Ich bin nicht aus Zucker

An article published in the Economist on 30 June had this opening line “Ask some Germans how people should react to terrorism and most would probably agree with the historian Herfried Münkler that the best attitude is heroische Gelassenheit: heroic calmness. Let other countries declare wars on terrorism and near-permanent states of emergency, they say; Germany’s dark history has taught it not to over-react”.

Yes, Germany had a dark history, and a share of misery, poverty, and war, coupled with an arduous and constant effort to redeem itself for mistakes created by long gone political brutes, cladded in ideological uniforms of scientific rationalism. Nonetheless, Germans realised that history must serve a purpose, and that purpose is to learn how to shape, control, and direct actions in an effective, efficient, and intelligent manner in order to achieve the desired objectives.

When the entire world expected a fuming Angela Merkel to step up on a pedestal and read, in passionate and heated German, that the nation will not succumb to terrorists who will be easily crushed under German boots, the silence of the German leader stunned the zealous audience. No, we will not crush anyone under our boots, nor impose collective punishment. We will not condole those who we love and owed to protect and who lost those they loved and vowed to protect with a promise to hunt the perpetrators and their accomplices like dogs.

Meanwhile, speeches made by Middle Easter leaders failed to resemble in any shape or form the level-mindedness of their German counterpart. Promises by Turkish leaders to impose “the strictest procedures ever established to counter terrorists”, the Afghani promise to “bury the terrorists with our vengeance”, the Chechen leader’s wishful plan of “selecting the best 2000 Chechen fighters to abolish and diminish all ISIS affiliates in street fight”, and the Iraqi calls for “galvanizing the powers of the fighters and heroic mujahideen” all sound similar to the much familiar promises of medieval rhetoric to stir passions. Many are the times that we read articles in Arabic newspapers which start off with calls to crush the enemy, smother them in their sleep, turn their weapons against them, wipe them off the face of the earth, mobilise the thirsty-for-justice young freedom fighters…the list of ardent cliché phrases goes on.

It is true that the Middle East’s share of terrorism is much higher than that of Europe, and that desperate measures are necessary in certain conditions. However, for a nation that has been mired with war and unrest since the early 1920s, would it be the wisest decision to foment feelings and desires of vengeance through rhetorical and inflamed speeches? Is a hubristic assumption that eradicating wrong-doing can and must come at the expense of humanity and reason? Is the Arab/Muslim nation so fragile that it cannot deal with misery other than a through a mindless urge and call for vengeance? Do leaders assume that by inflaming the passionate streets, the problems of radicalism, terrorism and fanaticism are solved? Are we that fragile to the attractive and luring choice of blind outrageous vendetta?

The German saying of ‘We are not made out of sugar’ must resonate better with us. Perhaps for a religious community, we can change the proverb into salt to assimilate Lot’s story and his turned-into-a pillar-of -salt wife, who probably dissolved when it was pouring acid rain. No, we will not dissolve into a container of hatred and vengeance because of drop of rain or a hurricane. We are neither made out of sugar nor salt.

Those Little Devilish Details

On Friday, the first British Airways airplane landed in Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran, following years of estrangement between Heathrow and Imam Khomeini. The move represents an act of goodwill and indication of the renewal of relations between the UK and Iran. The Airlines indicated that they will work on increasing the number of flights to six a week: doubting that Iran will serve as a mere alternative for English tourists to an upset Spain (following the divorce from the EU), the increase in flights is a reconfirmation that water is under the bridge...or clouds under the aircraft?

Press TV (Iranian official news portal) was quick to announce the news, citing that “the flagship British carrier has described the Iranian capital as “an important destination” for the airline”, and that “British Airways announced in June that it had postponed the long-awaited resumption of its flights to Iran due to “some technical issues.” The article concludes with “Air France also resumed Paris-Tehran flights in April after an eight-year break”.

Western cosying up to Iran after last summer’s nuclear deal does not come as news: talks, missions, correspondence, involvement in peace scenarios, and genuine engagement with the Persian state have multiplied. Indeed, at this very moment (afternoon of September 4th), the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Stephen O’Brien, is holding talks in Tehran with a senior adviser to Leader of the Islamic Revolution (Ali Akbar Velayati) who confirmed that “The Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to help the United Nations alleviate the suffering of people in the crisis-hit countries through whatever means and approaches”. Iran has marked its place in the political map of diplomacy; it is now time for the real deal: the details of every day life.

The Guardian also reported on the flight resumption news in a shy two-paragraph article, explaining that “British Airways described the Iranian capital as an important destination for the airline”, and concluded in a similar manner to that of Press TV, reminding readers of France’s flights to Iran resumed in April.

Iran is right to celebrate the return of British airplanes to its lands. Planes carry entrepreneurs, artists, writers, tourists, scholars, scientists, activists, romantics, and explorers. Iran’s re-integration into the world cannot be limited to the political sphere and locked inside the walls of UN halls and diplomatic cocktails. For the Iranian regime to be accepted as it is, and welcomed to the international community, every aspect of the Persian way of life is to be explored, experienced, and perhaps accepted.

In its elegant parlance and loathe to verbosity, Iranian media reminded the world that it has indeed achieved an important objective: building real bridges with the world through virtual air lanes. Perhaps a picture of a British couple enjoying a Fesenjan (Pomegranate Walnut Stew) is all that will be needed to welcome Iran back with arms wide open.

Win - Win

Elections in Jordan are due on September 20^th  - anyone driving down a Jordanian street will notice the dozens of posters hanging on electrical poles, which blaze with flaring slogans and ambitious, one-line promises that would bring peace, equality, democracy, prosperity, and justice to the country and its citizens. Candidates are grouping in national lists and are harmonising their programmes and electoral promises. Under the new Election Law, promulgated in 2016, which introduced a proportional system based on open-lists, candidates are no longer subject to the limitations imposed on them by the former system of “single un-transferable vote”, imposed since 1992.

The new Election Law has been praised as a step towards political development and party involvement. The scope of this article is not meant to analyse the law – which in no way empowers parties – but to discuss what the new elected parliament can do when elected in September.

Back to the slogans. Irrespective of the agendas and programmes of the candidates (independent or partisan), the soon-to-be member of parliament (MP) has one of the two goals (or both, or none): live up to the promises made to the electorate which were made through the numerous speeches/banners/interviews/lunch feasts, or appease the government and support its policies, which would require strict and blind support to anything proposed by the government/palace. Some might try to do both, but their credibility by both the street and the regime will be jeopardised. Some might do neither, and no one will notice.

Under these two potential behavioural scenarios, the question to ask is the following: how can MPs demonstrate that they are pushing for policies which emanate from street-petitions or those which are government-designed?

Friedrich (1937) referred to the ‘rule of anticipated reactions’, whereby one actor shapes their behaviour to conform to what they believe are the desires of another. This means that MPs usually change their behaviour and demonstrate that they are conforming to the desire of the government or the street, and attempt – at the same time- that somewhere in the middle, MPs are exercising some influence. It should be noted, as Benton and Russell (2009) argue, that “Influence is also associated with the perception of relevant actors; this is sensitive to anticipated reactions, but may conflate reputation for influence and actual influence”. They also propose that ‘there is no “Parliament”, in a collective sense, at all’.  This means that it all boils down to the behaviour of a group of MPs during the tenancy of the parliament and how they demonstrate their influence to either the street or the government, irrespective of its level, strength, and credibility.

In light of the fact that party representation will be minimal in the upcoming parliament (not to break habit), MPs who actually want to influence policy or take part in policy making (irrespective of who this policy serves) must attempt to act collectively and portray an image of unity before the street and the government. Parliamentary blocks might be a good starting place, but given their history of continuous break-ups and disaccords, MPs must think of a new mechanism to show the street that they are indeed fighting for policies, or to show the government that they can obstruct, influence or facilitate policy making.

Ambitious and unrealistic as this proposal might be, a demonstration of power might be indeed be achievable through the following: the parliament can be divided into two opposing powers. On one side, there is a clear group of MPs who support the government’s policies but can obstruct it should the government not yield to certain demands. This will keep the government in check. One the other side, there is a clear and semi-cohesive group which does not necessarily need to portray opposition, but to represent the general demands of their electorate. This group must portray to the street that they do exercise influence over policies and that it can change the course of events based on the street’s demands.

In both cases, one side will win, and it is clear which side it is. But this is not a zero-sum scenario: the fact that the one side lost indicates to the street that there was indeed a battle, and to the government that the battle was one thanks to the support of the loyal half of the parliament. What is being proposed here is not a reinvention of the wheel: it is merely the way that the Westminster Parliament functions. Despite the fact that the electoral system has changed and that the party system is different, Jordanian MPs can apply this system to their parliament if they ever want to get ahead in the realms of policy making.

Irrespective of the differences between the various political currents and ideologies that will be represented in the parliament, there is one common notion that binds all MPs: survival depends on strength, and strength must be demonstrated. Should the elected representatives not learn how to “perform” in parliament and reveal to the public and to the government that they can actually shape and influence policy in the Kingdom, the political scene in Jordan will forever remain trapped within the glorification of one’s personal attributes concealed behind a loyal disposition to abide or to sulk.

Short Story

A short story written a while back that depicts immigrants’ suffering. A heartfelt gratitude, appreciation and admiration to selfless souls in Spain and elsewhere in Europe who countered migration policies with humanitarian sensibility. Claudia Moya, you are meant here in particular.

The Roman Citadel held on but had to fall, and she had nowhere to hide at all. Over the cracked Greek stairs she was forced to crawl, until she reached the Phoenician quay on all four. She anchored her hopes to the boat and to the handler to whom she was in thrall, carrying within the child she wishes would never be born. Marooned in the deep blue sea she prayed for a god to save her soul, but her screams were much too stout for her weakened jowl. Watching the faces fade under the water while the waves roared, she clenched her nails into the rubber boat that was all torn. The sun at last shone and warmed her soaked bones, and fate did smile when she reached the old land of the Moors. With beauty and peace her heart did soar, and did not understand why they were calling her back to the shore. “In a village of La Mancha, the name of which I do not wish to recall, our fate would have been different my dear boy” she sobbed as her child snored.

A boy touches his crying father during a Nov. 19 protest by angry migrants from Pakistan and Morocco who blocked a section of the Greece-Macedonia border after Macedonia began granting entry only to refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. (CNS photo/Georgi Licovski, EPA)

Oh My Veil

Ellen DeGeneres made TV history in 1997 when her character on her sitcom “Ellen” revealed she was gay. The disclosure of her sexual preference drew many oohs and aaahs, and despite being hailed as courageous and transparent by some, her show did suffer, and so did her reputation as a comedian. Instead of being recognised as an artist with an incredible sense of humour and admirable creativity, Ellen was known as the “gay, short haired comedian”. In fact, the “Ellen” show lost some audience, and was even banned in some conservative countries (it was no longer aired on Jordan TV for instance).  Nearly twenty years later, people still refer to her as such.

What was considered as controversial back in the nineties has now become common, if not predictable, news. It is no longer a shocker. What is considered as such is the decision of western citizens to embrace Islam as a religion.

Reading the English version of El Pais newspaper last night, the first article that was posted on the daily’s page was a story about a Madrilenian young lady who works at a fast food restaurant, and whose decision to convert to Islam won her the star story of the leftist newspaper. No, the ISIL was not the opening story, not the stagnating economy, not the high unemployment rates, nor the lack of government formation for the second cycle in a row. It was about a girl who decided to convert to Islam.

The story starts off with a photograph of a young scarf-wearing woman, draped in dark and loose garments, and sitting in a dark room, whilst gazing outside a window. It must be underlined however that the girl does not actually wear a hijab in her everyday life (for professional and cultural/social reasons). Nonetheless, the writer decided to depict the convert’s appearance in a shabby attire, and mention the Islamic hijab and traditional wardrobe (or what is perceived as such) a total of nine times in the article.

It is fully understood that the radicalisation and the Islamisation of the western society is a threat to the Western-way-of life: such threat ranges from a mere distortion of cultural values to a real and dangerous threat to national security. Not only are young Europeans affiliating to the notorious ISIL and embarking on journeys to fight alongside the other mujahedeen in Syria and Iraq, but many of these brainwashed and fundementalised youth are taking part in internal attacks and plots against their own citizens. Watching out for such cases is empirical if this phenomenon or radicalisation is to be stopped; in the same vein, reporting on such cases and disseminating information on such incidents is enlightening and constructive. Nonetheless, the story being referred to in this article makes no connection between the girl’s decision to convert and the pressing socio-political realities that must be addressed, begging the question of “what is the whole point behind the article?”

Should the article intend to portray a more peaceful and tolerant face of Islam- an Islam which the West can live with and can be tolerated, then perhaps mentioning the word Hijab for nine times, the reference to the probable reprehension, the insistence on the web of secrets that must be woven, the emphasis on the cultural judgement, and the reminder of the inability to voice one’s own decision to embrace a doctrine or a theological line of understanding of the world within a liberal and a democratic society, renders the entire article pointless.

Why was not the girl pictured out with her friends having fun? What was she not seen having dinner with her boyfriend’s family? Why did she not talk about her understanding of Islam and the way she lives it and integrates it in her every day routine? Where is the part that talks about the ideological grounds, upon which a young European living in an increasing agonistic society, which might shed some light on a religion that is feared by many? Fortuitous is that all stories on converts follow the same logic of “garments, coming out, and oh my God the society will shun me?”

Every article, every piece of writing, and every scribbled notion must deliver a message or present an argument. What the El Pais article failed to do is to associate the story with a message; what it succeeded in doing is entrenching the idea that the Muslim community in Spain and elsewhere in Europe is destined to be culturally distinct, closed up, disassociated from the European way of life, and a constant potential threat to liberal ideas and women’s rights. Practising Muslims in Spain might always feel as cultural aliens – and reporters sympathising with this reality might only be unknowingly ameliorating such cultural separation. Muslim women will always be veiled...Muslim men will always be bearded, and Ellen will always be gay. It does not matter whether you are a doctor, a comedian, a teacher, or a fast-food restaurant waiter... thou shall always manifest the cliché.

Picture copied from the Huffington Post : 9/11 Ten Years Later: Muslim Women, Organizations Work To Fight Discrimination

Power and Influence, Horse and Wagon

                    'It is easier to fight for one's principles than to live up to them.' Alfred Adler

Inspiration, I recently learned, can be sought from people. Submerged in life’s demands and race with time, I failed to be inspired to re-take up my blog and share my notions, which have sometimes resonated with a few former followers (who probably and rightfully deserted the blog). However, and following a thought-provoking conversation with a work colleague who shared valuable and genuine insights on life experiences, I was prompted to ponder deeper into one particular observation and link it to present day political developments.

The discerning comment raised by that colleague (to whom I am grateful) during a lustrous lunch conversation was one related to the ease of shifting the minds and hearts of a nation that learned to believe, in all its passions, that ideology dictates every aspect of one’s life. He recalled from his childhood that the iniquitous capitalist system that has been long scorned during Communist regimes was suddenly hailed as the liberating force which freed nations from economic and intellectual enslavement. The powerful American doctrine with its liberal and neoliberal slogans influenced the minds of millions in a year that might just as well serve as historical breaking point.

History seems to repeat itself in that sense, where a game of influence vs. power is shifting realities in the troubled Middle East. A deal that is being brokered between the USA and Russia to set up a joint implementing group, which would facilitate the exchange of intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against the Islamic State and the Nusra Front in Syria, is a hubristic indication of the approaching winds of change. Suddenly, Russia has become a solution rather than a problem to the Syrian crisis, and soon enough, Al Assad regime will follow suit. The rhetoric regarding the butcheries orchestrated by the regime will gradually become “wrist slaps”, and the devilish features of the regime will be elegantly clad in a victimised “I had no other option” angelic robe.

The slow but steady approach followed by the Russians in their policy towards Syria must be commended. Giving Americans what they want (power), while maintaining what really matters (influence) stands testimony to the veteran ingeniousness behind Russia’s foreign policy.

Mokken and Stokman (1989:46 cit. by Kim, 2013:9) explained that “power is the capacity of actors to fix or to change a set of actions or choice alternatives for other actors, and influence is the capacity of actors to determine partly the actions or choices of other actors within the set of actions, or choice alternatives available to those actors”.  Meanwhile, Zimmerling (2005: 141,cit. by Kim, 2013:9)  defined power as “the ability to get desired outcomes by making others do what one wants, and influence as the ability to affect others’ beliefs, that is, their opinions about what ought be the case or what is right or wrong/desirable or undesirable.

What seems to be the case at the moment is that Russia is feeding America’s insatiable hunger for power – something it is doing by influencing the US foreign policy. Perhaps the US is in a position to enforce what it wants to enforce in Syria and carry out as many attacks as it wishes. However, this power is limited to what Russia is offering: limited options and limited targets under the umbrella of cooperation. Furthermore, Russian influence is extending beyond the traditional allies and expanding to other realms: what might have sounded as outrageous in the past (Assad regime intact), does not necessarily sound that outrageous any more. The belief system of many regimes and their nations is under the influence of the ex-Soviet power, and might be soon subject to its power, at least in the scope of Middle Eastern policy.

This article does not suggest that Al Assad will be hailed by western governments as the saviour of the Arab world from the ISIS wrath, but it proposes that he will indeed be tolerated. To influence people, beliefs must be addressed: if people believe that only limited solutions are available, and that these solutions necessarily include maintaining the current regime, then the  newly introduced and accepted capitalist and democratic system in a post-Communist region, is no different than maintaining an autocratic, yet stable system in a post-ISIS region.

References

• Kim, J. (2013) Conceptualising Influence and Power of EU Agencies in European Policy Making, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
• Mokken, R. and Stokman, F. (1989) Power and Influence as Political Phenomena, in Barry B. (ed.) Democracy, Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory (pp.33-54), Oxford, Clarendon Press.
• Zimmerling, R. (2005) Influence and Power, Dordrecht, Springer.

Iran’s Nuclear Deal: Summary

1.   Preview

The Islamic Republic of Iran celebrated a momentous event on the 14^th of July with the signature of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that will lift the economic sanctions imposed on the country and reintegrate it back into the international community. The deal has been described as historic and unprecedented, ending a 12 year standoff between the West and Iran and opening a new page in relations. The agreement came after twenty months of intensive negotiations between the six world powers, the EU and Iran, and was heralded as an achievement for all parties. Nonetheless, the deal has alarmed and confused key players in the region, considering the political, economic and geopolitical repercussions of the concluded agreement.

Iran’s controversial nuclear programme has long drawn international condemnation, fueled by Israel’s warning of Iran’s nuclear capacities that would place a nuclear bomb in the hands of a radical state. These fears were further amplified by Tehran’s references to the annihilation of Israel and its ties with radical and destabilising forces in the region, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. These preoccupations regarding a nuclear Iran were also shared by Gulf countries whose historic confrontation with Iran and whose fears regarding the latter’s ideological dominance over Shiite groups led to a regional recognition on the need to de-nuclearise and contain Iran. The USA, the prime ally of Israel and Saudi Arabia, has cushioned the fears of these nations and promised to protect them against the Iranian regime. Despite constant calls from the Israeli government and lobby to strike Iranian nuclear sites, Washington opted for a strategy based on negotiations and sanctions to entice Iran to limit its nuclear programme. The UNSC, for its part, had adopted a total of six resolutions and imposed gradual sanctions on Iran between 2006 and 2010 in an effort to curb its nuclear programme, after the International Atomic Energy Association found in September 2005 that Tehran was not compliant with its international obligations in respect to the nuclear programme. Measures included financial curbs, freezing assets of individuals and companies related to the enrichment programme, banning the supply of nuclear-related technology to the country, an expanded arms embargo and scrutiny of the dealings of Iranian banks. Meanwhile, and on the diplomatic track, the UNSC engaged with Iran in an effort to curb its nuclear programme and mandated a six nation group, known as the P5 + 1 (China, Russia, France, UK, USA and Germany) to negotiate a solution with Tehran.

Since the commencement of negotiations, Iran has been adamant about its prime condition for agreeing on any deal to halt its nuclear programme, which was lifting the sanctions imposed on the country. In 2013, a series of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran took place over a six-month period which aimed at reaching a permanent resolution to the global impasse over Iran's nuclear programme. In November 2013, an interim agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action, was reached in Geneva after a diplomatic marathon of three intensive rounds. This plan of action partially lifted the sanctions on Iran and paved the way for a comprehensive agreement. Deadlines for reaching a final agreement were not met and pushed back several times due to disagreements on the nature of the nuclear programme and the timeline for lifting sanctions. In March 2015, world leaders met in Lausanne, Switzerland, for further negotiations, and in April 2^nd Iran and world powers announced a framework deal to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief. In June 2015, talks resumed between the P5+1 and Iran in Vienna ahead of a June 30^th deadline to sign a final agreement. The deadline was not met and the Vienna talks were extended amidst disagreements over the lifting of an arms embargo. Finally, on July 14^th 2015, and after 17 days of marathon talks between world powers and Iran, a historic nuclear deal was reached with the signature of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [1]. The UNSC unanimously adopted a resolution on July 20^th that endorsed the nuclear deal between Iran and world powers which will take effect within 90 days.

The deal sparked controversy across the globe in general and in the region in particular. Whilst the international community praised the breakthrough and found in it an excellent alternative to another war in the region, regional actors, primarily Israel and Saudi Arabia, voiced their concerns regarding the deal. They referred to the dangers posed by the Persian state whose nuclear ambitions, they claim, will not necessarily be deterred by the above-mentioned deal. Moreover, with the reincorporation of Iran politically and economically into the international community, Iran’s influence in the region will be bolstered, threating the current balance of power and the alliances forged between regional actors. In light of these developments, Jordan must reexamine its policies and strategies in dealing with Iran and the Gulf states. The probable change status quo and the shift in relations between traditional allies must be analyzed by policy makers to ensure that Jordanian interests are protected in this transitional phase. This paper intends to shed light on the changes in the geopolitical map of the region and the reactions of regimes to these developments, offering as well recommendations to the Jordanian polity on dealing with these changes strategically and pragmatically. Prior to that, a brief summary on the nuclear deal will be provided.

2.   Summary of JCPOA Technical Details as per a statement issued by the European External Action Service[2]:

·      Under JCPOA, Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances it will ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons, and will move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme under the relevant articles Non-Proliferation Treaty.

·      Adoption day of the JCPOA is 90 days after its endorsement of the UNSC; an earlier date may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants.

·      A Joint Commission consisting of P5+1, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (thereof EU +3) and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures and provide regular updates to the UNSC. The EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus.

·      Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment research and development in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years.

·      Iran will not manufacture or assemble other centrifuges and will replace failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. From the end of the eighth year Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan.

·      For 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%. It will refrain from any uranium enrichment at Fordow and will convert it into a nuclear, physics and technology centre.

·      During the 15 year period, Iran will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride. The excess quantities are to be sold and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran.

·      Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce 8 weapons grade plutonium.. All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market. For 15 years Iran will not engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing,

·      Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, which include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years.

·      Regarding sanctions, the UNSC resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UNSC resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, as well as all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, 8 years after the Adoption Day of the JCPOA or when the IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. The US will cease the application of the sanctions to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear related measures by Iran. Eight years after the adoption day or when the IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, the US will seek such legislative action to terminate the sanctions on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA.

·      The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear related UNSC and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA and from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA.

·      Iran has stated that it will treat a re-introduction or re-imposition of sanctions or the imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments in whole or in part.

·      The EU and the US will refrain from any policy intended to affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran. The EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible areas for cooperation with Iran, and will consider using export credits to facilitate trade, project financing and investment in Iran.

·      On re-imposing the sanctions, JCPOA stipulates that if an issue was raised regarding Iran not meeting its commitments, the issue could be referred to the Joint Commission, Ministers of Foreign Affais, the Joint Commission and Advisory Board in order.  If the issue still has not been resolved the UNSC would be notified and will vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UNSC would be re-imposed.

3.      Regional Implications of the Nuclear Deal

The nuclear deal’s articles and stipulations go beyond the technical issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme. The recognition of Iran as player in the region was one important achievement that resulted from the deal, one that has many implications on the region and on the delicate balance of powers that has been protected by the west, primarily the USA. Iran will not only benefit financially, but politically and geopolitically as well where it can now use this opening to the international community as a means to build new alliances and strengthen those already established.

According to the analysis of Middle East expert Kenneth Pollack in a testimony before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the possible Regional implications of the nuclear agreement with Iran[3], Pollack indicated that contrary to popular opinion, Iran is unlikely to pursue a wider rapprochement with the US. According to him, Tehran will neither change its policy toward the region as a result of a nuclear agreement especially since Iran is content with current status quo, particularly in respect to Iraq and Syria. He explained that Iran’s most likely course after a nuclear agreement will be to continue to pursue the same regional strategy it has pursued over the past three years, but may interpret American behavior after a nuclear agreement as a sign of further disengagement from the Middle East. If that is the case, he added, it is highly likely that Iranian goals will become more expansive and its policy more aggressive. Other analysts however indicate that Iran indeed intends to shifts its policies in the region and move towards broader geopolitical collaboration, particularly in the area of cooperation in “the fight against extremism”, a hint at the prospects of Iran formally joining forces the US in fighting ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Moreover, powerful voices Tehran are gradually abandoning the revolutionary-era resistance to domineering imperialistic plans[4]. According to views shared by political experts, analysis indicated that Iran will systematically move away from its hardline ideological discourse to a more pragmatic one. By singing the deal, according to these analysts, revealed Iran's true colors and its prioritisation of its own interests over any other regional issue, despite any employed rhetoric Tehran employed in the past. The Obama administration too has indicated that the nuclear deal could be the beginning of wider collaboration with Iran in respect to pursuing pursuing its geopolitical goals in the region. The fears shared by Israel and Sunni powers in the region regarding a politically and economically strengthened Iran and, by proxy, its allies in the region are not necessarily true according to some observers. According to a study published in Global Research, by moderating and neutralizing Iran, the USA would undermine the challenge to its policies posed by Tehran via the stick approach of re-imposing sanctions. It should be noted the Tehran gabled on this agreement and has put a lot of stake on the revival of the Iranian economy and the improvement of the living standards to contain the reactions of hardliners who were not necessarily thrilled to see Iran succumb to international will.

Whether Iran indeed uses its bolstered influence in the region to further strengthen its relations with its traditional allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria or would use this breakthrough to shift alliances and prioritise its own interests, Jordan needs to draw possible scenarios and strategies to deal with the issue in a pragmatic way. 

4.      Reactions on the Nuclear Deal

International Reactions

The reaction from the international community in general on the nuclear deal has been one of commendation and optimism, with countries expressing relief that the stand-off has ended peacefully and fruitfully. The US administration in particular voiced its satisfaction with the deal, where President Obama heralded the Iranian nuclear deal and underlined that it would meet American national security needs and that of US allies.^[5] The American Ambassador to the UN explained that the terms of the deal will significantly delay Iran's nuclear development to the point of preventing Tehran from developing a nuclear weapon. She praised the deal for achieving objectives peacefully vis-a-vis the Middle East without resorting to war. Nonetheless, and in an effort to assuage regional concerns, the Ambassador also said that the US will continue to invest in the security of its regional allies.[6]

According to the analysis of political observers, the deal itself serves US interests in the region, as it reflects a growing recognition by the Obama administration that hostility towards Iran undermines other US priorities in the region, especially the fight against the ISIS. Containing Sunni terrorism and radicalism to protect western interests in the region may require an alliance with new and strong actors whose influence and power may serve long-term American interests. Washington appears to have agreed to shift its strategy in the region and openly deal with a “neutralised” Iran to solve or contain the conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, by opening a new chapter in relations with Tehran, Washington would also win Iran away from getting too close to Russia and China[7]. It should be note that the deal was sent to Congress on July 19^th where it will be reviewed in the next 60 days. The Congress will then vote on whether to lift the sanctions imposed on Iran or not^[8] noting that Obama has promised to veto any attempt by Republican opponents to undermine the deal[9].

Russia on the other hand also praised the deal; the Russian ambassador to the UN spoke of the inalienable Iranian rights to develop a nuclear program. He underlined that the deal would prevent another Middle East arms race and would create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction[10]. The EU also welcomed the deal and expressed contentment that it would avoid another war in the region. Analysts also indicate that the EU is particularly interested in the economic aspect of the deal, where the lifting of trade restrictions on Iran would enable the EU to expand trade as much as 400 per cent, according to the president of the Eurasia Group risk consultancy[11]. Moreover, the deal could help the EU to substitute imports of oil and gas from Iran for those from Russia, thereby undermining Russia’s influence over Europe[12].

Regional Reactions: Israel, Saudi Arabia and GCC

Israel's positions on the deal have been voiced since the beginning of negotiations between P5+1 and Iran, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the imminent UNSC resolution "hypocritical" and criticized the UN agency for giving legitimacy to a country that “systematically violates the Council's resolutions and threatens to destroy Israel”. The Israeli leader lobbied repeatedly against a disadvantageous deal with Tehran and called for including of a clear and unambiguous recognition of Israel’s right to exist in any final agreement with Iran[13].

The nuclear agreement came as a blow to Israeli leadership, where the Israeli premier described it as a “historic mistake” that will only make it easier for Iran to build a nuclear bomb[14] . Israel’s failure to obstruct the deal and win a US veto on the concluded nuclear deal left Israel with the sole choice of pushing the US Congress to oppose lifting sanctions on Iran. Netanyahu sent a message to US lawmakers where he stressed that as long as the sanctions imposed by the US Congress are in effect, Iran would have to make concessions[15].

The inking of the deal was much criticized by Israel who reiterated its concerns that a deal with a radical country such as Iran forms a direct existential threat to Israel. The deal does not guarantee that Iran will forge it nuclear ambitions and might even fuel the Iranian war machine via the lifting of sanctions, bolstering and reviving with that the Iranian economy[16]. However, analysts indicate that circles within the Israeli military and intelligence establishment favor the nuclear deal as a way to contain Iran's nuclear threat, freeing resources to deal with other threats^[17] . Numerous Israeli analysts and former military and intelligence-service officials agree with this analysis, such as members of the IDF’s general staff; a former head of Mossad; a former head of Shin Bet and a former head of the IDF’s intelligence branch^[18].

Nonetheless, analysts indicate that the nuclear threat posed by Tehran is not the sole motor behind Israel's expressed condemnation of the deal, and that of Saudi Arabia, but rather the realisation that the Iranian rapprochement with the international community and the USA in particular will create a paradigm shift and alter the status quo that has long protected the Israeli interests, especially in light of the rise of Iranian influence in several Arab capitals[19]. Analysts argue that Israel considered the US support to the nuclear deal as an erosion to its deterrence to Iran and as an actual legitimisation of a nuclear-threshold Iran.

In a testimony before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Middle East expert Kenneth Pollack gave a briefing on July 9^th on the possible Regional implications of the nuclear agreement with Iran. He explained that although Israel is opposed to the deal, a military response seems far-fetched, Tel Aviv would manifest its discontent in three major area. First Israelis will ramp up their covert campaign against Iran and its nuclear program, with more Iranian scientists mysteriously assassinated and more sensitive Iranian facilities blow up. Second, Israel will also seek greatly expanded U.S. aid in response to the nuclear deal with Iran to improve its capability to strike Iranian targets and to defeat retaliatory attacks by Iran or its allies, as well as ask for other weapons and capabilities previously denied. Finally, a nuclear deal with Iran could push Israel to become more aggressive in its own neighborhood using the security pretext, and therefore will be less willing to take risks on other security matters in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon[20].

Saudi Arabia on the other hand has been silent on the nuclear deal and an official public statement has not yet been issued, but the country’s reaction was revealed by statements made by government-sanctioned journalists and analysts[21]. Similar to the Israeli position, Saudi Arabia fears that the deal will not ensure a nuclear-free Iran. A Saudi researcher explained that a nuclear deal with Tehran will not deter Iran's capability to create a nuclear weapon considering that the deal will only take effect for a relatively short period of 15 years and will not destroy Iran's technical capabilities to maintain a nuclear programme[22]. After the signature of the agreement, Saudi diplomat told the Washington Post that his country took the deal as a “green light” to pursue its own nuclear program, arguing that this is a necessary step to protect the Kingdom against a nuclear Iran[23]. Saudi concerns also have an economic dimension, according to some observers who noted that Iran's oil will find its way back on the international market and will cut directly into Saudi exports[24].

The GCC countries have also been silent on the issue, with the exception of Oman, where the secretary-general of Oman's ministry of foreign affairs welcomed the deal. The UAE also officially congratulated Iran on the deal[25]. It should be noted that despite the possible consequences on the GCC economy as a result of Iran’s oil export, the benefits of investments in Iran would spill over to the GCC. The UAE in particular stands to gain significant economic benefits from Iran’s reintegration into the global economy considering that it has been a financial artery for Iran and has long benefitted from formal-sector trade with Iran until the tightening of sanctions in 2012[26].

Observers note that there are mixed reactions in the Gulf towards the Iranian nuclear deal. Those who support it argue it would prevent the region from sliding into a destructive and depleting nuclear arms race that would deplete everybody.  Opponents on the other hand say the deal will have a number of negative consequences for the Gulf. Moreover, Saudi worries economic worries are shared by the other oil exporting states, who worry that the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil exports, estimated at between one and 1.5 million barrels a day, would further flood the oil market with cheap Iranian oil, bringing prices even further down, bringing  adverse economic consequences on the Gulf states[27].

In general, Sunni powers in the region, according to analysts, are fearing the consequences of the deal, not from a nuclear-bomb stand point but that of an international recognition and reincorporation of Iran which will now be able to assert itself more forcefully in the region once sanctions are lifted and its economy revived, foreseeing the drastic repercussions that would be felt on the Syrian, Iraqi and Yemeni files[28].

It is clear that a western recognition of Iranian regional influence would come at the expense of the Gulf States, given that they are the weakest link in the region’s chain of influence. In the post-deal reality, there would be three recognized and regional powers: Iran, Turkey and Israel, a reality that would affect the traditional alliances built between Arab nations and the USA. In light of these developments, an according to a report published by Al Jazeera in April[29], analysts indicate that Saudi Arabia is undertaking a process of realigning the geopolitical map of the Middle East and will seek new alliances, given the “decline of US influence and the unreliability” of American assurances. A number of analysts highlighted that Riyadh's sense of abandonment by Washington may compel it to forge stronger alliances with fellow Sunni states to counter a U.S.-backed Iranian hegemony, with a potential establishment of a Sunni Arab military alliance that  has been already demonstrated by the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen[30].

What remains to see now is how this deal will impact the regional map and the alliances, where many regimes seem be reexamining their friendships and shared goals. Perhaps it is also a wake up call that despite rhetoric, voiced agendas and positions, it is very easy to shift lanes to suit one’s own interests.

 

 

 

 

 

 

References

·         Al Jazeera (2015) Why Saudi Arabia and Israel oppose Iran nuclear deal, article published in April 14^th 2015. HTML: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/saudi-arabia-israel-oppose-iran-nuclear-deal-150401061906177.html

 

·         Al Shamahi, A. (2015) Gulf States keep quiet on Iran nuclear deal, article published on July 14^th 2015 in Al Araby. HTML http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/Politics/2015/7/14/Gulf-states-keep-quiet-on-Iran-nuclear-deal#sthash.UDJ5BJMq.dpuf

·         Dvorin, T. (2015) UN Security Council Endorses Iran Deal, article published in Israel national news on July 20^th 2015. HTML address: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/198377#.VbnD5rWVHKQ

·         Elass, R. (2015) A Road Map for the Middle East After the Nuclear Deal, article published on July 14^th 2015 in the Guardian. HTML: http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/jul/14/arab-states-react-iran-nuclear-deal

·         Fallows, J. (2015) The Real Test of the Iran Deal, article published in the Atlantic on July 28^th 2015. HTML: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/07/the-iran-debate-moves-on/399713/

·         Hossein-Zadeh, I. (2015) Making Sense of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Geopolitical Implications, article published in Global Research on July 29^th 2015. HTML: http://www.globalresearch.ca/making-sense-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal-geopolitical-implications/5465427

·         Khan, T. (2015) Sheikh Khalifa congratulates Hassan Rouhani on Iran nuclear deal, article published on July 14^th 2015 in The National. HTML: http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/sheikh-khalifa-congratulates-hassan-rouhani-on-iran-nuclear-deal#full

·         Kutsch, T. (2015) Iran, world powers strike historic nuclear deal, article published on Al Jazeera on July 14^th 2015. HTML address: http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/14/iran-world-powers-strike-historic-nuclear-deal.html

·         Lewis, P. (2015) Obama vows to veto any Republican attempt to derail Iran nuclear deal, article published in the Guardian in July 14^th 2015. HTML address: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/obama-veto-republican-iran-nuclear-deal

·         Lyons, K. (2015) Iran nuclear talks: timeline, article published in the Guardian on July 14th 2015. HTML: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-talks-timeline

·         Pizzi, M. (2015) After nuclear deal, Israel and Saudi Arabia brace for resurgent Iran, article published in Al Jazeera on July 15^th 2015. HTML: http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/15/israel-and-saudi-arabia-brace-for-resurgent-iran.html

·         Pollack, K. (2015) Regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran: testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, published in Brookings Institute on July 9^th 2015. HTML: http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/07/09-pollack-iran-nuclear-agreement

·         Ravid, B. (2015) UN Security Council endorses Iran nuke deal, partial lifting of sanctions, article published on Haaretz on July 20^th 2015. Website address: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.666925

·         Sasson-Gordis, A. (2015) Why the nuclear deal is good for Israel, article published in Molad on July 14^th 2015. HTML: http://www.molad.org/en/articles/Iran-Deal-Good-for-Israel

 

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[1] Iran nuclear talks: timeline, article published on July 14^th 2015 in the Guardian.

[2] http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf

[3] Regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran,  testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, published in  Bookings Institute on July 9^th 2015

[4] Making Sense of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Geopolitical Implications, article published in Global Research on July 29^th 2015.

^[5] Iran, world powers strike historic nuclear deal, article published in Al Jazeera on July 14^th 2015

[6] UN Security Council Endorses Iran Deal, article published in Israel national news on July 20^th 2015

[7] Cit. 4

[8] UN Security Council endorses Iran nuke deal, partial lifting of sanctions, article published in Haaretz on July 20^th 2015

[9] Obama vows to veto any Republican attempt to derail Iran nuclear deal, article published in the Guardian  on July 14^th 2015

[10] Cit. 4

[11] Sheikh Khalifa congratulates Hassan Rouhani on Iran nuclear deal, article published on July 14^th 2015 in The National.

[12] Cit. 4

[13] Cit. 5

[14] After nuclear deal, Israel and Saudi Arabia brace for resurgent Iran, article published in Al Jazeera on July 15^th 2015.

[15] UN Security Council endorses Iran nuke deal, partial lifting of sanctions, article published in Haaretz on July 20^th 2015

[16] Cit.17

[17] Why the nuclear deal is good for Israel, article published in Molad on July 14^th 2015

[18] The Real Test of the Iran Deal, article published in the Atlantic on July 28^th 2015

[19] Cit. 9

[20] Regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran,  testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, published in  Bookings Institute on July 9^th 2015

[21] A Road Map for the Middle East After the Nuclear Deal, article published on July 14^th 2015 in the Guardian.

[22] Why Saudi Arabia and Israel oppose Iran nuclear deal, article published in April 14^th 2015

[23] Cit. 9

[24] Cit.9

[25] Gulf States keep quiet on Iran nuclear deal, article published on July 14^th 2015 in Al Araby.

[26] Cit, 18 and 14

[27] Cit 14

[28] Cit.9

[29] Cit 14

[30] Cit.9