Polite separatism or uniform unity?

An article published in Political Theory Journal in January 2017 discussed the moral versus procedural aspects of deliberative democracy. The article analysed different theories and positions of renowned theorists, including the two preeminent post-WWII philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas regarding the role of reason in political accord. The author, Dereker Barker, suggests that deliberative theory sees politics as an integrative model, and seeks to locate the process of public will-formation on formal processes that adhere to certain rule, rather than a sense of collective identity. Collective identity, whether considered in its most individualist or communitarian form forms a baseline for public reasoning in a general and broad sense, and not a representation of individualist sense of morality. Haberman refuses – as quotes in Three Normative Models – that political questions be reduced to the type of ethical questions we ask ourselves regarding who we are and who we would like to be. He rejects collective identity as the basis of a deliberative model, whose legitimacy lies in impersonal formal processes.

 

Barker argues that deliberative democracy requires a shared civic culture of mutual understanding of differences. It does not require an intense sense of social solidarity, but needs citizens to share habits, inclinations and capacities to engage in communication across their differences. He also explains that according to Rawl, public reason enables citizens to see liberal democratic institutions in public terms, independent of their particular moral and religious worldviews. Public reason necessarily requires to reason from others’ perspective, whilst considering at the same time that public reasoning might be jeopardised when it conflicts with their personal interests and beliefs.

 

In this context, it is necessary to consider the difference between pluralist liberalism and civic republicanism. The latter seeks to establish social harmony, while the latter demonstrates a lukewarm acceptance and tolerance to differences.  Reason that tolerates differences or reason that is based on common beliefs is a question that must be addressed in nations that are witnessing rapid changes in their cultural landscape.

 

Should a growing community of Chinese immigrants be forcefully influenced by the western code of conduct so that deliberations would be based on common understanding, or should their views be respected and untouched but not taken into account on the premises of ‘majority rules’. What is more important, preserving culture or exerting influence?

 

The collective identity of any society is destined to metamorphose, owing to changes in its composition and to the developing religious, ideological and intellectual bases. However, if this change is witnessed uniformly across a homogenous society, political deliberations would be successful and public reasoning would be void of individualistic considerations. The picture is not quite the same when it concerns a society that is composed of a segregated society that favours political marginalisation to an identity loss.

 

As an immigrant/expat myself, I still do not know whether reason or heart should decide on this.

Derek Barker (2017) Deliberative Justice and Collective Identity: A Virtues-Centred Perspective, Political Theory, 2017, Vol. 45 (1) 116-136

تعليق: لا للمنطق

نسخ من مقال نشر في صحيفة الغد

'كانت جملة رجال الدين المسيحي والإسلامي في العصور الوسطى يعتقدون أن الفلسفة والمنطق عدوان للدين، وأن تعلمهما يجعل الفرد يشك في صحته، أو يكفر به ويرتد عنه. وقد شبه رجال الدين المسلمون في حينه تعلم المنطق بتعلم الزندقة، فقالوا: "من تمنطق فقد تزندق". غير أنه لما كان غير ممكن منع التفلسف والتمنطق بحكم الدهشة وحب الاستطلاع والمعرفة عند الإنسان، فقد اضطر رجال الدين إلى تعلّم الفلسفة والمنطق وتعليمهما، للدفاع عن الدين والتصدي للمجدفين والمهرطقين والمارقين.
ولما بلغت الحضارة العربية الإسلامية أوجها في القرن الرابع الهجري؛ نتيجة انهيار السلطة المركزية وتفشي الانقسام السياسي، وتنافس الدويلات المسلمة المستقلة على رعاية الفلسفة والآداب والعلوم والفنون، رأيت الفلسفة والمنطق يزدهران، والمناظرات بين الفلاسفة تنتشر في كل مكان، ما اضطرهم إلى وضع قواعد للمناظرة: "اجتمع متكلمان (فيلسوفان إسلاميان) فقال أحدهما للآخر: هل لك في المناظرة؟ فقال: على شرائط: أن لا تغضب، ولا تعجب، ولا تشغب، ولا تحكم، ولا تقبل على غيري وأنا أكلمك، ولا تجعل الدعوى دليلاً، ولا تجوز لنفسك تأويل آية على مذهبك إلا جوزت لي تأويلها على مذهبي، وعلى أن تؤثر التصادق، وتنقاد للتعارف، وعلى أن كلاً منا يبني مناظرته على أن الحق ضالته، والرشد غايته".

ولأن انتشار الفلسفة والمنطق زاد على حده في نظر الإمام أبي حامد الغزالي (المتوفى عام 505هـ)، فقد تحول إلى ضدهما، وألف كتابه المشهور "تهافت الفلاسفة" الذي وقف رجال الدين آنذاك بين مؤيد له ومعارض. ولما وقع كتاب الغزالي بين يدي فيلسوف الأندلس الأعظم أبو الوليد بن رشد، المولود بعد وفاة الغزالي بخمس عشرة سنة، استفزه ما جاء فيه، فنهض للرد عليه؛ فقرة فقرة، وفكرة فكرة، بكتاب سماه "تهافت التهافت". كان هدف ابن رشد كهدف الغزالي؛ الدفاع عن الإسلام، ولكن بالفلسفة والمنطق والبرهان. كما ألف ابن رشد كتاباً آخر سماه "فصل المقال فيما بين الحكمة والشريعة من الاتصال"، للدفاع عن الدين بالفلسفة 

ونظراً لشهرة ابن رشد في الأندلس وأوروبا، وتقريب الأمير له، فقد حسدته البطانة وتآمرت مع رجال الدين السذج عليه، وحرضوا الأمير عليه، فحوكم في جامع قرطبة الكبير (عام 591هـ) بتهمة الكفر والزندقة. ولكنه دافع عن فكره ببسالة، إلا أن الحكم صدر بحرق جميع كتبه ما خلا ما له علاقة بالطب لحاجة البلاط إليه، وبالفلك والحساب لحاجة المسلمين إليها في المواقيت. ونُفي خارج قرطبة إلى قرية أليسانة اليهودية، فأشاع خصومه وأعداؤه أنه يهودي الأصل، كالعادة المتبعة إلى اليوم أو الموروثة عن الأسلاف عن اتهام بعض الزعماء العرب بذلك. ولما ضج بعض الناس احتجاجاً على المعاملة المذلة لابن رشد، أصدر الأمير بياناً متغطرساً يشرح فيه أسباب اضطهاد ابن رشد، وأنه للدفاع عن الدين الحنيف؛ الحجة القديمة الجديدة الدائمة كلما احتاجوا إلى اضطهاد مفكر أو فيلسوف.
لم تقتصر النقمة على ابن رشد، بل شملت كل المنشغلين بالفلسفة والمنطق الذين شردوا في الأفاق. لكن محنة ابن رشد لم تدم طويلاً، فقد عفا عنه الأمير لحاجته إليه لتعلّم الفلسفة والمنطق. لكن هذا الود لم يدم طويلاً، فقد نُفي ثانيةً ولكن إلى مراكش حيث مات بعيداً عن وطنه (عام 595هـ).

يذكرني حرق كتب ابن رشد في القرن الخامس الهجري بحرق التلاميذ والمعلمين والجمهور للكتب الإسلامية المدرسية في القرن الحادي والعشرين. فما أشبه الليلة بالبارحة؟ '

تعليق

ديفيد هيوم،  أحد الفلاسفة المرموقين في القرن الثامن عشر, أشار أن  المنطق وحده لا يمكن أن يكون الدافع لإرادة، بل المنطق هو "عبد الأهواء" حيث لا تستمد المواقف الأخلاقية من المنطق. إذا نظرنا حجته، يمكننا أن نستنتج أن المنطق -  كمفهوم مجرد - يتأثر بالضرورة بالقيم ، ويجعل المواقف أخلاقية وغير أخلاقية بناء على الفضيلة، وليس المنطق. وبالتالي، فإن المخاوف التي عبر عنها المحافظون حول التعاليم الفلسفية هي شهادة على حقيقة أن البوصلة الأخلاقية في العديد من الدول مبنية على أسس ضعيفة. الأخلاق أن يبررها القصاص بدلا من فضيلة يمكن أن تؤدي إلى تغذية المخاوف في العالم العربي من التعمق في الفلسفة.

Erdogan Abelhamid II

The Ottoman constitution of 1876 was the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, drafted by the Young Ottomans when Sultan Abedlahamid II acceded to the throne. However, Abdelhamid’s iron-fist rule meant that the Constitution was only in effect for two years, from 1876 to 1878 during the First Constitutional Era, and Empire’s hopes for political opening were shattered. For years, the Sultan exercised absolute power and controlled a ring of a ruling oligarchical elite. The Constitution was reinstated in 1908 following the Young Turk Revolution. The Constitution allowed for the respect of minorities and their right to be represented in regional assemblies, democratizing the Ottoman institutions and ceding representative rights to the disenfranchised. What Abdelhamid II planned to carry out with his absolute monarchy and autocratic rule by burying the Constitution was trumped by the courage, vision, and justice of the Yong Ottomans.

 

It is important to revert to this historical era of Turkey when it served as the centre of the Ottoman Empire, and underline the dichotomy between the actions taken by the young Sultan and their underlying reasons. The promulgation of a Constitution in 1876 under the Sultan’s nascent rein was hailed as an achievement and as a promise to political development and opening. Nations embedded in the Ottoman fabric of multi-confessional, multi-ethnic, and multi-continental Empire were thrilled to learn that their voice would be heard. Nonetheless, reality proved different, and nations were subject to further discrimination and control of freedoms.  

 

History seems to repeat itself. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’ ruling Justice and Development Party unveiled a proposed amendment to the Constitution which would change the political system, from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. The envisaged amendments include the abolishment of the prime minister's office and the cabinet; the appointment of the president as the head of the executive branch; and the preservation of the President’s ties with his (ruling) political party.

 

Presidential system and semi-presidential system has proven effective and democratic, taking the American and French systems as an example. However, the balance of powers and the accountability of the president and his team before the parliament are guaranteed in both systems, considering that the legislative body needs not be composed of a majority of the President’s party. Furthermore, the president is not necessarily the party’s leader but one of its figures, allowing therefore the party to oppose presidential positions and policies.

 

In other words, what the present Turkish constitutional amendment suggests is that the President will be elected by the public, who will simultaneously select the parliament. The party that will form the majority of the latter will logically and deductively be the party that backs the President. Consequently, the parliament, the president and his cabinet will be subject to the whims of one figure: the president.

 

So what Erdogan is proposing to do does not differ much from what Abdelhamid II did briefly back in the late 19^th century. However, while in the latter’s case the abolition of the Constitution lead to absolute monarchy, in the former’s case, the amendment of the Constitution will lead to a legalised autocracy. Time will only reveal what this ‘opening’ will lead to in the Turkish scene, and what it would mean for minorities and opposition powers.

That Would Be Mirific

In the ancient city of Rome, Britain’s foreign secretary mustered much lacking courage from the political elite and bluntly accused the Al Saud clan as acting as a puppeteer in proxy wars in the region. Whether it is through the proxy war in Syria or the direct war again Yemeni Houthis in the South, Saudi Arabia’s regional politics were criticised in the open, in an unprecedented and historical moment.

Obviously, the angered and embarrassed Prime Minster was relieved to know that the government’s spokesperson clarified that these comments do not reflect the official position of the UK government, but rather the foreign secretary’s personal views. This statement in itself accounts for a separate critical article, considering that these statements were made during an official event, not over a family dinner. The spokesperson went on to clarify that ‘Saudi Arabia was a vital partner for the UK, particularly on counter-terrorism and, when you look at what is happening in the region, we are supportive of the Saudi-led coalition which is working in support of the legitimate government in Yemen against Houthi rebels.

Saudi-British relations extend well beyond decades of mutual cooperation and understanding over economic and political files.

 In fact, the understanding struck between Great Britain and the Sherfis of Mecca prior to the Great Arab Revolt in 1916, and the subsequent reconciliation and understanding with Al Saud who took over modern day Saudi Arabia, has developed into a romance between the two nations.

There are a great deal of benefits that each side reaps from the other, and very convincing grounds to turn a blind eye to the detrimental policies followed by both governments. Cooperating on certain files will guarantee mutual benefits, so let us ignore the atrocities created by one of us. This mutual agreement reflects a well-known example of game theory known as Prisoners' Dilemma, which explains how the payoff structure affect the likelihood and robustness of cooperation.

First, it is necessary to define Prisoners' Dilemma – the article published by Kenneth A. Oye best describes it. ‘Prisoners' Dilemma: Two prisoners are suspected of a major crime. The authorities possess evidence to secure conviction on only a minor charge. If neither prisoner squeals, both will draw a light sentence on the minor charge (CC). If one prisoner squeals and the other stonewalls, the rat will go free (DC) and the sucker will draw a very heavy sentence (CD). If both squeal, both will draw a moderate sentence (DD). Each prisoner's preference ordering is: DC > CC > DD > CD. If the prisoners expect to "play" only one time, each prisoner will be better off squealing than stonewalling, no matter what his partner chooses to do (DC > CC and DD > CD). The temptation of the rat payoff and fear of the sucker payoff will drive single-play Prisoners' Dilemmas toward mutual defection. Unfortunately, if both prisoners act on this reasoning, they will draw a moderate sentence on the major charge, while cooperation could have led to a light sentence on the minor charge (CC > DD).’

It can be assumed that the prisoners are The UK and Saudi Arabia. If they cooperate and do not tell on one another regarding the absurd policies they are following, then the judge (international community) will draw a light sentence of polite recrimination/criticism (behind closed doors). If the UK attacks Saudi policies (Boris Johnson’s attempt), and Saudi Arabia denies, the UK will be hailed before liberal forces (DC), and its accomplice will be shunned (CD) – similar to the USA-Iraq scenario years earlier. If they both recognise the faults in their policies, both will be criticized, but moderately (DD). So far, it seems that the agreement is on the CC scenario – a scenario which is ignoring the bloodshed, loss of lives, and shatter of heritage and sense of humanity. Destructive, euphemistic, selfish, and blind cooperation can lead to nothing but the prioritisation of the payoff.

To finish off, the foreign secretary stressed that there is no strong enough leadership in the countries (Middle East) themselves. Perhaps that is correct, and perhaps this extends to British leadership as well. In an excellent analogy, the Chicken game-theory best describes the options available. Oye, again, describes it best: ‘Chicken: Two drivers race down the center of a road from opposite directions. If one swerves and the other does not, then the first will suffer the stigma of being known as a chicken (CD) while the second will enjoy being known as a hero (DC). If neither swerves, both will suffer grievously in the ensuing collision (DD). If both swerve, damage to the reputation of each will be limited (CC). In single-play Chicken, the temptations of unilateral defection are balanced by fear of mutual defection’. Perhaps what is needed is that both the UK and Britain swerve in order to avoid catastrophe.

 

Now that would be mirific.

 

Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses And Strategies, KENNETH A. OYE, 1985.

The garbage can model

Cohen, March, and Olsen (1974) conferred that in organised anarchies, decisions are interpreted as the result of interrelations between a stream of problems, a stream of solutions, a stream, of participants, and a stream of choices. The garbage can model, a term coined by these authors, suggests that actors taking these decisions have no stable goals, where decisions are made without comparing goals with solutions, and are not a product of negotiation between groups of interest. The garbage can model allows the development of several reflections without closely relating intentions to actions or causes to effects (Warglien, Mascuh, 1996: 57-58).

Clearly, some of the rhetorical speeches of newly elected President Donald Trump point to his tendency to resort to the garbage can model in his proposed foreign policy.  This is particularly relevant to the nuclear deal that was struck between the United Nations Security Council and Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was concluded on 14 July 2015 by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union and Iran, and was endorsed on 20 July 2015 by the Security Council through resolution 2231 (2015)).His threats to scrap the deal and re-impose sanctions might be void of substance, and filled with political hauteur, but have caused the Persian political machine to steam up and prepare for a media war.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani explained last week that Donald Trump’s victory cannot reverse the deal Tehran reached last year  - a deal that cannot be dismissed by a single government, adding that the US elections will have no effect on Iranian policies. Just today (Monday, November 14th), the Head of Iran’s Nuclear Energy Organisation stated that Iran is ready for all possible scenarios following Trump’s election, including the worst scenario. Another rhetorically-soaked statement from Iran’s side, although the position was apparently formulated in a non-garbage can approach.

It should be reminded that although the nuclear deal is in place, Iran has continued to develop military technologies, including ballistic missiles. Iran has also used ballistic missile testing and harassment of U.S. vessels to assert Iran's military power. In fact, Iran warned that it could – from a technical point of view- return to enriching uranium quickly, and that within one year, Iran can reach the enrichment levels that they have reached prior to the deal – if not surpass that level. The EU meanwhile is standing in the middle, carefully planning its investment options in oil and resource rich Iran.

Trump might be bluffing, and might have spoken out of a moment of passion. The problem of his statements however is that the international scene will remain at edge. Even if the US does not lift a finger and change a coma in the deal, and even if Tehran remains pacific and does not challenge the limitations imposed on Iran by the deal, the best case scenario is that the status quo will be maintained. Rash and thoughtless statements made by rash and thoughtless political heads through such an anarchical system of decision making will only freeze developments on the Iranian file. Whatever Mr Trumps’ political gamble in the region is, what is ensured is that his statements might be misinterpreted in Iran, and will have severe consequences on the region as a whole. A challenge of an economic nature will be responded to by a political action executed by Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria, or Yemen. Wasting money and wasting blood are synonyms in this game – if Trump dares to jeopardise Iran’s economic opening, Tehran will not shy away from creating more stir in the region. Words will likely be met by actions from Iran’s side – and it will not be blamed.  Perhaps the garbage can model of decision making and statement drafting should be rethought by the new President.

Warglein M., Mausch, M (1996) The Logic of Organization, Walter de Gruyter, Germany

Barking Episode

I was walking back home two days ago and decided to take the longer road, which had a nice park in the middle. I thought it would be a good occasion to relax and enjoy the tranquillity of a Spanish suburb.  A group of old ladies were sitting on a bench, side by side, probably enjoying a typical evening with neighbours, whilst observing the pedestrians. A minute later, I spotted two veiled women walking the opposite direction; in spite of the veil, the women’s attire was perfectly normal to Spanish standards. They were wearing jumpsuits, and were most probably exercising – if strolling down a street is considered as such.  When these two ladies approached the bench on which the old ladies were sitting, a tiny – yet boisterous - dog started barking its heart out. The dog hurdled off its master’s lap, and circulated the two veiled women, making it impossible for them to carry on walking without stepping over the dog (which I secretly hoped they would). In the dog's defence, the loyal pet was probably only defending its owner’s territory. Not being summoned by one of the old ladies, the only instinctive reaction that the dog could harbour was to chase these two women and bark them away.

I expected the pet’s owner to whistle the dog back to her, or to fetch him. However, the old women just sat there staring at the scene before them in silence. They did not summon the dog nor shush it; they just sat there.

There might be many reasons why no action was taken by these old ladies; perhaps the size of the dog and his amiability - to which they grew accustomed- made it unnecessary to do anything. However, it was quite obvious that the dog was being aggressive and offensive; his barking was no music to anybody’s ears. The question that immediately popped onto my mind was this sinister one: did these old ladies deliberately not act? Was their silence a statement towards the undesired class of immigrants who follow a certain faith?

An article I published a few weeks earlier addressed the issue of Spanish media’s depiction of the Muslim community, and its obsession with the Hijab. A couple of weeks later, a renowned conservative Spanish newspaper covered the story of the assassination of the Jordanian political activist and journalist Nahed Hattar on September 25^th. Nahed Hattar, like many other Jordanian activists and thinkers, was critical of the notorious Islamic State and shared a caricature that made fun of the fundamentalists' interpretation of heaven. The story should have been depicted as such, but Spanish media decided otherwise. The newspaper highlighted the religious affiliation of the journalist (Christian), while a left-oriented Spanish newspaper went so far as to point to the radical Sunni interpretation of the Islamic doctrine which was the subject of the journalist's caricature. 

What the Spanish media is doing is not only diffusing inaccurate, erroneaous, and unnecessary details that can easily manipulate and influence public opinion (who cares if the interpretation is Sunni, Shiaa or Alawi), but it is also forcing ideological motives into an issue that is void of one. Mr Hattar's Christianity had nothing to do with his death. Depicting a Christian martyr being killed in a Muslim dominated Amman, does not – in any shape or form – add substance to the story. Whether Mr Hattar was Christian or Muslim, the fact is, he was assassinated by a radical and demented fundamentalist. The picture that the newspaper itself posted on the news item reveals a veiled Muslim woman trying desperately to resuscitate Mr Hattar; subsequently, the story is not about Muslim vs Christian, but rather about the dangers of radical tendencies. It is radical to kill someone because of supposed blasphemy, and it is also radical to blame an entire religious doctrine for the act.

Now an old Spanish lady who is sipping coffee with her neighbours will not go into the details of the story: what she saw was the brutal assassination of a Christian by the hands of a Muslim. What she saw is the dark and gloomy side of a young Spanish woman who decided to convert to Islam and turned into a bag of misery (please see ‘Oh My Veil’). What she saw was that the mere criticism of Islam can cost one’s life. This old lady was not provided with an objective news item of a man who was politically and socially active, and his activity led to his assassination. Period.

Had this been the case, the old ladies might not have stayed silent while the dog was chasing the two Muslim women. These old ladies might have had every reason to suspect and reject the Muslim faith and its followers: they manifested such a rejection with silence and disinterest.

One can only imagine the dangers facing the European society in light of this islamophobia. The media must become more responsible and reasonable: creating an ambience of scepticism will only alienate a society whose vast majority is pacific, moderate, and peaceful. Europeans cannot celebrate multiculturalism and reject it at the same time. Se-Hyoung Yi* says it best when he explained that:

‘Multiculturalism deprives minorities of their cultural and moral claims in an ironic way: minority cultures may be able to exist, but they will also be separated and isolated’.

On a positive note, one of the veiled women who was being barked upon refused to be bullied by the dog – and its owner. Instead of addressing the ladies and asking them to curb the dog’s enthusiastic defence, she simply stood firm, stared at the dog and barked back at him. It was a good two minute barking competition between the two, and the veiled lady managed to shove him away and to continue jogging. I wish I saw the look on her face, and that of the ladies, but I can only imagine it.

 

*Democratic Inclusion and ‘Suffering Together’ in the Eumenides: Duality of Immigrants, Political Theory, 2015, Vol. 43(I) 30-53

Ich bin nicht aus Zucker

An article published in the Economist on 30 June had this opening line “Ask some Germans how people should react to terrorism and most would probably agree with the historian Herfried Münkler that the best attitude is heroische Gelassenheit: heroic calmness. Let other countries declare wars on terrorism and near-permanent states of emergency, they say; Germany’s dark history has taught it not to over-react”.

Yes, Germany had a dark history, and a share of misery, poverty, and war, coupled with an arduous and constant effort to redeem itself for mistakes created by long gone political brutes, cladded in ideological uniforms of scientific rationalism. Nonetheless, Germans realised that history must serve a purpose, and that purpose is to learn how to shape, control, and direct actions in an effective, efficient, and intelligent manner in order to achieve the desired objectives.

When the entire world expected a fuming Angela Merkel to step up on a pedestal and read, in passionate and heated German, that the nation will not succumb to terrorists who will be easily crushed under German boots, the silence of the German leader stunned the zealous audience. No, we will not crush anyone under our boots, nor impose collective punishment. We will not condole those who we love and owed to protect and who lost those they loved and vowed to protect with a promise to hunt the perpetrators and their accomplices like dogs.

Meanwhile, speeches made by Middle Easter leaders failed to resemble in any shape or form the level-mindedness of their German counterpart. Promises by Turkish leaders to impose “the strictest procedures ever established to counter terrorists”, the Afghani promise to “bury the terrorists with our vengeance”, the Chechen leader’s wishful plan of “selecting the best 2000 Chechen fighters to abolish and diminish all ISIS affiliates in street fight”, and the Iraqi calls for “galvanizing the powers of the fighters and heroic mujahideen” all sound similar to the much familiar promises of medieval rhetoric to stir passions. Many are the times that we read articles in Arabic newspapers which start off with calls to crush the enemy, smother them in their sleep, turn their weapons against them, wipe them off the face of the earth, mobilise the thirsty-for-justice young freedom fighters…the list of ardent cliché phrases goes on.

It is true that the Middle East’s share of terrorism is much higher than that of Europe, and that desperate measures are necessary in certain conditions. However, for a nation that has been mired with war and unrest since the early 1920s, would it be the wisest decision to foment feelings and desires of vengeance through rhetorical and inflamed speeches? Is a hubristic assumption that eradicating wrong-doing can and must come at the expense of humanity and reason? Is the Arab/Muslim nation so fragile that it cannot deal with misery other than a through a mindless urge and call for vengeance? Do leaders assume that by inflaming the passionate streets, the problems of radicalism, terrorism and fanaticism are solved? Are we that fragile to the attractive and luring choice of blind outrageous vendetta?

The German saying of ‘We are not made out of sugar’ must resonate better with us. Perhaps for a religious community, we can change the proverb into salt to assimilate Lot’s story and his turned-into-a pillar-of -salt wife, who probably dissolved when it was pouring acid rain. No, we will not dissolve into a container of hatred and vengeance because of drop of rain or a hurricane. We are neither made out of sugar nor salt.