Notions

S even months into the tenure of the Jordanian 18 th Lower House of Parliament, no miracles have yet taken place. The parliamentary elections were celebrated in September 2016 under a new election law that changed the electoral system into a fully proportional system under which candidates and political parties participate in open electoral lists at the district level. Under the new system, candidates must register through lists on the district level with a minimum of three members on each list. The number of candidates on the list cannot exceed that of the available seats in the respective district and is generally topped off at ten. Voters can cast their vote for the whole list as such, for different candidates on one list or for all candidates from the chosen list. Through the open list system, there is thus competition between the different lists as well as between the candidates of each list. It must be underlined however that voters can cast their vote for only one list – a

Muaawiya Bin Abi Sufyan was the first Umayyad Caliph, who ruled as a just and jovial leader until his death in 683 AD. Known for his sense of humour and his love for women, Abi Sufyan was famous for a story that took place in his own harem. While escorting a woman for the Khorasan region in modern day Iran, a beautiful woman entered the harem and mesmerised the Leader of All Believers. With his pride in his manhood and prowess in the bed arena, Abi Sufyan did not hesitate to engage in a brazen and manly sexual act in front of the Khorasani woman, who was patiently waiting for her turn. After he was done, he turned victoriously to his first concubine and asked her how to say ‘lion' in Persian - in a direct analogy to his sexual performance.  The Khorasani woman, unamused, told him slyly, that lion is kaftar in Persian. The Caliph went back to his Court ever so jubilant and told his subjects – repeatedly – that he was one lucky kaftar. His subjects started gi

An article published in Political Theory Journal in January 2017 discussed the moral versus procedural aspects of deliberative democracy. The article analysed different theories and positions of renowned theorists, including the two preeminent post-WWII philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas regarding the role of reason in political accord. The author, Dereker Barker, suggests that deliberative theory sees politics as an integrative model, and seeks to locate the process of public will-formation on formal processes that adhere to certain rule, rather than a sense of collective identity. Collective identity, whether considered in its most individualist or communitarian form forms a baseline for public reasoning in a general and broad sense, and not a representation of individualist sense of morality. Haberman refuses – as quotes in Three Normative Models – that political questions be reduced to the type of ethical questions we ask ourselves regarding who we are and who we

نسخ من مقال نشر في صحيفة الغد 'كا نت جملة رجال الدين المسيحي والإسلامي في العصور الوسطى يعتقدون أن الفلسفة والمنطق عدوان للدين، وأن تعلمهما يجعل الفرد يشك في صحته، أو يكفر به ويرتد عنه. وقد شبه رجال الدين المسلمون في حينه تعلم المنطق بتعلم الزندقة، فقالوا: "من تمنطق فقد تزندق". غير أنه لما كان غير ممكن منع التفلسف والتمنطق بحكم الدهشة وحب الاستطلاع والمعرفة عند الإنسان، فقد اضطر رجال الدين إلى تعلّم الفلسفة والمنطق وتعليمهما، للدفاع عن الدين والتصدي للمجدفين والمهرطقين والمارقين. ولما بلغت الحضارة العربية الإسلامية أوجها في القرن الرابع الهجري؛ نتيجة انهيار السلطة المركزية وتفشي الانقسام السياسي، وتنافس الدويلات المسلمة المستقلة على رعاية الفلسفة والآداب والعلوم والفنون، رأيت الفلسفة والمنطق يزدهران، والمناظرات بين الفلاسفة تنتشر في كل مكان، ما اضطرهم إلى وضع قواعد للمناظرة: "اجتمع متكلمان (فيلسوفان إسلاميان) فقال أحدهما للآخر: هل لك في المناظرة؟ فقال: على شرائط: أن لا تغضب، ولا تعجب، ولا تشغب، ولا تحكم، ولا تقبل على غيري وأنا أكلمك، ولا تجعل الدعوى دليلاً،

The Ottoman constitution of 1876 was the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, drafted by the Young Ottomans when Sultan Abedlahamid II acceded to the throne. However, Abdelhamid’s iron-fist rule meant that the Constitution was only in effect for two years, from 1876 to 1878 during the First Constitutional Era, and Empire’s hopes for political opening were shattered. For years, the Sultan exercised absolute power and controlled a ring of a ruling oligarchical elite. The Constitution was reinstated in 1908 following the Young Turk Revolution. The Constitution allowed for the respect of minorities and their right to be represented in regional assemblies, democratizing the Ottoman institutions and ceding representative rights to the disenfranchised. What Abdelhamid II planned to carry out with his absolute monarchy and autocratic rule by burying the Constitution was trumped by the courage, vision, and justice of the Yong Ottomans.   It is important to revert to this histo

In the ancient city of Rome, Britain ’s foreign secretary mustered much lacking courage from the political elite and bluntly accused the Al Saud clan as acting as a puppeteer in proxy wars in the region. Whether it is through the proxy war in Syria or the direct war again Yemeni Houthis in the South, Saudi Arabia’s regional politics were criticised in the open, in an unprecedented and historical moment. Obviously, the angered and embarrassed Prime Minster was relieved to know that the government’s spokesperson clarified that these comments do not reflect the official position of the UK government, but rather the foreign secretary’s personal views. This statement in itself accounts for a separate critical article, considering that these statements were made during an official event, not over a family dinner. The spokesperson went on to clarify that ‘Saudi Arabia was a vital partner for the UK, particularly on counter-terrorism and, when you look at what is happening in the re

Cohen, Ma rch, and Olsen (1974) conferred that in organised anarchies, decisions are interpreted as the result of interrelations between a stream of problems, a stream of solutions, a stream, of participants, and a stream of choices. The garbage can model, a term coined by these authors, suggests that actors taking these decisions have no stable goals, where decisions are made without comparing goals with solutions, and are not a product of negotiation between groups of interest. The garbage can model allows the development of several reflections without closely relating intentions to actions or causes to effects (Warglien, Mascuh, 1996: 57-58). Clearly, some of the rhetorical speeches of newly elected President Donald Trump point to his tendency to resort to the garbage can model in his proposed foreign policy.   This is particularly relevant to the nuclear deal that was struck between the United Nations Security Council and Iran ( the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was c