistence on dividing the nation along geographic lines does not serve parties’ interest at all. Had the open lists been national lists, parties could have garnered more support from their constituents located in different parts of the country. Alternatively, an innovation and bespoke solution for Jordan could be allowing voters to select candidates from any list, provided that they select the lists that pertain to their electoral district, and respect the number of voted allocated to the district, which might be a fairer approach to parties. Instead of the hypothetical scenario, one could also suggest to go back to a majority system.  Again and again, the point is lost before law makers: parties cannot compete against tribal leaders. Tribal affiliation trumps political beliefs. Consequently, parties will win few seats, will have a meagre representation at the Parliament, and will not be able to forge sustainable coalitions- a Parlia­ment composed of individuals is the result.

In an excellent paper written by Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair*, a solution might be available to address Jordanian parties’ conundrum. They explain that ‘Contemporary Belgium can be interpreted as lacking a polity-level system of parties, for example, in that the linguistic divisions that have fractured each of the traditional party protagonists have now progressed to such an extent that, at least at the national level, there is now no electoral competition between the various Flemish and Walloon parties. With the possible exception of those living in the ‘mixed’ Brussels region, no Belgian voter is obliged, or even has the capacity, to choose between the opposing sides of this fundamental cleavage. There is, in short, no Flemish– Walloon electoral interaction, and hence no party system at the electoral level. If we are to speak of a Belgian party system, therefore, it can only be in the sense of a set of parties. Within each of the regions, on the other hand, and within each of the linguistic communities, strong competition prevails, with different Flemish parties challenging one another for the support of Dutch-speaking voters, and with different Walloon parties challenging one another for the support of French-speaking voters. Hence, while Belgium does not appear to maintain a national party system, at least at the level of the electorate, it does maintain two parallel sub-national party systems, one for Flemish voters and one for Walloon voters, and within each there regularly ensues quite intense electoral competition’.

So why not do precisely that in Jordan? Instead of dividing the nation based on geographical lines, it would be better to divide it based on ideological lines. Areas that are commonly known to be conservative, to vote for loyalists/centrist parties/tribal leaders can have their lot of districts, and those with politically active, ideologically driven and doctrine-oriented populations can have their lots of districts. A Parliament elected on that basis will have a more accurate representation of the society, and will represent two sides of the coin. Furthermore, grouped to compete before their own kind, parties will necessarily find safety in numbers, and will rethink the power of mergers. Otherwise, elections for the year 2020 will see the participation of, well, 2020 parties, 2 of which will win seats by their own right. Belgian solutions - like their chocolates - can be sweet.

*Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair, The Parameters of Party Systems, Party Politics 2008; 14; 147