That Would Be Mirific

In the ancient city of Rome, Britain’s foreign secretary mustered much lacking courage from the political elite and bluntly accused the Al Saud clan as acting as a puppeteer in proxy wars in the region. Whether it is through the proxy war in Syria or the direct war again Yemeni Houthis in the South, Saudi Arabia’s regional politics were criticised in the open, in an unprecedented and historical moment.

Obviously, the angered and embarrassed Prime Minster was relieved to know that the government’s spokesperson clarified that these comments do not reflect the official position of the UK government, but rather the foreign secretary’s personal views. This statement in itself accounts for a separate critical article, considering that these statements were made during an official event, not over a family dinner. The spokesperson went on to clarify that ‘Saudi Arabia was a vital partner for the UK, particularly on counter-terrorism and, when you look at what is happening in the region, we are supportive of the Saudi-led coalition which is working in support of the legitimate government in Yemen against Houthi rebels.

Saudi-British relations extend well beyond decades of mutual cooperation and understanding over economic and political files.

 In fact, the understanding struck between Great Britain and the Sherfis of Mecca prior to the Great Arab Revolt in 1916, and the subsequent reconciliation and understanding with Al Saud who took over modern day Saudi Arabia, has developed into a romance between the two nations.

There are a great deal of benefits that each side reaps from the other, and very convincing grounds to turn a blind eye to the detrimental policies followed by both governments. Cooperating on certain files will guarantee mutual benefits, so let us ignore the atrocities created by one of us. This mutual agreement reflects a well-known example of game theory known as Prisoners' Dilemma, which explains how the payoff structure affect the likelihood and robustness of cooperation.

First, it is necessary to define Prisoners' Dilemma – the article published by Kenneth A. Oye best describes it. ‘Prisoners' Dilemma: Two prisoners are suspected of a major crime. The authorities possess evidence to secure conviction on only a minor charge. If neither prisoner squeals, both will draw a light sentence on the minor charge (CC). If one prisoner squeals and the other stonewalls, the rat will go free (DC) and the sucker will draw a very heavy sentence (CD). If both squeal, both will draw a moderate sentence (DD). Each prisoner's preference ordering is: DC > CC > DD > CD. If the prisoners expect to "play" only one time, each prisoner will be better off squealing than stonewalling, no matter what his partner chooses to do (DC > CC and DD > CD). The temptation of the rat payoff and fear of the sucker payoff will drive single-play Prisoners' Dilemmas toward mutual defection. Unfortunately, if both prisoners act on this reasoning, they will draw a moderate sentence on the major charge, while cooperation could have led to a light sentence on the minor charge (CC > DD).’

It can be assumed that the prisoners are The UK and Saudi Arabia. If they cooperate and do not tell on one another regarding the absurd policies they are following, then the judge (international community) will draw a light sentence of polite recrimination/criticism (behind closed doors). If the UK attacks Saudi policies (Boris Johnson’s attempt), and Saudi Arabia denies, the UK will be hailed before liberal forces (DC), and its accomplice will be shunned (CD) – similar to the USA-Iraq scenario years earlier. If they both recognise the faults in their policies, both will be criticized, but moderately (DD). So far, it seems that the agreement is on the CC scenario – a scenario which is ignoring the bloodshed, loss of lives, and shatter of heritage and sense of humanity. Destructive, euphemistic, selfish, and blind cooperation can lead to nothing but the prioritisation of the payoff.

To finish off, the foreign secretary stressed that there is no strong enough leadership in the countries (Middle East) themselves. Perhaps that is correct, and perhaps this extends to British leadership as well. In an excellent analogy, the Chicken game-theory best describes the options available. Oye, again, describes it best: ‘Chicken: Two drivers race down the center of a road from opposite directions. If one swerves and the other does not, then the first will suffer the stigma of being known as a chicken (CD) while the second will enjoy being known as a hero (DC). If neither swerves, both will suffer grievously in the ensuing collision (DD). If both swerve, damage to the reputation of each will be limited (CC). In single-play Chicken, the temptations of unilateral defection are balanced by fear of mutual defection’. Perhaps what is needed is that both the UK and Britain swerve in order to avoid catastrophe.

 

Now that would be mirific.

 

Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses And Strategies, KENNETH A. OYE, 1985.