Morlino's Lesson

   

         Long has it been established that history repeats itself, and that countries tend to tread the same path chosen by nations before (whether for their own good or destruction). The European experience throughout the past centuries, supported by the countless studies that have been conducted to investigate Europe's history and political development, are of utmost importance to understand the current crisis through which some Arab states are passing. Examining the current state of affairs in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt reveals extreme tension on all levels as well as the need to disseminate political and intellectual consciousness so as to prevent the transformation of this current crisis into a state of constant and permanent instability. In this context, Leonardo Morlino's reference in his book “Democracies and Democratization”, published in 2009, in which he referred to the phases of transformation from democratic regimes to authoritarian regimes (citing the German experience in the 1930s in particular) sheds a light on the transformations happening in Arab regimes. Should the theoretical aspect of Morlino's transformation steps be compared with the current Egyptian scenario, where the democratically elected government was out thrown and a new interim government took control, then the “history repeats itself” notion would be proven fatefully accurate. 

    The crisis in democratic regimes begins, according to Morlino, with the emergence of a state of political competition between parties, political elites and social activists, followed by an increase in polarization, divisions and fragmentation, whether in the party, in political participation or in the standing government. Polarization in this sense means the deviation in political positions between parties and elites on either pole, whilst radicalization follows polarization and involves a growing distance between these polar forces, either in the parliament or in the street. Amidst such radicalization, division and instability, the government finds itself drawing inefficient policies, leading to the general perception of the regime's illegitimacy and a deepening of political conflict. In this phase, should the rival political elite reach a compromise/ agreement, then the crisis could be overcome; otherwise, the crisis would move to the next phase that leads to the fall of the regime, increase in violence and the politicization of the neutral powers, deeming any agreement or compromise impossible. 

      A transitory phase follows, described as involving two opposing political coalitions as the regime is being gradually transformed from a democratic regime to an authoritarian regime. The new regime would then transform and alter the standing structures and norms as it sees fit. The differences between the old and new regimes are wider when there is a state of chaos and violence which assist in the appearance of new leaders with reactionary policies against the old regime, noting that the new regime would be institutionalized much easier and faster if elements in the older regime – such as the army – were an accomplice in overthrowing the government. This new regime would do all that is possible to protect itself, its guardians and its economic and political interests, confiscating at the same time all coercive powers. Gradually, this new authoritarian regime will establish itself in all domains of public life, and its removal would not be an easy task.

     The point behind Morlino's study is two folded: for one part, it is a reminder of how easy a regime can be transformed from a democratic model to an authoritarian one. The Weimar Republic's experience, albeit short standing, serves as an excellent example. On the other hand, it reveals how necessary it is to spread political culture amongst citizens, who are both the protagonists and victims of political rivalries and national, regional and international forces. For us, as activists and concerned citizens, we must learn that every demonstration, every act of violence and every blind acceptance of the decisions and actions that undermine the essence of democracy -no matter how appealing they may seem or how convenient they are to our political orientations – would have dire consequences. And yes, history proved so.

Parties' Reinvention

Political parties in Western Europe have been developing throughout the past two centuries, reinventing themselves and reorganizing their structures to reflect socio-economic changes in their societies. Elitist parties that dominated European politics had to expand their support-base and include members from other social classes following the introduction of universal suffrage. The expanded parties – known as mass parties – were actively recruiting members and gaining supporters at the beginning of the 20^th century, adhering strictly at the same time to their ideological agendas and party doctrines. With the organizational modernization of contemporary politics following the Second World War and the birth of pressure groups and strong political bureaucracies, in addition to the expansion of public participation, technological advances and intense competition between parties and political opponents, mass parties transformed themselves to catch-all parties. These parties intended to appeal to a larger sect of the society and electorate, therefore modifying their agendas, focusing on specific issues at hand, softening their ideological approach and working on galvanizing support from different political cleavages. Finally, in the 21^st century, political parties took the form of cartel or catch-all-plus parties, acting as professional agencies and networks of political agents, dominating public institutions, which, rather than competing in order to win support from wherever it can be found, are content to ensure their access to the state by sharing power with others.

Examining the European experience against the Arab experience has been a rejected notion, considering the vast differences between the history, society, economy, culture and ideological orientations between Arab and European countries. What is however meant from the exposition of party development is highlighting the importance of western parties' adaptation to changes and developments occurring in their societies. A 21^st century party cannot follow the same line of actions, calls, aspirations and strategies applied 50 years ago. European and western communities and their political leaders customized their party systems, organization and structures to accommodate such changes and alterations in the general political culture.

Parties in the Arab world on the other hand have followed a different route and have passed through different periods that restricted their performance and - sometimes – their continuance and existence. Nonetheless, the Arab Spring served as an opportunity for party reorganization and reinvention, with the Arab populace eager to re-engage in political participation via elections and party affiliation. Parties, in this sense, must act as change-motors and adapt themselves to the new realities on the ground. Employing decades-old mentalities and reminiscing about past glories and political achievements is a romantic disconnection from reality that would lead to further social and political disorientation. Egypt's current political and social turmoil may be an excellent example of weak party development occurring in many Arab states. The country's social confusion may be attributed to the disconnection between parties and political elites on one side, and the public on the other. The polarization between public opinion (with right-left and confessional-secular cleavages) and the political organization (both parties and political establishments) have led to general chaos on Egyptian streets. This unfortunate reality is being fed by further regional and international intervention, leaving the Egyptian public to feel like a victim of a western-designed conspiracy or theological authoritarian ambitions. Millions have taken to the street to protest against an Islamic government, and millions have also taken to the street to protest its ousting. Millions are supporting democratically elected governments, and millions are supporting the preservation of security and freedom even if democracy were to be compromised. Finger pointing and exchange of accusations are common, and many – lamentably – seem to favour bullets to ballots. Both sides view state organization differently, and parties and establishments (military in particular) hold an entirely different view. This lack of a minimum consensus has a series of reasons and justifications behind it, but failing to address this issue is in itself a contributing factor to the growing schism between citizens, government and parties.

In the end, democracy has always needed parties to defend it and preserve it, acting as its loyal gatekeeper. Most importantly parties have always been the product of the societies from which they emerged. Unless parties learn how to reorganize, reinvent themselves, modify their approach, soften their ideological ideals, accommodate different orientations and interests of their societies with all its colours, and spread political education and culture, only two options would be available for the Egyptian (and other) political systems: democratic chaos or authoritarian stability.

Nationality and Arabs

   Nationality, patriotism, panarabism, regionalism....terms designed to define individuals residing certain geographic areas and thier feelings towards their patria. Long have I – as an Arab – heard the praise of Arab glories...the readiness to die for this stretch of land, ideals and history...the supremacy of the nation's historic and heroic figures and the injustice the imperialist world has served it in our modern days. Examining the history of Arabs, the problems emerge from the very beginning of this quest. Who are Arabs? Are they defined by their language? History? Religion? Culture? Does a Yemeni beduin have much in common with a Morrocan citizen? Is the arguement of some Lebanese intellectuals of pertaining to a generic meditteranean race of phonecian history rather than the Arab race accurate? Are caucasian residents in Jordan, Syria and Palestine considered Arabs? What about Kurds? They speak Arabic afterall, and are Muslims and Christians – the two main faiths in the Arab world. 

     Considering the history of Arab countries, basically after the birth of Islam in the 7th century and the rise and fall of Islamic Empires that stretched throughout history and geography, culminating in the Ottoman Empire, it is evident that the notion of statehood was one mixed of nationhood : a community of citizens identifying themselves as muslims, and not as citizens of certain regions. This identification with religion did not rule out the sense of “belonging” to a certain region, but the Asabiye – the prejudice and blinded identification with a closed group of  people (whether a clan, tribe or family) and the segmentation of societies based on race was prohibited – at least in theory. The Ottomans clearly did not respect this heritage, and the racist policies practiced by the Osmalis, coupled with the spread of nationalist sentiments in the XVIII and XIX centuries led to “Arab Nationalism or Panarabism”. The dismantling of the Empire and the division of Arab lands between colonial powers accentuated the identification of citizens with their bordered lands, and gradually – with the liquidation of nationalist parties and activists – the borders of these countries deepened and nationality laws started being promulgated. When a 15th century Arab identified himself as pertaining to a Muslim nation irrespective of the race/ethnicity of the ruling class, a 20th century Arab strongly identifies with the fellow citizens within the land space occupied by a given regime. The term “Arab” has therefore been blurred: if there is no actual Arab nation, and individuals are to be content with their identification as citizens of sub-nation states, then no Arab can logically and truthfully say that he or she is an Arab. History, language, culture and religion may be binding, but the diverse makeup of modern societies these days, thier orientation, cultural beliefs, norms and even linguistic expression have all loosened the once tightly sealed definition of Arabism. The state, with its rule, regulations, political system and the passport color shape who you are, and what you are entitled to. 

  This lengthy introduction is meant to address the issue of the Bahraini government's recent threat of withdrawing nationalities from Bahrani opposition activists. Apart from the fact that the right of nationality is a fundamental right granted by article 15 of the World Declaration of Human Rights, how can a government decide to use the “natural right of belonging” against any citizen who dares to cross it? How can a nationality become so awfully cheap and easily played with by officials when convinient? How can one's entire existence, self identification and pertinence be subject to arbitrary decisions? How can an entire nation be toyed with throughout history...leaving elites and imperlialists deciding on how one should feel and identify himself/herself? When were Arabs given a chance to decide on who they want to be and how they want to label themselves?

   

     The authoritarian regime in Bahrain is no stranger than that in many Arab countries, and the decision to withdraw nationalities is also not an innovative Al Khalifa coercion formula. Nonetheless, the fact that it is being used in the 21st century, third year into the Arab Spring, and amongst heated debated and studies on “what went wrong with democracy and human rights in the Arab world” is a shame. Moreover, this coercive instrument is being used whilst the slogans mentioned at the very beginning of the article are also employed passionately by the very same regimes...and that, dear readers, is simply a nifty disgrace.