Thursday, May 29, 2014

The Nationality Business

    Famous is the Spanish government’s offer of granting Spanish residency permits to foreigners who alleviate the country’s economic burdens. Introduced in September 2013, a new law rewards those who buy property worth more than €500,000, invest €1 million or more in shares of publicly traded Spanish companies, deposit at least €1 million in a Spanish bank account or make a major business investment leading to job creation a one year visa, extendable to two years, and renewable thereafter. Spain-lovers from across the world can now buy themselves a residency in the land of fun and sun. The generosity does not stop there. Another interesting gesture, this time orchestrated by the Spanish Justice Minister, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, was drafting a bill that would grant Sephardic Jews the Spanish nationality. The bill, which stills needs ratification by the parliament, aims at righting what the government has called a grievous error when Jews were expelled by the Reyes Católicos in 1492, compensating their loss by granting them a Spanish passport without any condition of renouncing their original nationality. The justice Minister said in an interview at The New York Times in March[1] that he anticipated that “more than 150,000 people, scattered in the Sephardic Jewish diaspora, would seek Spanish citizenship under the measure”.

    Interesting. So far, the government, under the first scheme, and according to an El País report[2], has issued 81 visas on the basis of people meeting the law’s requirements, 72 of whom bought property in the country. Almost half of the new residents are Chinese and Russian millionaires, the remaining being Ukrainian, Lebanese, Qatari, Egyptian and Iranian, among others. The government’s figures suggest that the new visa holders will have spent at least €43 million on property, along with at least a further €6 million on purchasing bonds. It adds that the visa scheme will have created around 640 jobs, and around €40 million in investments, mainly in high-tech industries. Under the second scheme, and according to a Jerusalem Post[3] report, the Spanish Justice Ministry had already registered some 3,000 applications and many more are expected to follow.

   As noble as both legislations appear to be, the hidden reasons behind them are not. Granting residency permits on the basis of economic considerations cheapens the concept of pertaining to a nation and forming part of its society. Thousands of immigrants arrive to Spain from African countries looking for opportunities to improve their economic conditions and form part of the labour force (skilled or not) at the same time. Why are these immigrants not easily granted the residency permit? Why are they shot dead at Spanish shores? Why are modest African salesmen who try to start their humble businesses forced into a life of hide-out and illegality (in terms of not obtaining the required documents not in terms of business substance nor nature)? Any resident in Spain – legal resident – understands the bureaucracy and headache that is applying for a residency; why would a €500,000 check make it an easier one? And once this investor is given a residency, why cannot he /she get a work permit in the first year? Why can’t his/her family get a residency as well? Are they a mere piggy bank that serves the sole purpose of injecting money into the country? Instead of rewarding these international billionaires and betting on their investment interests, why not seriously try to boost local businesses and ease unnecessary and complicated measures that hinder entrepreneurial ambitions of Spanish nationals? The meagre number of those who actually applied and obtained the residency under the first scheme is an indication of the very poor and insulting logic behind it. Even if it did save a contractor or two by selling a number of houses, the economy is far from being saved and the seriousness of residency regulations has been much much compromised.

   Now, the second scheme, that of the Jews that were wrongly expulsed from Spain. Apart from the very late apology and quite bizarre compensation, why is the measure racist? What about the Muslims/Arabs who were expelled? Those are not allowed to apply for a nationality? Why is that? Did they not lose their property when they left in the fifteenth century? Did they not have to surrender to the catholic kings and were forced to either convert or leave? Did they not suffer? Or is suffering exclusive to the Jewish nation? And as humanitarian as the plan appears to be, the Justice Minister clearly stated the real reasons lying behind it: the measure, according to him, “does not only intend to repair an injustice done to Jews, but also to repair Spain, where Jewish contributions to art, science and literature flourished before the expulsion”. There is another thing that flourished before the expulsion Minister Gallardón: the economy. The Jewish community, now and then, enjoys excellent financial credentials that come at a very critical time in Spanish history. Ms. Weiss-Tamir (an Israeli lawyer who specializes in applications for citizenship in European countries[4]) explained that just as Jewish applicants are interested in Spanish citizenship for sentimental and family reasons, some Israelis are eager to open businesses in Spain. Michael Freund[5], in the same Jerusalem Post report cited above said that “the prospect of forging anew a link with potentially millions of people of Sephardi ancestry, and the possible windfall that might ensue as a result of increased investment and tourism, was surely not lost on the decision-makers in Madrid when considering the citizenship bill”. He explained that the Sephardic Diaspora can be viewed as a large pool with the potential to benefit the economy provided that it settles and invests.

    Ok, I am generally not against the notion of sealing a deal with the devil himself if that would bring good to people. But things must be called with their proper names. Spain is suffering and needs to use every trick in the book and come up with all sorts of solutions. But don’t lie about your motives please. Remembering in 2012 (when bill was first introduced) to right the wrongs did against the Jewish community is an insult to the intelligence of everyone, Jews being first. Rewarding people with a residency in return for money is actually a commercial deal: give me money I will give you legal rights. Observed from the outside, the Spanish government looks desperate and unethical. Coming clean with the real and hidden motives and going forward with the decisions nonetheless is a lesser evil. Business is business, nothing more, nothing less.




[2] http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/05/23/inenglish/1400837712_504456.html
[3] http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Fundamentally-Freund-From-expulsion-to-expediency-Spain-the-Jews-and-Israel-341941
[5] Founder and chairman of Shavei.

Sunday, May 25, 2014

Independencia de Jordania

Hoy se celebra el aniversario sesenta y ocho de la independencia de Jordania (el 25 de mayo de 1946). En esta feliz ocasión, se presenta una breve presentación de la historia del país y su lucha para la independencia.

Visita Histórica
Jordania tiene una historia rica y amplia, empezando desde el periodo Paleolítico (500,000-17,000 a.C.) y pasando por el periodo Neolítico (8500-4500 a.C.) y Calcolítico (4500-3200 a.C.). En el 3200 a.C., Jordania tuvo un carácter urbanístico muy simple donde hubo algunos asentamientos en el periodo Bronce Antiguo (3200-1950 a. C.) en diferentes partes en Jordania.


Jordania fue parte del Imperio Babilónico, el cual a su terminación en el 539 a.C, fue puesto bajo el Imperio Persa. En el 332 a. C, Alejandro Magno estableció  el control griego sobre Jordania y varias ciudades griegas fueron establecidas. Antes de su conquista, una civilización importante formada por la tribu de nabateos, que inmigró de Arabia en el siglo sexto a. C y dejó la gran joya de Petra en el sur del país, que fue su capital.




Después de la muerte de Alejandro, los Ptolomeos consolidaron su poder en Egipto y gobernaron Jordania desde el 301 al 198 a.C. Los Seléucidas gobernaron Jordania entrr el 198 y el 63 a.C. La victoria de Pompey en el 63 a.C. comenzó un nuevo periodo de control Romano seguido por el control Bizantino desde el 324 d.C. Las fuerzas musulmanas vencieron a los bizantinos en el 636 d.C. y las dinastías y civilizaciones Omeya, Abasí, Fatimí, Ayyubí y Mamelucos controlaron Jordania. En 1516 los Mamelucos fueron vencidos por los Otomanos.





Hacia La Independencia
El Imperio Otomano compuesta por turcos, griegos, serbios, croatas, albaneses, búlgaros, árabes, armenios y kurdos empezó a enfrentarse con problemas de movimientos nacionalistas que resultaron en la separación de unos estados del Imperio. La llegada del Sultán Abdelhamid II (1876-1909) y los Nuevos Otomanos tras una revolución conirtió el sistema de gobierno en uno dictatorial, donde el Sultán suprimió los movimientos disidentes, restringió las libertades y centralizó el poder.




Como consecuencia de la dictadura del Sultán, se formó un grupo conocido como los Jóvenes Otomanos quienes tuvieron el objetivo de restaurar la constitución, deponer al Sultán y fortalecer el Imperio. El grupo se organizó oficialmente en lo que fue llamado el “grupo del Comité de Unión y Progreso”, que inspiró un golpe militar, obligando al Sultán a restaurar la constitución en el año 1908 e instaurar un sistema más democrático. Sin embargo, los movimientos nacionalistas continuaron, y el Imperio empezó a desmantelarse, perdiendo Bosnia, Bulgaria, Creta y Albania, y casi todos sus territorios europeos en 1912. En los países árabes también empezó a surgir el nacionalismo árabe, donde los nacionalistas demandaron derechos iguales y autonomía cultural para los árabes en el Imperio.




El nacionalismo árabe vio un desarrollo importante cuando el Imperio otomano decidió participar en la Primera Guerra Mundial al lado de Alemania. En aquel momento, el Sharif Hussein Bin Alí, el Emir de Meca se puso en contacto con el alto comisionado británico en Egipto, sir Henry McMahon para estudiar la posibilidad de colaborar juntos contra los otomanos en la guerra. Entre julio de 1915 y marzo de 1916 el Sharif y el alto comisionado británico en Egipto tuvieron correspondencia donde el último ofreció el apoyo británico financiero y militar al Sharif si él proclamaba una revuelta árabe contra el Imperio otomano. Además, McMahon prometió la creación de gobiernos árabes en la península árabiga y en la mayoría de la partes del creciente fértil después de la revuelta. 




La coordinación entre los británicos y el Sharif resultó en que la revuelta contra el Imperio otomano estalló en junio de 1916, liderada por el Sharif Hussein Bin Ali, donde las fuerzas tribales atacaron la guarnición otomana en Meca. Los partidarios del Sharif y sus hijos Abdullah y Faisal lucharon durante dos años al lado de los aliados y empezaron a ganar territorios árabes. La captura de Damasco en 1918 supuso el triunfo final de la revolución y formó la base de la demanda de independencia árabe total. Tras la victoria en Damasco, el Emir Faisal – hijo del Sherif Husein- anunció el establecimiento del primer gobierno árabe en Damasco en octubre de 1918.  




Sin embargo, Gran Bretaña, Francia y Rusia firmaron un tratado secreto en mayo de 1916 conocido como el tratado de Skyes-Picot para dividir entre ellos el control del Oriente Medio; Francia y Gran Bretaña acordaron el 25 de abril de 1920 en San Remo imponer el mandato Británico a Transjordania, Iraq y Palestina, y el mandato Francés a Siria y Líbano.


Por esto, el gobierno árabe de Faisal terminó en 1920 con la marcha del ejército francés hacia Damasco y la expulsión de Faisal y su gobierno tras las decisiones de San Remo. Transjordania, por su parte, fue puesto bajo el mandato británico (como parte del mandato en Palestina) en 1920. El alto comisionado del mandato británico de Palestina fue a Transjordania en agosto de 1920 y se reunió con un número de líderes locales donde anunció los planes de Gran Bretaña para establecer unas administraciones autónomas.



Estos gobiernos no duraron más que siete meses  y no establecieron ninguna estabilidad ni seguridad en el territorio. Dentro de estas circunstancias, el Emir Abdullah - hijo de Sharif Hussein- llegó a Maan en Transjordania procedente de Hijaz (Arabia Saudi) el 11 de noviembre de 1920 con una importante fuerza militar, anunciando su plan de liberar Siria y restaurar la monarquía Hachemita. Por esto, el secretario colonial británico, el alto comisionado del mandato británico de Palestina y el secretario principal de Palestina  se reunieron con el Emir en Jerusalén en marzo de 1921, donde acordaron establecer un gobierno central en Transjordania y nombrarle Emir del nuevo Emirato. Así, el Emir Abdullah empezó a administrar el nuevo Emirato bajo la tutela británica, y concluyeron en 1923 un tratado que reconoció el gobierno local en el Emirato como uno independiente del gobierno en Palestina aunque se quedó bajo la supervisión del alto comisionado del mandato británico de Palestina.


El Emir al principio encontró resistencia local manifestada en cinco revoluciones tribales principales entre 1921 y 1923. Las revoluciones fueron basadas a demandas de reducciones de impuestos, participación en el proceso político, asunción de puestos administrativos. Sin embargo, las relaciones entre las tribus y el Emir mejoraron y al final de 1931 Transjordania estaba estabilizando. Además, se formaron varios partidos políticos, unos formados por tales tribus,  que lideraron la vida política en el Emirato. Transjordania y Gran Bretaña firmaron un nuevo tratado en 1928 que reconoció la independencia de Transjordania que era solamente una expresión más que un reconocimiento verdadero de la independencia, dado que el tratado estipuló que Gran Bretaña conservó su derecho a mantener fuerzas armadas en Jordania y establecer estas fuerzas si era necesario, al lado de ejercer poderes judiciales y administrativas para regular las relaciones internas.




Tras la firma del Tratado jordano-británico hubo manifestaciones públicas en todo el Emirato rechazando el tratado y los privilegios británicos. La oposición principal en el Emirato organizó cinco conferencias nacionales entre 1929 y 1933 asistidas por los intelectuales y líderes de tribus, criticando los poderes británicos, exigiendo reformas y rechazando todas las acciones sionistas en relación con sus intereses en los territorios transjordanos.


La lucha de los poderes nacionales y los partidos para conseguir la independencia del Emirato fue larga y extensa, donde las fuerzas nacionales fueron perseguidas y expulsadas. Pero esto no descorazonó a los activistas, quienes utilizaron todos los medios posibles para diseminar sus pensamientos e ideales de liberación e independencia de Transjordania y el mundo árabe entero. Transjordania finalmente pidió su independencia de Gran Bretaña y en 1946 un nuevo Tratado fue concluido que suspendió el Tratado de 1928, terminando el mandato y creando un nuevo Estado independiente. Así, los sacrificios de los árabes en la gran revuelta para conseguir una independencia de los ciudadanos árabes tuvo un resultado; la independencia de Jordania fue finalmente conseguida, un acto que consolidó la gran historia del país y las varias civilizaciones que pasaron en su tierra.



Thursday, May 15, 2014

Pan-Arabism vs. Middle Easternism?

      



      Arab Nationalism, a romantic concept that moved poets to write ballads, intellectuals to preach volumes, activists to passionately organize and the masses to cheer freedom. A concept introduced by students at the American University of Beirut in the last phases of the ageing Ottoman Empire and studied in secret societies. This concept developed and led, under western planning, to the Great Arab Revolt in 1916. The slogans of Arab revival and freedom from Ottoman tyranny swept the Arab nations, where hopes of independence and self-rule were promised by the restoration of Arab control over the area. Then problems arose. Who are Arabs? What is an Aran nation? How does it extend geographically? Is it an area that encompasses people who speak the same language and share the same history? If so, why did the Lebanese Maronites reject the concept of Arab nationalism and insist on a Lebanese identity? Why did the Egyptians hesitate before including themselves under the Arab banner? What about the Berber speaking Moroccans? And most importantly, after much struggle for Arab unity revival, why did Arab states, after achieving independence in the thirties and forties, insist on the concept of national sovereignty and respect of frontiers in the Arab League Charter?

     It is important to study the very root of this notion of Arab unity to understand what and why the Arab nationalists were (some still are) fighting for. How can a Bedouin in Iraq claim to share the same cultural background and traditions with a Carthagian? What are the grounds of this strong Arab identification? Is it language? Peruvians do not feel Spanish just because they speak Spanish. IS it religion? Then Indonesia might just as well be part of the much aspired Arab bloc. Is it both? Then how would the Christians in this geographic bloc feel? And if that were the case anyhow, why are these very states that want to unite (popular demand and not regime’s interest at all) facing the constant threat of getting divided themselves? Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan and Libya all have internal differences that led and might lead to internal divisions. If these countries cannot conserve internal integrity, how can they possible unite 200 million Arabs?
     The pan-arabists dream of unification under one Arab bloc failed miserably, confronted and defeated by regimes’ clinging to national sovereignty, islamists rejection of the notion of Arab nationalism, internal rivalries and animosities, constant defeats before Israel, Egypt’s treason to the cause in the seventies and to the realization that language, history and some cultural aspects link those who call themselves Arab in loose ties that untangle easily against national interests.

    The fragmentation of the Arab bloc into geographic zonings such as the eastern and western Arab blocs, the Fertile Crescent, Greater Syria and the Gulf Region is a strong indication of the personal interests of those who are behind such geographic zonings. What could not (logically) be achieved in pan-Arab unity was substituted by more modest attempts and terminology for dreams of unions that always failed. Starting from Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in 1950, then Egypt’s union with Syria in 1958 and the decision of Iraq to annex Kuwait as part of a plan to initiate Arab unification in the nineties were all rejected and condemned by the countries involved in these processes. This dream of unity disappeared after being fought for and against for the past century. Now, a new form of unity seems to be appearing in the horizon.

      The Middle East unity. What is that Middle East to start with? The term "Middle East" first appeared 1902 by American naval officer Alfred T. Mahan, who, writing for London's National Review, used the new term in calling for the British to strengthen their naval power in the Persian Gulf. Mahan’s Middle East “was an indeterminate area guarding a part of the sea route from Suez to Singapore”. It should be noted that the entire area was given different names over different times, where the terminology almost always depended on Europe’s interests in the region and its definition of its location accordingly, whether Far East, Near East or now Middle East.

   In general, the Middle East included parts of Africa, Greater Syria, Gulf countries a number of central Asian countries (at some point) as well as Turkey and Iran. The extension and membership in this region have changed constantly throughout the years but have recently taken a more fixed shape after the 2001 attacks in the USA. 

Since then, the Bush administration came up with reform plans for the region: the Greater Middle East Initiative which was then replaced by the Broader Middle East initiative. Coincidently, the EU also started intensifying its plans for the southern Mediterranean, founding in 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy (which builds on 1995 the Euro-Med partnership). These initiatives plan to enhance dialogue and cooperation amongst the neighbours in that region in an effort to create a peaceful bloc that act as a buffer against any threat that may filter into the west via southern and eastern European borders. Examining the members of these countries, one notices that they are not made up entirely of Arab states; actually they do not encompass all Arab states. They include Israel, Turkey, Ukraine and other non-Arab nations. The objective behind this geographic grouping is to stimulate cooperation, and perhaps establish some sort of union in the far future amongst these states via joint projects and programmes that foster peace and prosperity. What was once an Arab dream of union is now being replaced by a more strategic union plan drawn by the west. The concept of Arab unity is longer enforced on Arabs who may choose to team up with a Turk or an Armenian or an Israeli, with whom they do not share racial, linguistic or religious parents, but do share a historic cousin (in the majority of cases[1]), and strategically build a new economic bloc with social diversity similar to the EU.

  A beautiful idea? Yes indeed. Does it come at the expense of Arab nationalists (and islamists) dream? Yes again. The point is the  following: Arabs need to d- romanticize their history and start planning strategically. I admire and defend the celebration of identity and champion solidarity between nations that have much in common. Arabs share religion, history, language, culture and ardent dreams of union and liberty from their very own selves and tyrants. Nonetheless, the dream never came through and every attempt failed tremendously. What remains are fragmented patches that have nothing and everything in common at the same time, a region of self-contradictory realities. A nation where its mini-sovereign nations witness internal conflicts, with sectarian, religious and ethnic differences further dissecting them into smaller organs within an already fragmented state. Yes, I would rather have Morocco feel closer to the EU and Iraq closer to Iran and Jordan closer to Turkey if that means achieving prosperity, development and democracy. It seems that in the end, Arab nationalists will always have to pick up the tab.




[1] Example: Belarus is part of the ENP but it does not share the same historic background of the majority of the members.

Saturday, May 10, 2014

Autotelic Politics


    I came across an interesting blog today which is mainly dedicated to posting videos of fights in parliaments. These fights - as in fist fights- that erupted in European, Middle Eastern and African parliaments, not only revealed the hidden barbaric aspect of suit-masked gentlemen, but also drew attention to their very poor fighting skills. I mean, if you are going to throw a fist every now and then, you might at least try to improve what little kung-fu skills you have. Maybe start up a fund with member contribution? New taxes perhaps?

      In all cases, this was not what most drew my attention in the blog; after all, the diversity in the ideological background of MPs in some parliaments and the wide spectrum of political orientations of its representatives may have added coal to the fiery politician. At some point, and according to the political scholar Khaleel Al Hajjaj, differences between Jordanian partisans led to exchange of fire, inside and outside the parliament. Extreme right populist parties must not tolerate any of the ideals presented by far left socialist parties; a communist party member may never see eye to eye with an Islamic party; and a neo-liberal may never understand a Marxist. Policies drawn in such parliaments need to follow the rule of compromise and disappointing consensus. Even when dealing with majority systems (such as the UK), policies drawn by governments do not tend to greatly differ from what the opposition bloc would be willing to accept. Policies have to pay the price of conciliation.

     What does however draw my attention is the question of “the autotelic nature” of politics. Politics is not considered autonomously valuable or an end in itself. It is considered as a mere mean in deliberation to reach an end. As Guido Parietti explains, many reject the idea that politics could be an end in itself; defence of democracy and political participation stop just short of recognising politics as ends in themselves. What is the root of rejecting the autotelic nature of politics? Is it the fault of those who defend democracy heatedly? Is it a result of considering that any decision taken that does not take into account the opinions of others should be considered void of any meaning or purpose? Do politics and political activity always need a result to justify their use?

     Personally, I believe that politics is a need; expressing one’s opinions, fighting for ideals, lobbying for selfish purposes, compromising for the good of all are all aspects of our modern intellectual selves. Even if the result is not convenient to some sometimes, even if there are no results at all, political deliberations are a must in any civilized society. To teach our children how to argue, how to debate and how to manoeuvre is building up political consciousness whose importance goes way beyond democratic achievement of results. However, focusing on moderation and compromise in any political activity confirms the notion of “useless politics if not agreement is reached”. As Berber said: !It is the self-governing people who most need moderation, for they have nothing but moderation to remind them of the weakness and infirmities on which their self- government relies, and by which it is justified”. Moderation is indeed a necessity in drawing polices and making decisions, but it is not what defines a political activity or its purpose. Difference of opinion, strong commitment to ideals, ability to explain one’s political beliefs also do count, even if they do not yield the aspire results. Should our politicians remind themselves that politics is autotelic, and is praised as a procedure in itself, more civilization in the chambers of political deliberations would be achieved.

    To conclude, Winston Churchill famously testified in the House of Commons in 1947: ‘Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.’ Democracy has its faults, compromise has its faults, but politics – in itself - does not.




References
·         Barber, B. (1984) Storng Democracy
http://books.google.es/books?id=2YbevnCXAhgC&pg=PA311&lpg=PA311&dq=It+is+the+self-governing+people+who+most+need+moderation,+for+they+have+nothing+but+moderation+to+remind+them+of+the+weakness+and+in%EF%AC%81rmities+on+which+their+self-+government+relies,+and+by+which+it+is+justi%EF%AC%81ed&source=bl&ots=kNnuojDgSq&sig=EGu9dhOuWeJz8OjAXVBx2zqRefs&hl=es&sa=X&ei=9TJuU8mmCIWd0AW9l4DIBQ&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=It%20is%20the%20self-governing%20people%20who%20most%20need%20moderation%2C%20for%20they%20have%20nothing%20but%20moderation%20to%20remind%20them%20of%20the%20weakness%20and%20in%EF%AC%81rmities%20on%20which%20their%20self-%20government%20relies%2C%20and%20by%20which%20it%20is%20justi%EF%AC%81ed&f=false
·         Al Hajjaj, K. (2001) The History of Political Parties in Jordan, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan
·         Parietti, G. (2011) On the autotelic character of politics, Journal of Political Theory

URL: http://ept.sagepub.com/content/11/1/59 

Yesterday condemned, today embraced

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