Trade-Off?

      Well, we all heard about the random act of terrorism in Boston that left many innocent people injured and others dead. The perpetrators were identified as Muslim brothers who immigrated to the US from Dagestan. According to a Startfor analysis, terrorists such as the Dagestani brothers although not affiliated with organizations such as Al Qaeda and its main branches, they are "inspired" by its agenda, and independently - as grassroot movements - form  small cells that implement terrorist acts. Whether the attackers acted as per the indications of Al Qaeda leaderships - which are now opting for smaller attacks that create chaos and shake national stability and security- or they were acting independently to express frustration with US policies towards the Muslim world and the Palestinian plight is irrelevant to this article. What is relevant is the fact that the attackers are from the Caucasus...the troubled and troubling region in Russia's periphery.

    Putin made a statement on Thursday declaring the need for the US and Russia to work together to fight terrorism. These terrorists can be anywhere, and can threaten anyone. As we all saw, these Dagestani men were able to carry out an attack on US soil. Now the US and Russia want to work together to rid the world of such movements. Such a decision might have important implications on the current wave of political change in the Arab world, via concessions from both the US and Russia on the Syrian and Caucasus files.

    The US has long followed a policy of containing Russia, impairing its efforts from expanding and reestablishing itself as a Soviet power. Ensuring that former Soviet satellite states are well accommodated into the EU or are aligned with the US, and supporting western aligned states such as Georgia in confrontations with Russia, in addition to strengthening NATO presence are but some means to contain the Russian empire from reemerging. Conveniently enough for the US, chaos in the Caucasus ensure that Russia has its share of trouble in the immediate periphery, which is an important hurdle to any expansionist move to the west. 

      Now that Russia, as a permanent member in UNSC, vetoed any action against the Syrian regime, and the US is cornered as Al-Qaeda affiliated fighters are moving closer and closer to the Golan Heights (which means grave security threats to the Israeli depth), a stubborn Russia must be dealt with. Could it be that the US and Russia are reaching a trade-off? Can it be that Russia with will withdraw its veto in return for US "support" in clamping down on the Islamist separatist movements in the Caucasus? Will the US be ready to allow Russia to maneuver westward in return for abandoning Syria?

   Personally, I think that the attack (unfortunately) came at excellent timing. Americans will feel that they are targeted by not only Islamists emerging from Afghanistan and Pakistan,  but also from the region that has been long troubling Russia. Any cooperation with Russia in this area will be supported and justified. Should this reading be accurate, then the entire map in the region will soon change, and the international balance of power will start changing, tilting more perhaps to the heartland and its Russian sponsor. 

Nationalism or Patriotism?

      An interesting article published in Al Ghad newspaper two days ago reminded me of national songs we used to sing at the school assembly every morning. The writer contemplates patriotism, and its extreme manifestation in the Arab world, giving accurate examples that no Arab reader can deny. The writer raises questions about the deep love affair an Arab citizen has with his country, contrasting this unconditional love he or she has to offer with that of a citizen from a developed country. The writer's embarrassment with this exaggerated emotion perhaps drove him to declare that the nation is an unnecessary term for developed countries as it is one nostalgic term, used only when the country is threatened. Unlike the case of an Arab country, no one in Sweden would be shouting patriotic slogans in a demonstration. The writer stressed the need to redefine the concept of a "nation" in the Arab world, in a less romantic form, where instead of having the citizen fight and die for the patria, instead of being obliged to demonstrate his or her love to the mother land, and instead of offering all to his country, the state should be the one serving and protecting its citizens.

    Good. The writer obviously raises important points and draws excellent observations about Arab patriotism. Nonetheless, his ideas- albeit sharp and shrewdly sarcastic- bear some criticism.

       To start with, the writer uses the terms nationalism and patriotism interchangeably, whilst they are not the same concept. In the 19^th century, Lord Acton contrasted nationality and patriotism as affection and instinct vs. a moral relation. Nationality is “our connection with the race” that is “merely natural or physical,” while patriotism is the awareness of our moral duties to the political community (Acton 1972, 163). George Orwell contrasted the two in terms of aggressive vs. defensive attitudes. Nationalism is about power: its adherent wants to acquire as much power and prestige as possible for his nation, in which he submerges his individuality. While nationalism is accordingly aggressive, patriotism is defensive: it is a devotion to a particular place and a way of life one thinks best, but has no wish to impose on others (Orwell 1968, 362).  Nationalism raises questions about the concept of a nation or national identity and whether sovereignty entails the acquisition of full statehood with complete authority, while patriotism is related to loyalty to the political entity called the state.

    The Arab nation, that of common ancestry, history, and a set of cultural traits, is a romantic and nostalgic ideal that many Arabs long for. Whether to revive of the Islamic glory or to solve the state of underdevelopment, corruption and backwardness, the magical solution to many ordinary citizens and political activists is the establishment of a unified Arab nation-state.

      When citizens demonstrate in the street, expressing their love and valor to their country, what they are really calling out for is love for Arab nationalism. When the writer draws comparison between Sweden and an Arab country, for example Jordan, where in the former citizens find it unnecessary to hit high notes in national melodies on every other occasion, while in the latter citizens constantly remind their governments that they are willing to sacrifice their lives for their country, an element of threat was left out of the comparison. Whilst Sweden lives in complete and utter safety, Jordan (and other Arab states) is under constant threat of foreign domination or even annihilation. While Sweden houses the Swedish nation under its nation-state, Jordan houses a sub-national group imposed by western powers following World War I. Jordanians, identify themselves first as Arabs, then as Jordanians, and those further to the fundemental side, identify themselves as Muslims and then as Arabs. Segmenting a nation to separate and independent sub-nations should, and does, cause nostalgic and romantic longings by citizens.  And lastly, the historic development of Sweden and the peace it has long achieved explain the moderate patriotism it enjoys, while the constant state of war in the Arab world inflames feelings, whether religious feelings or patriotic feelings.

     Patriotism is most importantly expressed in a readiness to die and to kill for one's country. But a country is not a discernible collection of discernible individuals, it is rather an abstraction, a compound actual and imaginary ingredients. Therefore patriotism is a readiness to die and to kill for an abstraction. This abstraction, which might be viewed as highly irrational, constitutes an important component in an Arab citizen’s pride in his history, especially amidst the current state of backwardness that the nation is living in. This irrational romanticism of one’s patria cannot be solved, as the writer suggests, by creating modern, democratic and efficient state institutions that serve the citizens -and not the other way around only, but by addressing the core call of citizens: self-determination. Arab citizens, unlike their Swedish counterparts, have no say in determining the territorial demarcation of their nation. The French live in France, the Italians in Italy, the Spanish in Spain, they why not Arabs in Arabia? Why can Catalans demand their right of self determination while 350 million Arabs cannot? The sense of historic, moral, cultural and religious involvement between Arab citizens is tamed and controlled by governments, and the patriotic and nationalistic calls are but a reminder of the much longed for Arab solidarity.

     Extreme patriotism, and nationalism, do have their dangers, and might be immoral and outdated, and a tool to manipulate citizens and allow corruption and exploitation. Moderate patriotism and nationalism on the other hand are not uncritical, unconditional, or egocentric. What needs to be redefined, in my opinion, is not the concept of a nation or patria, but the intensity of nationalism and patriotism and the moral grounds they stand on. That will not and cannot be changed unless democracy prevails and the political culture matures. Only when citizens believe that they really have a say in the destiny of their country and the future of their nation would those inflamed feelings be quenched and rendered more moderate and rational.  

References

Acton, Lord (1972), “Nationality,” Essays on Freedom and Power, Gloucester: Peter Smith, 141–70.

Orwell, George (1968), “Notes on Nationalism,” Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters, Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (eds.), London: Secker & Warburg, vol. 3, 361–80.

Peace for War

        Interesting was the visit of Obama to the region, or perhaps the minimized region, where important allies sat together to agree on agreeing. Most interesting about Obama’s visit were the quite coincidental peace offering initiatives: ever so proud and victimized Israel, led by a grossly arrogant Netanyahu, apologized to Turkey for the Gaza flotilla incident.  Not only was the unprecedented Israeli apology a surprise, but Erdogan’s quick acceptance and instantaneous resumption of diplomatic relations after much rhetoric also raises eyebrows. Moreover, Jordan revisiting its conscience and accepting to keep its borders open to future Syrian refugees (of course the much publicized 200 million dollar aid package had an important role in that) is also intriguing, given the country’s dire economic conditions. And lastly, the most troublesome Kurdish Labor Party leader suddenly offered an olive branch of peace from his prison cell, renouncing violence and initiating a new peaceful relationship with the Turkish government.

      Examining these acts of peace, prior and during Obama’s visit, in which he adamantly stressed US protection to the Jewish democracy of Israel and its support to its small ally in any action in takes to protect its existence, is quite worrisome. The US has long been fed up with both Syria and Iran, and the world will soon be as well, if not already. The brutalities of the Syrian regime against its people, the well-studied Israeli propaganda against a fanatic Iran and the phobiazation of the Islamic movements and rule have indeed changed world view and understanding of the geopolitics of the region and charged the delicate emotions of world viewers.  Any strike and military action against the Syrian-Iranian allies would be widely justified by the world – not that any of that matters to the US or Israel, but for economic delicacies and rise of new world powers an umbrella of legitimacy would be wiser.

     Again, Obama’s reassurance of US support to the Israeli state against any existential threat, his visit to the Israeli dome missile system upon arrival, his urging of Netanyahu to make peace with the NATO member (which is conveniently opposed to the Syrian regime and a nuclear Iran) and his generous aid package to Jordan to take in more Syrians might be a strong indication of a war that will soon strike the region. Unifying the fronts and taking all on board is an important step before any engagement with the Syrian and Iranian regimes.

      The timing could not be more perfect; the gulf countries are waiting for an excuse to get rid of the Iranian threat and Saudi Arabia’s capture of the Iranian spy network is the cherry that topped the cake. Egypt, the Arab super power, is busy with fighting the massive media campaign and local public renouncement and violence against its Islamic government. The rest of the Arab world, if not attempting to quell any uprising, is then watching in careful silence. Turkey can now see internal peace and does not have to worry about a separatist Kurdish front or betrayal should war break. Israel has regained confidence in US support.

    The politics of the region will soon change; the interview with King Abdullah with the Atlantic, in which he criticized the Muslim Brotherhood and conservative tribal leaders, should be read in the general regional context. Change will happen, but it needs a preparatory phase…a phase of justification and clarification… a phase of peace and alliance building… a phase of closing old account and opening a new page… and a phase of sudden change in positions to explain future decisions and acts.

Guns and Moaners

       Karl Deutsch defined social mobilization as a process in which “old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior”. He suggested that political mobilization involves the induction of the socially uprooted into socially stable new patterns of behaviors and commitment, adding that among the most important results of the process of political mobilization are the increase in the number and membership of political organizations. 

       This transformation in the social values, expectations and orientation in Jordan - following the Arab Spring and its strengthening of the political culture - saw the engagement of people in political life, whether through voting, protesting, running for elections and forming/joining political parties. Jordan currently has 23 political parties and political activists were able to form 61 national lists running for elections. The parliament nowadays is experimenting active coalition formation, paving for future parliamentary governments. This societal change is impacting the political culture and establishment, but it is not clear how positive that is.

The parliament held a session on Wednesday, March 6^th to discuss the troubling issue of the surge in petroleum prices. While the Prime Minister was explaining to the MPs the reasons why the government decided to raise prices, he was constantly interrupted by members of the parliament protesting the decision and accusing the premier of corruption. The issue escalated despite the Prime Minister’s efforts to calm the protestors down and proceed with his speech, and minutes  later pro-government parliamentarians decided to take things with their pwn hands. Gun reaching, name calling and fist throwing were all but part of the scandalous session which ended without understanding why the government found no other solution but to raise the price of four fuel products. A session that was intended to brainstorm, to discuss innovative alternatives and examine all other possibilities to protect citizens from yet another surge in price ended in interruptions, accusations and physical confrontations.

Two issues stand out in this boxing ring:

1-      Political participation and awareness led to the election of new enthusiastic faces, who now feel free to criticize the government and its decisions without fear of persecution. Nonetheless, did this social upheaval and development cause genuine political elitism? Did it create a new well read, educated and sophisticated political class? The fact that a number of parliamentarians were outwardly protesting the rise in price, as if they we unaware of the economic crisis in the country, the strict World Bank fiscal obligations Jordan has to respect and the socio-economic constraints in the Kingdom, all of which limiting the acceptable alternatives, is simply embarrassing. Are our representatives completely ignorant of political and economic realities, and do they resort to moaning to gain popular support?

2-      Armed politicians.  Did the democratic wave and political freedom foresee the empowerment of tribesmen whose “issue settlement style” involves violence and gun pointing? Did Deutsch’s prophecy of social mobilization and political development fail when it came to our region? It saddens me that an insulting image was posted on facebook depicting the parliament as a barnyard (please see above caption). The societal change and quest for development should be followed by responsible political development. Joining a party, but running as an independent candidate and representing a constituency as an 8^th century tribal warrior were the unfortunate results of the political opening. This current state of political chaos might have serious consequences on any hope for genuine political freedom, democratic participation and popular engagement. Thank you fellow "guns and moaners", our expert pausers, for pressing the pause button with your gun-powdered fingers at each step towards political advancement and development .

Partidos Polítiicos...Michels y El Baath

El libro de Robert Michels Partidos Políticos ofreció un debate contemporáneo del movimiento social democrático y argumentó la relación entre la organización, burocracia, oligarquía y democracia.  Michels introdujo el término “Iron Law of Oligarchy” que estipula que todos los tipos de organizaciones se desarrollan con el tiempo a oligarquías. Esta ley incluye todos los niveles de la organización social, incluso el estado. Siendo un socialista su mismo, Michels criticó la realidad de los partidos socialistas en Europa, que aun tenían una ideología democrática y provisiones de participación ciudadana, parecen ser dominados por los lideres de estos partidos, igual que los partidos conservadores. Su conclusión es que el problema está en el fondo la naturaleza de la organización y la burocracia. Quien dice organización, dice oligarquía (Michels, 1968:241).

A pesar de la importancia de su libro en el análisis de los partidos socialistas, su organización, su liderazgo, su transformación  y su manifestación en la administración, había críticas de sus conclusiones y su análisis del tema. Este trabajo intenta demostrar unas críticas – bien validas – de las ideas de Michels, pero también va a demonstrar la validez de sus argumentos en un estudio de caso en la segunda parte.

Hands (1971) explica que en contrario de lo que propone Michels sobre el desarrollo de los lideres en los partidos políticos – los cuales surgen tras la delegación de responsabilidades y especialización a ellos-  los partidos nacen por elites o agitadores profesionales, no al revés. Por otra parte, la explicación de Michels (1968: 240) que la especialización técnica  (junto con habilidad política) de estos líderes políticos fortalece la posición de estos elites, quien convierten con tiempo a lideres profesionales, estables e indispensable y quien con tiempo emancipan sus mismos de las masas y se convierten más independientes de su control, está cuestionada por Hands, quien dijo que la profundidad de la experiencia y especialización de los lideres es inversamente proporcional a su amplitud, y que cualquier tipo de ejercicio de poder de estos líderes expertos depende a la estructura de la organización (Hands 1971: 165).  Por último, Hands (1971: 156) crítica el hecho que Michels no distinga muy bien el concepto de un partido democrático desde su objetivo de formar un estado democrático y en el otro sentido de disfrutar una estructura democrática interna, y tampoco menciona la posibilidad que la democracia al nivel estatal puede lograrse tras una competición entre unos partidos internamente no democráticos.

May (1965: 421) también indica que cuando Michels explica que la presencia de la organización es incompatible con la presencia de democracia, su proposición es inatacable siempre cuando se cumple dos consideraciones: (a) que la proposición pertenece a la accesibilidad de la democracia pura o la igualdad absoluta y (b) que la oligarquía no significa la antesis de la democracia, sino una condición ocupando el sitio entre la democracia pura y la autocracia pura. Añada que Michels no demuestra que el incremento en la organización causa cambios anti-democráticos, sino que la organización no es compatible con el mantenimiento de la democracia absoluta (May, 1965).

Teniendo las observaciones de Michels en su libro Partidos Políticos, y las críticas mencionadas arriba, se refiere ahora en la segunda parte del trabajo a las revoluciones socialistas en el mundo árabe en el siglo XX, particularmente el caso de Siria en los años cincuenta.

El partido de Baath de Siria ha evolucionado de un movimiento nacionalista a una organización vasta que infiltró a todos los aspectos de la vida pública. El partido fue formado en 1947  y sus eslóganes son “unidad, libertad y socialismo”. El partido tenía éxito al nivel nacional y regional, especialmente entre los activistas árabes de pensamiento pan árabe, contra los gobiernos árabes respaldados por el occidente. A pesar de los varios golpes militares  desde los 50 hasta los 70 y la disolución del partido (tras la unión con Egipto entre 1958-1961) los Baathis llegaron a poder permanente debajo de Hafez Al Assad en 1970. Cuando Al Assad llegó al poder, el partido convirtió a un instrumento para promocionar lealtad y fue utilizado para controlar el gobierno, el ejército y los servicios de seguridad. Sin embargo, la división entre los grupos del partido incrementó con diferencias irreconocibles, lo que resultó en la decisión de Assad de condenar unos  líderes de estos grupos disidentes a la muerte. En 1973, la constitución de Siria fue modificada para dar el partido de Baath el estatus de “líder del estado y la sociedad”, preparándose para enterar a todos los aspectos de la vida pública. Los otros partidos legales en el país fueron del Frente Nacional Progresiva, una alianza de los y de izquierda, partidarios del gobierno (nacionalistas y de la izquierda) que aceptó "el papel dirigente" del partido Baath.

El control del partido de Baath aumentó con el tiempo, incluyendo todos los aspectos de la administración, desde los sindicales hacia los colegios. En 1981, 375,000 se unieron al partido; en 2001, el número aumentó a 1,2 millones, casi 10% de la población. El partido sigue influyente, pero el poder está concentrado en el Presidente Bashar Al Assad y su círculo intimo de familia y amigos. Incluso después de las protestas en 2011 y el cambio en la ley electoral, las elecciones en Mayo 2012 vieron la elección de partidos a favor del gobierno. Los Principales órganos de la dirigencia partidista, la Comandancia Regional y el Comando Nacional, se han mantenido firmemente leales a Bashar al-Assad (BBC).

Tomando las observaciones de Michels, el caso de Siria y la evolución del partido en Siria confirman unas de las observaciones de Michels.  El poder de esta oligarquía creció en Siria, especialmente después de 1971; el partido Baath contribuyó en la cohesión de un monopolio de clase del poder, y por lo tanto la cohesión del régimen Sirio en sí. El partido Baath es una organización política totalitaria de hierro, controlando el sistema político, de que se originó. El régimen en Siria y el partido son la misma cosa: la única diferencia es que el partido es más amplio que el régimen y por lo tanto lo absorbe. Esta relación entre el partido y el régimen convirtió que el parte (régimen) se caracteriza con el total (el partido de Baath) en respeto de su exhaustividad. No hay ninguna organización, actividad, movimiento comercial,  religioso, asociación deportiva sin relación con el Baath.

Lo que es interesante es que la revolución (y los siguientes golpes) intentaron lograr democracia, equidad económica y libertad de la nación del control de los regímenes apoyados por el mundo occidente y del control de las elites de la economía. La revolución socialista tenía su éxito en Siria y en la región, con la ciudadanía poniendo aspiraciones para una unión árabe nacionalista y un sistema democrático e igualdad social.  Sin embargo, lo que pasó después era la manifestación de las observaciones de Michels de la oligarquía en los partidos políticos, y la desaparición de las ideas revolucionarias y el efecto de la organización a la democracia. Los líderes de Baath, principalmente el presidente y sus ministros, asumieron más poderes y se alejaron no solamente de la ciudadanía, pero también de los miembros del partido, que actuaba con alta lealtad y obediencia en un sistema extremadamente burocrático. En sus intentos desesperados por aferrarse al poder, se volvieron más represivos que nunca, incluso renuente a considerar la introducción de reformas democráticas. Michels (1968: 219) nota que la organización de partidos significa una aspiración de un número grande de miembros, y que el parlamentarismo significa las aspiraciones el número más grande de votos, añadiendo que el partido político moderno en una organización de la masa electoral. Esta observación refleja la situación en Siria desde los 70 hasta hoy en día.

Además, un punto importante que Michels menciona es que la organización política conduce al poder, pero el poder es siempre conservador (Michels, 1968: 218). Si comparamos esta observación con el caso de Siria, aún existe muchos ejemplos para verificar la validez de esta observación, como la posición del régimen Sirio, liderado por Assad padre o Assad hijo, sobre la ocupación Israelí del Golán. Mientras el Baath vino con eslóganes de libertad y la nación árabe de la influencia de los países europeos y la ocupación Sionista de Palestina, el partido no entró en guerra ni intentó entrar en un enfrentamiento directo con Israel sobre este tema desde los años 70. El partido, que supuestamente logra el apoya de la mayoría de los Sirios, no ofrece más que retorico para los Sirios en este asunto. Esto también refleja el punto de Michels (1968: 221) que en el nombre de las grandes responsabilidades relacionadas con su posición, el partido político ahora repudia el antimilitarismo, rechaza la huelga general, y niega todas las audacias lógicas de su pasado.

Por otra parte, la centralización del partido a base de los principios de autoridad y disciplina, que caracterizan la organización del estado, y lo que resulta en el partido organizándose como un mini estado (Michels, 1968: 220) también es evidente en el caso del partido Baath, donde los Assads centralizaron todo el poder y lo delegaron a su círculo oligárquico intimo, donde la jerarquía del estado y las limitaciones del poder están presente en el partido mismo.

El punto de Michels que cada nuevo oficial, cada nuevo secretario contratado por el partido es en teoría es un nuevo agente de la revolución (Michels, 1968: 220)  también refleja la realidad en Siria. Tal como he mencionado arriba, el número creciente de los miembros de este partido  y su infiltración a cada aspecto en la vida política y social en Siria convirtieron los miembros a agentes leales y protectores del partido, el régimen y la oligarquía controlándolo. Es especialmente interesante la posición de los nuevos miembros, estos miembros que no han vivido en la época revolucionaria de los años 50, y que aceptan por defecto los eslóganes socialistas revolucionarias del partido cuya manifestación real es inexistente.

También es válido el comentario de Michels que el término partido supone  la existencia de una dirección de voluntad para un objetivo común y cuando esto es ausente, el partido se convierte a una organización (Michels, 1968: 225). El partido en Siria perdió su impulso revolucionario,  limitándole a un retorico repetitivo. Los objetivos del partido (democracia, igualdad económica, cooperación pan-árabe, anti-Sionismo), han desaparecido de la agenda practica.

Otro punto de interés que Michels menciona es en el contexto del orden social marxista (Michels, 1968: 228)  es la pregunta si tal como los miembros de las clases capitalistas tienen en instinto de transmitir la herencia a sus hijos, los administradores de la riqueza del estado socialista van a utilizar su influencia para garantizar a sus hijos la sucesión a las oficinas que se mantengan. En el caso de Siria, Assad hijo heredó la presidencia de su padre, y aseguró que todos los altos puestos en el país, de inteligencia a ejercito, sean controlados por miembros de su familia.

El argumento de Michels en que  el proletario moderno, influido por los lideres intelectuales y superiores de las masas, quien creen que  con su voto en las elecciones puede asegurar su participación en el poder (Michels, 1968: 241), no exactamente refleja la realidad Siria en mi opinión de hoy en día (manifestado por la revolución popular contra la dictadura y oligarquía Siria). Sin embargo, este comentario en mi opinión, sí que reflejaba la euforia Siria - y árabe en general- cuando se formó el partido, cuando entró en una unión en egipcio, y cuando prometió en los años setenta la liberación de los territorios ocupados Sirios y Palestinos y de la formación de una economía industrial moderna.

Para concluir, y volviendo a las críticas de el trabajo de Michels, es cierto que en el caso de Sirria los líderes del partido galvanizaron el apoyo popular y a través de ellos nació el partido, y que la especialización de los líderes del partido está inversamente proporcional con su extensión, pero el partido Baath aseguró que todas los puestos claves del país (requiriendo más especialización) sean cubiertos por familiares. El punto mencionado arriba por Hands sobre la ausencia de democracia interna del partido puede lograr democracia externa en el estado pudiera haber sido una realidad en Siria si las circunstancias nacionales y regionales fueron diferentes. Desafortunadamente, lo que resultó fue una oligarquía que gobernó con hierro por los últimos 4 décadas. Tal como May dijo (1965: 421), la oligarquía puede significar el sitio entre la democracia pura y la autocracia pura. Por lastima,  no es en el caso Sirio.

Ahora que el país está viviendo otra revolución, se debe recordar la historia moderan de Siria y la consecuencia de los movimientos populares. Se observa que los mismos eslóganes utilizados en los cincuenta están apareciendo, y es un poco alarmante si la crítica de de Michels de la teoría de Pareto sobre la circulación des élites  en que los elites no se reemplazan por nuevos elites, sino es un proceso continuo de entremezcle entre los elementos antiguos quien atraen y absorban los nuevos elementos (Michels, 1968: 225). Si las figuras del partido Baath y el régimen que representa mantienen su popularidad después de la caída del régimen (lo mismo que pasó en Egipto en las elecciones de 2012 cuando el primer ministro del antiguo régimen derrocado llegó segundo en las elecciones), y lo que cambiará es solamente unas figuras nada más, no se puede esperar ningún cambio radical en el país, ni en retorico ni en lo práctico.

 

Referencias

BBC (2012) Profile: Syria's ruling Baath Party, 9 July, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755

Hands, G. (1971) Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties, British Journal of Political Science, vol.1, no.2, April,   pp 155-172, published online on January 27 2009. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400009029

May, J. D (1965) Democracy, Organization, Michels, The American Political Science Review, vol. 59, no. 2, June, pp. 417-429. American Political Science Association. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953059 Accessed: 07/07/2008 11:30

Michels, R. (1968) Political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy, 2 ed. New York: Free Press (translated by Eden and Cedar Paul)

What Syria?

       The new chairman of the Jordanian parliament who formerly served as Minister of Interior and Deputy Prime Minister answered the following when asked about possible reconciliation steps between Damascus and Jordan and intelligence cooperation: "as far as I know, Jordan does not interfere in Syrian territories in any form, and Jordan’s role is to protect its security and citizen well-being, with a clear decision from the very beginning of a policy of non-interference".

      Assuming that a high-level figure such as the former Minister of Interior/Deputy Prime Minster is indeed kept in the dark about a major security crisis occurring 300 km away from Amman, the neutrality and passiveness in his response still struck a chord. What does it mean to follow a policy of non-interference? Is this is civil disaster occurring in a Latin American country with which Jordan has no historic, cultural, economic and  political ties? Is the destiny of the Syrian nation, a nation with whom we-Jordanians-share a history, a religion, a culture and a language, a matter out of our realm of interest? Or are we promoting extreme acts of respect towards national sovereignty?

      When thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin called for sovereignty of states, their governments and their citizens against the intervention and attacks of neighboring regions, their call was meant to establish peace. The intention and drive was to ensure that nations live peacefully side by side, respecting each others’ boundaries and rules. Experts as we are in the Arab world in transforming ideals and slogans into tools of control, molding them to suite the tastes and interests of political elites, we have managed again to interpret sovereignty as an abstract concept, applied strictly as has been theorized. We voided it from any humanistic perspective and moral obligation.

     The neutrality towards the Syrian crisis is an embarrassment and a disgrace to political integrity. Pointing rifles and canons towards the Syrian regime or the revolutionists or both is not what is being requested; what is is a position of compassion, indignation and rejection of what is happening. An active, responsible and inclusive position is what should be expected. A position of apathy and political shrewdness to ensure the protection and security of one group of people while the other group suffers is an embarrassing one.

     To conclude, Turkish rhetoric about what is happening in Syria is void rhetoric, but it is a lesser evil. So pretty please dear Excellencies, when asked about what the government is doing about a humanitarian catastrophe just across the border, do not fake ignorance and do lie for compassion’s sake.

American Flag

An article posted in the Washington Post eloquently titled “The day the American flag was shown unmolested in Iran” is in no way void of cynicism. The poetic depiction at the end of the article of an American flag displayed in the ever so radical and fundamentalist Iran, on the occasion of the Wrestling World Cup held in Tehran, must have raised eyebrows amongst non western readers, mine at least.

Why is the American flag not the most popular flag in the Middle East? A quick review of historic events may clear the enigma: instigation of a 10 year war between two neighbors; a war on Iraq that left the country in shatters; an embargo on Syrian economy and society; demonization of Islamic groups and thought; support and then persecution of militant groups in Afghanistan; an intended stalemate of any peace deal in the holy lands; reckless killing of Yemeni citizens by foreign military planes; and support to oppressive, authoritarian and proxy regimes, all are the works of US administrations throughout the past 40 years. Why the American flag is not hung on the balcony of each Iranian house should therefore not come as a surprise.

Iran’s historic ties with its neighbours have passed through good and bad times, just like every other nation on the face of the planet. Europe was not an oasis of happy friendly relations between neighboring countries until relatively recently, and neither was that the case in countries with border disputes. The difference between these scenarios and that of Iran is the international campaign against Iran, depicting Persia as the bogyman, directly threatening the interests and security of fellow Arab and Jewish neighbours (use of Jewish is intentional as the Israeli state identifies itself based on religious affiliation). Ganging up against the country, as billion dollar arms deals in gulf countries are being sealed for protection against potential invasions, as Israeli generals are rallying for strikes, as Shiite Islam is becoming portrayed as a perilous invading ideology, and as the history of the country and its culture are being reduced to a veil, a beard and a nuclear weapon, all contribute to maintaining animosity and suspicion between Iran and its neighbours. Why the American flag is not welcome in the country is perhaps related to the former's administration non-waning efforts to westernize the country and its non discreet frustration towards an Iran that refuses to succumb and offer its sovereignty on a silver plate.

Reminiscence of the shah days in Iran, where the country enjoyed pro-western ties and a culture accepted by the west and reflective of its norms should not come at the expense of the modern realities, beliefs and orientations of the Iranian public. Whether the regime and its electors choose what the west views as an outdated, retarded ideologically restrictive system or a more liberal and modern system is a matter exclusive to the Iranian people only. Designing and marketing scenarios where Iran is pointing guns and bombs towards the world is not the way to go about changing the regime and its intellectual basis.

Engagement with this Persian power is a necessity for the tranquility and peace of the region as a whole.  The politics of polarization, accusation and intimidation are not bearing any results, nor are constant reminiscences of a happier past changing the stance of either sides. To conclude, I believe that instead of posting sentimental articles that long for peaceful relations between the near east and west, more articles and opinions should be voiced, demanding serious steps and measures to restore whatever dignity is left amongst the Arab public and concrete plans to assist the region to develop politically, culturally, socially and economically at its own pace and within its own beliefs and ideals.