The Nationality Business

    Famous is the Spanish government’s offer of granting Spanish residency permits to foreigners who alleviate the country’s economic burdens. Introduced in September 2013, a new law rewards those who buy property worth more than €500,000, invest €1 million or more in shares of publicly traded Spanish companies, deposit at least €1 million in a Spanish bank account or make a major business investment leading to job creation a one year visa, extendable to two years, and renewable thereafter. Spain-lovers from across the world can now buy themselves a residency in the land of fun and sun. The generosity does not stop there. Another interesting gesture, this time orchestrated by the Spanish Justice Minister, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, was drafting a bill that would grant Sephardic Jews the Spanish nationality. The bill, which stills needs ratification by the parliament, aims at righting what the government has called a grievous error when Jews were expelled by the Reyes Católicos in 1492, compensating their loss by granting them a Spanish passport without any condition of renouncing their original nationality. The justice Minister said in an interview at The New York Times in March[1] that he anticipated that “more than 150,000 people, scattered in the Sephardic Jewish diaspora, would seek Spanish citizenship under the measure”.

    Interesting. So far, the government, under the first scheme, and according to an El País report[2], has issued 81 visas on the basis of people meeting the law’s requirements, 72 of whom bought property in the country. Almost half of the new residents are Chinese and Russian millionaires, the remaining being Ukrainian, Lebanese, Qatari, Egyptian and Iranian, among others. The government’s figures suggest that the new visa holders will have spent at least €43 million on property, along with at least a further €6 million on purchasing bonds. It adds that the visa scheme will have created around 640 jobs, and around €40 million in investments, mainly in high-tech industries. Under the second scheme, and according to a Jerusalem Post[3] report, the Spanish Justice Ministry had already registered some 3,000 applications and many more are expected to follow.

   As noble as both legislations appear to be, the hidden reasons behind them are not. Granting residency permits on the basis of economic considerations cheapens the concept of pertaining to a nation and forming part of its society. Thousands of immigrants arrive to Spain from African countries looking for opportunities to improve their economic conditions and form part of the labour force (skilled or not) at the same time. Why are these immigrants not easily granted the residency permit? Why are they shot dead at Spanish shores? Why are modest African salesmen who try to start their humble businesses forced into a life of hide-out and illegality (in terms of not obtaining the required documents not in terms of business substance nor nature)? Any resident in Spain – legal resident – understands the bureaucracy and headache that is applying for a residency; why would a €500,000 check make it an easier one? And once this investor is given a residency, why cannot he /she get a work permit in the first year? Why can’t his/her family get a residency as well? Are they a mere piggy bank that serves the sole purpose of injecting money into the country? Instead of rewarding these international billionaires and betting on their investment interests, why not seriously try to boost local businesses and ease unnecessary and complicated measures that hinder entrepreneurial ambitions of Spanish nationals? The meagre number of those who actually applied and obtained the residency under the first scheme is an indication of the very poor and insulting logic behind it. Even if it did save a contractor or two by selling a number of houses, the economy is far from being saved and the seriousness of residency regulations has been much much compromised.

   Now, the second scheme, that of the Jews that were wrongly expulsed from Spain. Apart from the very late apology and quite bizarre compensation, why is the measure racist? What about the Muslims/Arabs who were expelled? Those are not allowed to apply for a nationality? Why is that? Did they not lose their property when they left in the fifteenth century? Did they not have to surrender to the catholic kings and were forced to either convert or leave? Did they not suffer? Or is suffering exclusive to the Jewish nation? And as humanitarian as the plan appears to be, the Justice Minister clearly stated the real reasons lying behind it: the measure, according to him, “does not only intend to repair an injustice done to Jews, but also to repair Spain, where Jewish contributions to art, science and literature flourished before the expulsion”. There is another thing that flourished before the expulsion Minister Gallardón: the economy. The Jewish community, now and then, enjoys excellent financial credentials that come at a very critical time in Spanish history. Ms. Weiss-Tamir (an Israeli lawyer who specializes in applications for citizenship in European countries[4]) explained that just as Jewish applicants are interested in Spanish citizenship for sentimental and family reasons, some Israelis are eager to open businesses in Spain. Michael Freund[5], in the same Jerusalem Post report cited above said that “the prospect of forging anew a link with potentially millions of people of Sephardi ancestry, and the possible windfall that might ensue as a result of increased investment and tourism, was surely not lost on the decision-makers in Madrid when considering the citizenship bill”. He explained that the Sephardic Diaspora can be viewed as a large pool with the potential to benefit the economy provided that it settles and invests.

    Ok, I am generally not against the notion of sealing a deal with the devil himself if that would bring good to people. But things must be called with their proper names. Spain is suffering and needs to use every trick in the book and come up with all sorts of solutions. But don’t lie about your motives please. Remembering in 2012 (when bill was first introduced) to right the wrongs did against the Jewish community is an insult to the intelligence of everyone, Jews being first. Rewarding people with a residency in return for money is actually a commercial deal: give me money I will give you legal rights. Observed from the outside, the Spanish government looks desperate and unethical. Coming clean with the real and hidden motives and going forward with the decisions nonetheless is a lesser evil. Business is business, nothing more, nothing less.

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[1]http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/world/europe/many-seek-spanish-citizenship-offered-to-sephardic-jews.html?_r=0

[2] http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/05/23/inenglish/1400837712_504456.html

[3] http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Fundamentally-Freund-From-expulsion-to-expediency-Spain-the-Jews-and-Israel-341941

[4]http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/14/world/europe/interest-in-israel-as-spain-weighs-citizenship-for-sephardic-jews.html

[5] Founder and chairman of Shavei.

Independencia de Jordania

Hoy se celebra el aniversario sesenta y ocho de la independencia de Jordania (el 25 de mayo de 1946). En esta feliz ocasión, se presenta una breve presentación de la historia del país y su lucha para la independencia.

Visita Histórica

Jordania tiene una historia rica y amplia, empezando desde el periodo Paleolítico (500,000-17,000 a.C.) y pasando por el periodo Neolítico (8500-4500 a.C.) y Calcolítico (4500-3200 a.C.). En el 3200 a.C., Jordania tuvo un carácter urbanístico muy simple donde hubo algunos asentamientos en el periodo Bronce Antiguo (3200-1950 a. C.) en diferentes partes en Jordania.

Jordania fue parte del Imperio Babilónico, el cual a su terminación en el 539 a.C, fue puesto bajo el Imperio Persa. En el 332 a. C, Alejandro Magno estableció  el control griego sobre Jordania y varias ciudades griegas fueron establecidas. Antes de su conquista, una civilización importante formada por la tribu de nabateos, que inmigró de Arabia en el siglo sexto a. C y dejó la gran joya de Petra en el sur del país, que fue su capital.

Después de la muerte de Alejandro, los Ptolomeos consolidaron su poder en Egipto y gobernaron Jordania desde el 301 al 198 a.C. Los Seléucidas gobernaron Jordania entrr el 198 y el 63 a.C. La victoria de Pompey en el 63 a.C. comenzó un nuevo periodo de control Romano seguido por el control Bizantino desde el 324 d.C. Las fuerzas musulmanas vencieron a los bizantinos en el 636 d.C. y las dinastías y civilizaciones Omeya, Abasí, Fatimí, Ayyubí y Mamelucos controlaron Jordania. En 1516 los Mamelucos fueron vencidos por los Otomanos.

Hacia La Independencia

El Imperio Otomano compuesta por turcos, griegos, serbios, croatas, albaneses, búlgaros, árabes, armenios y kurdos empezó a enfrentarse con problemas de movimientos nacionalistas que resultaron en la separación de unos estados del Imperio. La llegada del Sultán Abdelhamid II (1876-1909) y los Nuevos Otomanos tras una revolución conirtió el sistema de gobierno en uno dictatorial, donde el Sultán suprimió los movimientos disidentes, restringió las libertades y centralizó el poder.

Como consecuencia de la dictadura del Sultán, se formó un grupo conocido como los Jóvenes Otomanos quienes tuvieron el objetivo de restaurar la constitución, deponer al Sultán y fortalecer el Imperio. El grupo se organizó oficialmente en lo que fue llamado el “grupo del Comité de Unión y Progreso”, que inspiró un golpe militar, obligando al Sultán a restaurar la constitución en el año 1908 e instaurar un sistema más democrático. Sin embargo, los movimientos nacionalistas continuaron, y el Imperio empezó a desmantelarse, perdiendo Bosnia, Bulgaria, Creta y Albania, y casi todos sus territorios europeos en 1912. En los países árabes también empezó a surgir el nacionalismo árabe, donde los nacionalistas demandaron derechos iguales y autonomía cultural para los árabes en el Imperio.

El nacionalismo árabe vio un desarrollo importante cuando el Imperio otomano decidió participar en la Primera Guerra Mundial al lado de Alemania. En aquel momento, el Sharif Hussein Bin Alí, el Emir de Meca se puso en contacto con el alto comisionado británico en Egipto, sir Henry McMahon para estudiar la posibilidad de colaborar juntos contra los otomanos en la guerra. Entre julio de 1915 y marzo de 1916 el Sharif y el alto comisionado británico en Egipto tuvieron correspondencia donde el último ofreció el apoyo británico financiero y militar al Sharif si él proclamaba una revuelta árabe contra el Imperio otomano. Además, McMahon prometió la creación de gobiernos árabes en la península árabiga y en la mayoría de la partes del creciente fértil después de la revuelta. 

La coordinación entre los británicos y el Sharif resultó en que la revuelta contra el Imperio otomano estalló en junio de 1916, liderada por el Sharif Hussein Bin Ali, donde las fuerzas tribales atacaron la guarnición otomana en Meca. Los partidarios del Sharif y sus hijos Abdullah y Faisal lucharon durante dos años al lado de los aliados y empezaron a ganar territorios árabes. La captura de Damasco en 1918 supuso el triunfo final de la revolución y formó la base de la demanda de independencia árabe total. Tras la victoria en Damasco, el Emir Faisal – hijo del Sherif Husein- anunció el establecimiento del primer gobierno árabe en Damasco en octubre de 1918.  

Sin embargo, Gran Bretaña, Francia y Rusia firmaron un tratado secreto en mayo de 1916 conocido como el tratado de Skyes-Picot para dividir entre ellos el control del Oriente Medio; Francia y Gran Bretaña acordaron el 25 de abril de 1920 en San Remo imponer el mandato Británico a Transjordania, Iraq y Palestina, y el mandato Francés a Siria y Líbano.

Por esto, el gobierno árabe de Faisal terminó en 1920 con la marcha del ejército francés hacia Damasco y la expulsión de Faisal y su gobierno tras las decisiones de San Remo. Transjordania, por su parte, fue puesto bajo el mandato británico (como parte del mandato en Palestina) en 1920. El alto comisionado del mandato británico de Palestina fue a Transjordania en agosto de 1920 y se reunió con un número de líderes locales donde anunció los planes de Gran Bretaña para establecer unas administraciones autónomas.

Estos gobiernos no duraron más que siete meses  y no establecieron ninguna estabilidad ni seguridad en el territorio. Dentro de estas circunstancias, el Emir Abdullah - hijo de Sharif Hussein- llegó a Maan en Transjordania procedente de Hijaz (Arabia Saudi) el 11 de noviembre de 1920 con una importante fuerza militar, anunciando su plan de liberar Siria y restaurar la monarquía Hachemita. Por esto, el secretario colonial británico, el alto comisionado del mandato británico de Palestina y el secretario principal de Palestina  se reunieron con el Emir en Jerusalén en marzo de 1921, donde acordaron establecer un gobierno central en Transjordania y nombrarle Emir del nuevo Emirato. Así, el Emir Abdullah empezó a administrar el nuevo Emirato bajo la tutela británica, y concluyeron en 1923 un tratado que reconoció el gobierno local en el Emirato como uno independiente del gobierno en Palestina aunque se quedó bajo la supervisión del alto comisionado del mandato británico de Palestina.

El Emir al principio encontró resistencia local manifestada en cinco revoluciones tribales principales entre 1921 y 1923. Las revoluciones fueron basadas a demandas de reducciones de impuestos, participación en el proceso político, asunción de puestos administrativos. Sin embargo, las relaciones entre las tribus y el Emir mejoraron y al final de 1931 Transjordania estaba estabilizando. Además, se formaron varios partidos políticos, unos formados por tales tribus,  que lideraron la vida política en el Emirato. Transjordania y Gran Bretaña firmaron un nuevo tratado en 1928 que reconoció la independencia de Transjordania que era solamente una expresión más que un reconocimiento verdadero de la independencia, dado que el tratado estipuló que Gran Bretaña conservó su derecho a mantener fuerzas armadas en Jordania y establecer estas fuerzas si era necesario, al lado de ejercer poderes judiciales y administrativas para regular las relaciones internas.

Tras la firma del Tratado jordano-británico hubo manifestaciones públicas en todo el Emirato rechazando el tratado y los privilegios británicos. La oposición principal en el Emirato organizó cinco conferencias nacionales entre 1929 y 1933 asistidas por los intelectuales y líderes de tribus, criticando los poderes británicos, exigiendo reformas y rechazando todas las acciones sionistas en relación con sus intereses en los territorios transjordanos.

La lucha de los poderes nacionales y los partidos para conseguir la independencia del Emirato fue larga y extensa, donde las fuerzas nacionales fueron perseguidas y expulsadas. Pero esto no descorazonó a los activistas, quienes utilizaron todos los medios posibles para diseminar sus pensamientos e ideales de liberación e independencia de Transjordania y el mundo árabe entero. Transjordania finalmente pidió su independencia de Gran Bretaña y en 1946 un nuevo Tratado fue concluido que suspendió el Tratado de 1928, terminando el mandato y creando un nuevo Estado independiente. Así, los sacrificios de los árabes en la gran revuelta para conseguir una independencia de los ciudadanos árabes tuvo un resultado; la independencia de Jordania fue finalmente conseguida, un acto que consolidó la gran historia del país y las varias civilizaciones que pasaron en su tierra.

Pan-Arabism vs. Middle Easternism?

      

      Arab Nationalism, a romantic concept that moved poets to write ballads, intellectuals to preach volumes, activists to passionately organize and the masses to cheer freedom. A concept introduced by students at the American University of Beirut in the last phases of the ageing Ottoman Empire and studied in secret societies. This concept developed and led, under western planning, to the Great Arab Revolt in 1916. The slogans of Arab revival and freedom from Ottoman tyranny swept the Arab nations, where hopes of independence and self-rule were promised by the restoration of Arab control over the area. Then problems arose. Who are Arabs? What is an Aran nation? How does it extend geographically? Is it an area that encompasses people who speak the same language and share the same history? If so, why did the Lebanese Maronites reject the concept of Arab nationalism and insist on a Lebanese identity? Why did the Egyptians hesitate before including themselves under the Arab banner? What about the Berber speaking Moroccans? And most importantly, after much struggle for Arab unity revival, why did Arab states, after achieving independence in the thirties and forties, insist on the concept of national sovereignty and respect of frontiers in the Arab League Charter?

     It is important to study the very root of this notion of Arab unity to understand what and why the Arab nationalists were (some still are) fighting for. How can a Bedouin in Iraq claim to share the same cultural background and traditions with a Carthagian? What are the grounds of this strong Arab identification? Is it language? Peruvians do not feel Spanish just because they speak Spanish. IS it religion? Then Indonesia might just as well be part of the much aspired Arab bloc. Is it both? Then how would the Christians in this geographic bloc feel? And if that were the case anyhow, why are these very states that want to unite (popular demand and not regime’s interest at all) facing the constant threat of getting divided themselves? Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan and Libya all have internal differences that led and might lead to internal divisions. If these countries cannot conserve internal integrity, how can they possible unite 200 million Arabs?

     The pan-arabists dream of unification under one Arab bloc failed miserably, confronted and defeated by regimes’ clinging to national sovereignty, islamists rejection of the notion of Arab nationalism, internal rivalries and animosities, constant defeats before Israel, Egypt’s treason to the cause in the seventies and to the realization that language, history and some cultural aspects link those who call themselves Arab in loose ties that untangle easily against national interests.

    The fragmentation of the Arab bloc into geographic zonings such as the eastern and western Arab blocs, the Fertile Crescent, Greater Syria and the Gulf Region is a strong indication of the personal interests of those who are behind such geographic zonings. What could not (logically) be achieved in pan-Arab unity was substituted by more modest attempts and terminology for dreams of unions that always failed. Starting from Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in 1950, then Egypt’s union with Syria in 1958 and the decision of Iraq to annex Kuwait as part of a plan to initiate Arab unification in the nineties were all rejected and condemned by the countries involved in these processes. This dream of unity disappeared after being fought for and against for the past century. Now, a new form of unity seems to be appearing in the horizon.

      The Middle East unity. What is that Middle East to start with? The term "Middle East" first appeared 1902 by American naval officer Alfred T. Mahan, who, writing for London's National Review, used the new term in calling for the British to strengthen their naval power in the Persian Gulf. Mahan’s Middle East “was an indeterminate area guarding a part of the sea route from Suez to Singapore”. It should be noted that the entire area was given different names over different times, where the terminology almost always depended on Europe’s interests in the region and its definition of its location accordingly, whether Far East, Near East or now Middle East.

   In general, the Middle East included parts of Africa, Greater Syria, Gulf countries a number of central Asian countries (at some point) as well as Turkey and Iran. The extension and membership in this region have changed constantly throughout the years but have recently taken a more fixed shape after the 2001 attacks in the USA. 

Since then, the Bush administration came up with reform plans for the region: the Greater Middle East Initiative which was then replaced by the Broader Middle East initiative. Coincidently, the EU also started intensifying its plans for the southern Mediterranean, founding in 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy (which builds on 1995 the Euro-Med partnership). These initiatives plan to enhance dialogue and cooperation amongst the neighbours in that region in an effort to create a peaceful bloc that act as a buffer against any threat that may filter into the west via southern and eastern European borders. Examining the members of these countries, one notices that they are not made up entirely of Arab states; actually they do not encompass all Arab states. They include Israel, Turkey, Ukraine and other non-Arab nations. The objective behind this geographic grouping is to stimulate cooperation, and perhaps establish some sort of union in the far future amongst these states via joint projects and programmes that foster peace and prosperity. What was once an Arab dream of union is now being replaced by a more strategic union plan drawn by the west. The concept of Arab unity is longer enforced on Arabs who may choose to team up with a Turk or an Armenian or an Israeli, with whom they do not share racial, linguistic or religious parents, but do share a historic cousin (in the majority of cases[1]), and strategically build a new economic bloc with social diversity similar to the EU.

  A beautiful idea? Yes indeed. Does it come at the expense of Arab nationalists (and islamists) dream? Yes again. The point is the  following: Arabs need to d- romanticize their history and start planning strategically. I admire and defend the celebration of identity and champion solidarity between nations that have much in common. Arabs share religion, history, language, culture and ardent dreams of union and liberty from their very own selves and tyrants. Nonetheless, the dream never came through and every attempt failed tremendously. What remains are fragmented patches that have nothing and everything in common at the same time, a region of self-contradictory realities. A nation where its mini-sovereign nations witness internal conflicts, with sectarian, religious and ethnic differences further dissecting them into smaller organs within an already fragmented state. Yes, I would rather have Morocco feel closer to the EU and Iraq closer to Iran and Jordan closer to Turkey if that means achieving prosperity, development and democracy. It seems that in the end, Arab nationalists will always have to pick up the tab.

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[1] Example: Belarus is part of the ENP but it does not share the same historic background of the majority of the members.

Autotelic Politics

    I came across an interesting blog today which is mainly dedicated to posting videos of fights in parliaments. These fights - as in fist fights- that erupted in European, Middle Eastern and African parliaments, not only revealed the hidden barbaric aspect of suit-masked gentlemen, but also drew attention to their very poor fighting skills. I mean, if you are going to throw a fist every now and then, you might at least try to improve what little kung-fu skills you have. Maybe start up a fund with member contribution? New taxes perhaps?

      In all cases, this was not what most drew my attention in the blog; after all, the diversity in the ideological background of MPs in some parliaments and the wide spectrum of political orientations of its representatives may have added coal to the fiery politician. At some point, and according to the political scholar Khaleel Al Hajjaj, differences between Jordanian partisans led to exchange of fire, inside and outside the parliament. Extreme right populist parties must not tolerate any of the ideals presented by far left socialist parties; a communist party member may never see eye to eye with an Islamic party; and a neo-liberal may never understand a Marxist. Policies drawn in such parliaments need to follow the rule of compromise and disappointing consensus. Even when dealing with majority systems (such as the UK), policies drawn by governments do not tend to greatly differ from what the opposition bloc would be willing to accept. Policies have to pay the price of conciliation.

     What does however draw my attention is the question of “the autotelic nature” of politics. Politics is not considered autonomously valuable or an end in itself. It is considered as a mere mean in deliberation to reach an end. As Guido Parietti explains, many reject the idea that politics could be an end in itself; defence of democracy and political participation stop just short of recognising politics as ends in themselves. What is the root of rejecting the autotelic nature of politics? Is it the fault of those who defend democracy heatedly? Is it a result of considering that any decision taken that does not take into account the opinions of others should be considered void of any meaning or purpose? Do politics and political activity always need a result to justify their use?

     Personally, I believe that politics is a need; expressing one’s opinions, fighting for ideals, lobbying for selfish purposes, compromising for the good of all are all aspects of our modern intellectual selves. Even if the result is not convenient to some sometimes, even if there are no results at all, political deliberations are a must in any civilized society. To teach our children how to argue, how to debate and how to manoeuvre is building up political consciousness whose importance goes way beyond democratic achievement of results. However, focusing on moderation and compromise in any political activity confirms the notion of “useless politics if not agreement is reached”. As Berber said: !It is the self-governing people who most need moderation, for they have nothing but moderation to remind them of the weakness and infirmities on which their self- government relies, and by which it is justified”. Moderation is indeed a necessity in drawing polices and making decisions, but it is not what defines a political activity or its purpose. Difference of opinion, strong commitment to ideals, ability to explain one’s political beliefs also do count, even if they do not yield the aspire results. Should our politicians remind themselves that politics is autotelic, and is praised as a procedure in itself, more civilization in the chambers of political deliberations would be achieved.

    To conclude, Winston Churchill famously testified in the House of Commons in 1947: ‘Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.’ Democracy has its faults, compromise has its faults, but politics – in itself - does not.

References

·         Barber, B. (1984) Storng Democracy

http://books.google.es/books?id=2YbevnCXAhgC&pg=PA311&lpg=PA311&dq=It+is+the+self-governing+people+who+most+need+moderation,+for+they+have+nothing+but+moderation+to+remind+them+of+the+weakness+and+in%EF%AC%81rmities+on+which+their+self-+government+relies,+and+by+which+it+is+justi%EF%AC%81ed&source=bl&ots=kNnuojDgSq&sig=EGu9dhOuWeJz8OjAXVBx2zqRefs&hl=es&sa=X&ei=9TJuU8mmCIWd0AW9l4DIBQ&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=It%20is%20the%20self-governing%20people%20who%20most%20need%20moderation%2C%20for%20they%20have%20nothing%20but%20moderation%20to%20remind%20them%20of%20the%20weakness%20and%20in%EF%AC%81rmities%20on%20which%20their%20self-%20government%20relies%2C%20and%20by%20which%20it%20is%20justi%EF%AC%81ed&f=false

·         Al Hajjaj, K. (2001) The History of Political Parties in Jordan, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan

·         Parietti, G. (2011) On the autotelic character of politics, Journal of Political Theory

URL: http://ept.sagepub.com/content/11/1/59 

Welfare State ...No Thank You

A welfare state is an ideal state model where the welfare of citizens, economic and social, is provided for by a state that not only assumes this responsibility but defends its exclusive right in doing so (although it may share it with other independent institutions). The objective is social protection…a guarantee of conservation of human dignity, fair treatment of citizens and the effort to solve their ordeals in an efficient and effective manner. The developed world has achieved perfection in its design and implementation of such a state, whilst the developing world (or part of it) is improving its systems and institutions for that end. A state where people’s needs are met, where health, education and decent living are responsibilities that the state assumes in full accord with its citizens is the objective. A culture of well-being is the supreme goal.  

However, the utopian scenario is, well, utopian. Perfection in a public administration is an unrealistic (and quite arrogant) concept. Each system has its flaws and defauxs; even those designed with the best intention and good will have their share of cons. For instance, a country as developed and the USA where the defence of human dignity and protection of citizens’ well-being are founding pillars has its share of mistakes in its understanding and implementation of its welfare state model. Let us take healthcare as an example, which failed miserably and had to be rescued by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (AKA Obamacare) with the ambitious goal of enrolling 6 million people into private health care plans via the Affordable Care Act. The goal was ambitious but was met as 7 million people enrolled for private coverage. The new law, notedthe Los Angeles Times, "has spurred the largest expansion in health coverage in America in half a century." So this affordable health insurance should solve an important problem in the US society, even if it means that citizens have to pay from their own pockets to ensure receiving tis vital service. A country that spends trillions on weapons is asking its citizens to enrol in private health schemes.  Where welfare in that is, I am not quite sure.

    This Act would have appalled and caused mass demonstrations in European countries which frowned upon such a solution. Let’s take Spain for example, an excellent model of supreme health services, where citizens, foreigners, tourists and illegal immigrants all have access to free, immediate and excellent health services. Retired European senior citizens flee to sunny Spain feeling confident that they would be in safe hands. They know that they will be taken care of without any discrimination or additional payments. The health system is very well designed and transparent, where citizens are assigned to a health centre and a set of doctors to consult when in need with zero charge. That is indeed a state that cares about the wellbeing of its citizens, as no one would worry about being unattended in times of need. Or is that so? The problem with a highly organized and regulated system is that it tends to kill the human and social aspect. As a patient you become a number…that number gets you to that only hospital, to that only doctor and to that only appointment. You can’t choose your healthcare practitioner, nor can you tailor your appointments to your needs, nor can you establish a personal relation with any of the staff. You are identified by an ID that dictates your future when it comes to health issues and how they are addressed. You don’t exist outside that number. That sense of security suddenly fades in a moment of emergency or illogical and inexplicable worry. The system does not identify worry as a reason to access such services. Surprisingly, a non-welfare state offers –sometimes- a relief dose much needed in these advanced systems. Let us take Jordan as an example, a country that does not enjoy an efficient healthcare service, but is one where one can feel secure nonetheless. You do exist outside your ID number. A telephone call can solve a problem or push a date back. Logic, compassion and common sense are not limited by bureaucracy and systems. Your confidence stems not from the quality of the system but the quality of the staffs’ character and morals. The social ties and cultural background in this county, as may be in other countries I assume, are a solid rock to many…a safe place to fall back on. Welfare, in my opinion, is a sense of security, confidence that when in need someone will help in a personalized manner. It is not paying little money in a private health scheme with a fancy name, neither is it a blind treatment of ailments in a manner void of any compassion or interest. It is indeed a prompt response, a flexible attitude and a personalized treatment. To conclude, welfare means different things to different people and different nations. My personal understanding of it has been strengthened and rooted thanks to my experience with Jordanian healthcare. Not a welfare state perhaps, but one of welfare health providers.

Peaceful Taliban

     

     The Afghan Taliban on Saturday called for an end to violence against Muslims in the Central African Republic, a statement echoed by al-Qaida's North Africa branch. After weeks of atrocities and horrific acts of barbarity committed by the 'anti-balaka' militia against Muslim citizens, along with mutilations, death sentences, beatings, burnings and terrorization, the Muslim salvation group decided to speak out and call on the international community and the Christian leadership in particular to put an end to what is happening. The question is: where are they? They found their way to the US, and Iraq and now in Syria, fighting for the liberty and dignity of Muslim citizens across the world…does the Central African Republic not count? Do Muslim suffering in the African country fall under a second class category of Muslims? Fighters were able to infiltrate into the Middle Eastern region and North Africa, but could not go further south? In no way am I suggesting or promoting their involvement in Central Africa, or anywhere else, but perhaps the rhetoric and the hypocrisy of these militant organizations must be acknowledged by themselves first, and then by their admirers. To claim to defend an ideology/religion by all possible means and at any cost may sound heroic and idealist (to some), but to “pick your fights” changes the equation. It is no secret that Syria, Iraq and the Middle East in general is of greater interest to Al Qaeda (and to an extent Taliban), may it be of strategic, political or economic purposes, and the for the time being Central Africa does not seem a lucrative engagement.    

      Sirs (Taliban and Qaeda militants), a statement condemning what is happening and calling on the Pope to interfere do not sound like something you would generally say nor do they reflect your brutal and bloody strategies. If there is a change in heart in respect to your tactics and the African country's events have opened your eyes to a new diplomatic and peaceful way to tackle crises, then please advise. If not, then it would be more dignified (and credible) to retract your statement. It was pointless, and void, and will remain so.

     I will conclude with a George W. Bush statement that once made no sense (apologies) but now appears to be accurate: “you are either with us or against us”. Just as the political thinker Maurice Duverger suggested, there is no real centrality in politics…you either agree with one solution or the other, take the side of one party or the other. No matter how many variations of a decision there are, in the end, it is either “this” or “that”. Centrality is false. The same is applicable to our dear militias, you either choose the "diplomatic wing" or the "violence wing". It is either the political and diplomatic course when it comes to conflicts in all nations where Muslims are oppressed, or blood shed and violence. You can’t have it both ways...it is futile, just like everything elese you  did or said.

Note: This is a link to a video exposing what is happening in Central Africa…viewer discretion is strongly advised. http://alarabalyawm.net/?p=127216

What Machiavelli Said

The 16^th century politician and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli argued in his morally controversial book “The Prince” that the final objective of politics is to conserve and augment political power. He championed absolute monarchy in the chaotic renaissance Italy which was facing a problem of a corrupt and damaged society, arguing that when the necessary virtues disappear from a given society, it is not possible to neither restore such virtues nor form an organized government except via tyrannical power. Such a tyrannical power, he argued, enjoyed a special status in respect to the society. The governor, according to Machiavelli, is above morality; morality that must be adhered to by the group of citizens, but not the governor himself. The only way to measure the success of such a governor is through the policies he applies to augment the power of his state. Machiavelli also recommended despotism in the creation of new states and the reform of a corrupt one, adding that when corruption is vast, laws would be impotent and incapable of containing such corruption, hence the need of an iron-fist governance model. To save a country, issues of justice and injustice, humanity and cruelty, glory and infamy are not to be considered…what is primordial is the salvation of the state and the protection of its existence and liberty.

The resonance behind Machiavelli’s masterpiece and his political thought amidst a corrupt and divided Italy (controlled by heads of the church at the time) is beyond the scope of this article. What is intended is to draw parallels between the arguments applied centuries ago with those used today by tyrannical leaders and oligarchic leaderships in Arab states. Observing the arguments used by the Assad regime, the defence strategy of actions made in the name of "protecting Syria" and the logic behind the positions it has been taking throughout the past three years, one can say that indeed, some do believe that the only path towards salvation of a nation is through tyrannical leaders. The constant reminding of the dangers of islamists, the hand of Israel in the riots, the personal and self-serving interests of the suggested alternative government and the hidden agendas of regional and international actors are the arguments used and repeated by this regime. The acts of violence, targeting of citizens, blood shedding and stubborn hold on to power are all being justified by Assad, his circle of elites and his sympathizers, both local and international.

  Perhaps the prophecy of Machiavelli is true…perhaps morality is not to be applied on all equally…perhaps the protection of the existence of the nation is an objective that justifies acts of cruelty and injustice…perhaps holding on to power is the ultimate objective of politics….but what is sure is that such a line of thought only exists in that part of the world.