No motive

It was a clever plan. A 17-year-old carpentry-apprentice waited patiently until the target client purchased furniture from his employer, who in return tasked the young man in particular with delivering the furniture to the target’s rented apartment. Just when he made sure that no one was around, except for the landlord of course, the master-mind behind the plot charged and stabbed the victim with a screw-driver-turned-into-a-weapon. The victim quickly reached for his gun and fired a round of shots in the air that killed both the young attacker, and the innocent bystander (landlord). The failed attempt was politically motivated, as intelligently clarified by the law enforcement authorities of the screw driver victim’s country. Yes, the 17-year-old planned all of this to get out an important political message. No one shall be safe…furniture shops will serve as a breeding ground for young political criminal wannabes.  

The whole incident, sarcasm-free, occurred a week earlier when an Israeli embassy security guard shot dead a 17-year-old Jordanian man and the landlord who was at the wrong place at the wrong time. Allegedly, the young man was delivering furniture to the Israeli man, when they both quarrelled and the former attacked the latter with a screwdriver. To defend himself, the Israeli security guard reached out for his gun (like a sensible person would do), and with little regard to human life, killed both the young boy and the landlord who was standing there.

The tragedy of the entire episode, besides the unnecessary and unjustified death of two Jordanians, is the casual reaction of the Israeli government to the crime. To add insult to injury, Israeli officials have suggested that the incident was political (in response to the riots in Jerusalem following Tel Aviv’s wise decision to place metal detectors at Al Aqsa Mosque’s site).

By insisting on diplomatic immunity that protects the guard from questioning and prosecution, and by fabricating events and insisting on the ‘political motive’, Israel masked the regular excessive, brutal, unjustifiable, and non-discriminatory act with the typical self-defence rhetoric.

Any incident, any place and any time is meant to directly harm the innocent and defenceless (but gun bearing) Israeli civil servants – that is the common perception marketed by the masters of the victimisation theory. Had Tel Aviv had a little bit of tact, they would have at least given themselves some time to investigate the elements behind the incident and then blame it on political agendas.

It could have been a regular, old fashion argument between a client and an employee. It could have been an act of rage by a young young boy, which could have been handled more compassionately and wisely by an older and more sensible man. It could have been so many things, but death should not have been one of them.

God rest the souls of the two innocent victims.

Picture Perfect

        In an insightful op-ed, political analyst Fahd Al Khitan criticised the newly approved instructions developed by the Greater Amman Municipality regarding the professions that can be run from one’s own home. These professions range from intellectual activities, services, and food production. His criticism to these instructions is valid, but fails to address a number of key issues that are of equal – if no exceeding – importance.  

His argument that the conversion of buildings into small shops will create disturbances, tarnish the public appearance of residential areas, and contribute to further chaos and disquiet in already poorly planned neighbourhoods is pertinent to the problem at hand. Mr Khitan’s shift to the associated economic problems that will arise as a result to probable tax evasion, misuse of buildings’ infrastructure, and business- generated dregs is also understood, and so is his concluding paragraph and main argument that the decision will eventually lead to Amman’s loss of identity and transformation into a city with a random layout.

It will be assumed that the writer also meant to explicitly mention health and safety issues, and the possibility of transforming homes into sweatshop that employ already enslaved foreign employees. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that these vital issues were addressed as some of the major concerns.

However, the op-ed failed to address one important questions: why were these instructions emitted in the first place?

Failing to tackle this question as a first step is similar to criticising the decision of impoverished African villagers to collect unsanitary water to quench the thirst of children. Had potable water been available at ease, people would no jeopardise the health and wellbeing of their own families by searching for water from a puddle.

The unemployment rate in Jordan stands at 18.2% percent in the first quarter of 2017. There are around 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Jordan, representing almost 20 per cent of the country's population, and 14.2% of the population lives below the poverty line. Coupling this problem with growing unrest in the region and the ease of radicalisation amidst desperation, one can only expect the metamorphosis of socio economic problems into the catastrophes that mire the region.  

Policy making is not an easy task. It is neither clean cut. It has many shades of grey that are equally scandalous to a novel that carries a similar title. Some problems are more relevant and perilous than others. Opening the door for entrepreneurs try to start up their businesses with the least costs involved will stimulate innovations, entrepreneurship, solidarity, and hope. It will provide youngsters with the opportunity to think of how to build on their ideas rather than how to apply for immigration visas. It will give housewives a chance to convert their skills acquired through a lifetime into bread-winning activities that would contribute to sustaining families and empowering women. It would bring neighbours together to help out in waving carpets than in heating coal for argileh. It might create more trash, it might generate more noise, it might lure the unethical into missing the opening, but it will certainly motivate change.

If ensuring self-sufficiency and entrepreneurship would require in their initial stages a disturbance to the picture perfect of the city, then I hope a  new loud, boisterous and alive Amman resurrects from its long, and serene nap.

What Common Cause?

      

      President Donald Trump is on an international tour that was kicked off with a visit to Saudi Arabia. It was followed by a trip to Israel, which was subsequently followed by expected mess, confusion, and poor strategic vision. Trump opened his first visit to Israel by saying that he sees growing recognition among Muslim nations that they share a ´common cause´ with Israel in their determination to counter Iranian threats. The opportunity was ripe for a peace deal, he said. Reading this statement could be interpreted in only one of two ways: continued American arrogance and determination to fuel sectarianism, or stupidity. The latter option – as appealing and convincing as it may sound – might not be the sole motor behind the actions and the statements of the American president. His lack of experience is compensated for by the shrewd and wise insights received from veterans in diplomacy - such as Jared Kushner- and therefore, we need not to worry about that.

Now, sectarianism. Trump arrives to a country in which prisoners are on a hunger strike pressing for better conditions, and the situation is alarming. Everyone is at edge until the crisis ends.  The enemy, as far as the prisoners and their supporters are concerned, is primarily the Israeli government at the given moment. It is their biggest security threat and sole source of injustice. The Arab world at large is sympathising with these prisoners, and the rhetoric is on the rise. A sensible act would have been for an American president to prioritise this issue as one of the main factors behind the dispute, and address it at this earliest convenience. But no. Let us deepened the sectarian schism that has led to the birth, extension, and radicalisation of groups such as the ISIS. Let us alienate a country that has agreed to a peaceful solution regarding its nuclear activities and offered investment opportunities to the entire world if it were allowed the chance for dignified existence. Let the Houthis and the Salafis quench their thirst for more hatred, sectarianism, prejudice, and extremism.

The number one enemy in the Middle East as far as Muslim nations are concerned is not Iran, Israel, the USA, or any country really. It is the deep-seated and innate fear of the other, and the appealing solutions of annihilation and suppression to face such fears. A ‘common cause’ cannot be unanimous animosity towards an entity, and who it represents. Settling scores by ganging up against an adversary through rhetoric is cowardly and foolish. Trump’s hosts know better, and their lack of response is hopefully attributed to a Middle Eastern common tradition of hospitality – even if Trump is the guest.

Next stop is the Vatican...his trilogy was not lost on anyone. 

Wind of Change

The results of the French presidential elections  were unusual:  the failure of the two main parties (Socialist and Republican), who have been hogging the French scene for more than six decades came as a shock. The elections envisaged for May 8, will see Marin Le Pen, leader of the extreme right-wing party, and Emmanuel Macaron, leader of the centre Party, head to head.

The traditional left-wing Socialist and Republican parties have failed in recent years to address the problems facing the French society, which is suffering from an accumulated economic crisis and high unemployment, especially among young people. They also failed to instil a sense of security in the French society which has suffered from painful blows in the past years by terrorists.

In the first round, Marie Le Pen's victory came as a shock to the ruling class; it represented an extreme right-wing party. Therefore, immediately after the results, the political leaders of the traditional parties collapsed and demanded their electoral rules to vote for Macron to block Le Pen and not allow her to win the second round. However, traditional parties have lost part of their popular bases to other parties. For example, Marie Le Pen has been able to get support from the middle class. The boundaries between political parties are no longer as they were in the past. The global economic and political transformations have led to the collapse of these borders.

Manuel Macaron may have chances to win the second round of the French presidency, but his victory is not guaranteed yet, despite the support he has received from the political class and from several parties in the European Union. But she should not be underestimated because she proved to be a sophisticated political politician. She resigned from the party chairmanship not only for campaigning but also to distance herself slightly from her extreme party and to get closer to the right and centre of the vote.

The election results will decide who France's next president is, but it also shows the magnitude of the change that has taken place in France.

Belgian Sweet Solution

Seven months into the tenure of the Jordanian 18^th Lower House of Parliament, no miracles have yet taken place. The parliamentary elections were celebrated in September 2016 under a new election law that changed the electoral system into a fully proportional system under which candidates and political parties participate in open electoral lists at the district level. Under the new system, candidates must register through lists on the district level with a minimum of three members on each list. The number of candidates on the list cannot exceed that of the available seats in the respective district and is generally topped off at ten. Voters can cast their vote for the whole list as such, for different candidates on one list or for all candidates from the chosen list. Through the open list system, there is thus competition between the different lists as well as between the candidates of each list. It must be underlined however that voters can cast their vote for only one list – a comment that seems evident and redundant, in electoral terms, but will explained at the end of the article.

In all, 1252 candidates ran in 226 lists in the elections. The Islamic Action Front formed a list that included tribal, nationalist and Christian figures, participating under the National Coalition for Reform (NCR). Other parties also campaigned under party lists, or mixed lists. Out of the 50 political parties that are currently registered in Jordan, 39 presented candidates in the elections. Nearly 18% of candidates  who participated in the elections are party members, and 99 out of the 226  competing lists include at least one party member as a contender.

The results came at no surprise; the Islamic Action Front won 10 seats; the Zamzam Islamic party won 5 seats; the centrist National Current Party won 4 seats; the Islamic Centric party won 5 seats; the centrist party Justice and Reform won 2 seats; while the Baath (nationalist), Communist (left), National Union (left) and Awn (centrist) parties won one seat each. In total, 30 seats out of 130 seats. Not a bad figure in light of the history or marginalisation of parties in Jordan. Nonetheless, and again no surprises expected, parties did not form any strong coalitions in the Parliament, nor decided to merge into bigger and stronger parties that would have greater weight and influence. No; Jordan needs 50 parties, which form no majority and which win no more than 10 seats each.

The problem remains in the Election law and the formula chosen to distribute the votes, whereby the insistence on dividing the nation along geographic lines does not serve parties’ interest at all. Had the open lists been national lists, parties could have garnered more support from their constituents located in different parts of the country. Alternatively, an innovation and bespoke solution for Jordan could be allowing voters to select candidates from any list, provided that they select the lists that pertain to their electoral district, and respect the number of voted allocated to the district, which might be a fairer approach to parties. Instead of the hypothetical scenario, one could also suggest to go back to a majority system.  Again and again, the point is lost before law makers: parties cannot compete against tribal leaders. Tribal affiliation trumps political beliefs. Consequently, parties will win few seats, will have a meagre representation at the Parliament, and will not be able to forge sustainable coalitions- a Parlia­ment composed of individuals is the result.

In an excellent paper written by Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair*, a solution might be available to address Jordanian parties’ conundrum. They explain that ‘Contemporary Belgium can be interpreted as lacking a polity-level system of parties, for example, in that the linguistic divisions that have fractured each of the traditional party protagonists have now progressed to such an extent that, at least at the national level, there is now no electoral competition between the various Flemish and Walloon parties. With the possible exception of those living in the ‘mixed’ Brussels region, no Belgian voter is obliged, or even has the capacity, to choose between the opposing sides of this fundamental cleavage. There is, in short, no Flemish– Walloon electoral interaction, and hence no party system at the electoral level. If we are to speak of a Belgian party system, therefore, it can only be in the sense of a set of parties. Within each of the regions, on the other hand, and within each of the linguistic communities, strong competition prevails, with different Flemish parties challenging one another for the support of Dutch-speaking voters, and with different Walloon parties challenging one another for the support of French-speaking voters. Hence, while Belgium does not appear to maintain a national party system, at least at the level of the electorate, it does maintain two parallel sub-national party systems, one for Flemish voters and one for Walloon voters, and within each there regularly ensues quite intense electoral competition’.

So why not do precisely that in Jordan? Instead of dividing the nation based on geographical lines, it would be better to divide it based on ideological lines. Areas that are commonly known to be conservative, to vote for loyalists/centrist parties/tribal leaders can have their lot of districts, and those with politically active, ideologically driven and doctrine-oriented populations can have their lots of districts. A Parliament elected on that basis will have a more accurate representation of the society, and will represent two sides of the coin. Furthermore, grouped to compete before their own kind, parties will necessarily find safety in numbers, and will rethink the power of mergers. Otherwise, elections for the year 2020 will see the participation of, well, 2020 parties, 2 of which will win seats by their own right. Belgian solutions - like their chocolates - can be sweet.

*Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair, The Parameters of Party Systems, Party Politics 2008; 14; 147

Kaftar

Muaawiya Bin Abi Sufyan was the first Umayyad Caliph, who ruled as a just and jovial leader until his death in 683 AD. Known for his sense of humour and his love for women, Abi Sufyan was famous for a story that took place in his own harem.

While escorting a woman for the Khorasan region in modern day Iran, a beautiful woman entered the harem and mesmerised the Leader of All Believers. With his pride in his manhood and prowess in the bed arena, Abi Sufyan did not hesitate to engage in a brazen and manly sexual act in front of the Khorasani woman, who was patiently waiting for her turn. After he was done, he turned victoriously to his first concubine and asked her how to say ‘lion' in Persian - in a direct analogy to his sexual performance.  The Khorasani woman, unamused, told him slyly, that lion is kaftar in Persian. The Caliph went back to his Court ever so jubilant and told his subjects – repeatedly – that he was one lucky kaftar.

His subjects started giggling and explained to him that kaftar actually means a lame hyena. He was bragging endlessly that he was futile in bed. Being light-hearted himself, he took the prank well and commended the Khorasani woman for her wits and courage. It is unclear whether he showed such understanding when they were again joined to consummate their Caliph-concubine arrangement.

Now this story serves as an excellent analogy to what happened a few days earlier during the visit of Japan’s Prime Minister to the USA. During the Japanese leader's stay in the US, President Trump said that defending against the nuclear and missile threats from North Korea was a “very, very high priority.” In a joint statement with the Japanese counterpart, the two leaders urged North Korea “to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and not to take any further provocative actions.”

Two days later, North Korea launched a ballistic missile toward the sea off its eastern coast.

The moment was ripe for Trump to become a loose cannon. However, he was poised and said: "I just want everybody to understand and fully know that the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100 percent.” No raging threats, no UN recriminatory promises, no plans to wipe the Korean regime off the face of the planet or fencing it in. Only a statement that could have been drafted more eloquently by a 15 year old.

What happened was that North Korea caught the new President lying, and revealed his true colours. Its test went to show that the lion Trump is trying to portray himself to be was indeed a lame hyena that scavenges on the dead and weak. Boasting to the American public that he will take action and defend US interests, his reaction contradicted – for the first time – his promises and assurances.  North Korea is indeed the Khorasani woman who was supposedly a priority in the American agenda, but who was actually ignored by Trump who was distracted by other attractive stuff - his resort in Palm Beach.

Time will tell if Trump will ignore the incident and be content with the 'stern' statement, or take serious action to execute the policies he claims to defend. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un will be chuckling like a hyena for some time.

Polite separatism or uniform unity?

An article published in Political Theory Journal in January 2017 discussed the moral versus procedural aspects of deliberative democracy. The article analysed different theories and positions of renowned theorists, including the two preeminent post-WWII philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas regarding the role of reason in political accord. The author, Dereker Barker, suggests that deliberative theory sees politics as an integrative model, and seeks to locate the process of public will-formation on formal processes that adhere to certain rule, rather than a sense of collective identity. Collective identity, whether considered in its most individualist or communitarian form forms a baseline for public reasoning in a general and broad sense, and not a representation of individualist sense of morality. Haberman refuses – as quotes in Three Normative Models – that political questions be reduced to the type of ethical questions we ask ourselves regarding who we are and who we would like to be. He rejects collective identity as the basis of a deliberative model, whose legitimacy lies in impersonal formal processes.

 

Barker argues that deliberative democracy requires a shared civic culture of mutual understanding of differences. It does not require an intense sense of social solidarity, but needs citizens to share habits, inclinations and capacities to engage in communication across their differences. He also explains that according to Rawl, public reason enables citizens to see liberal democratic institutions in public terms, independent of their particular moral and religious worldviews. Public reason necessarily requires to reason from others’ perspective, whilst considering at the same time that public reasoning might be jeopardised when it conflicts with their personal interests and beliefs.

 

In this context, it is necessary to consider the difference between pluralist liberalism and civic republicanism. The latter seeks to establish social harmony, while the latter demonstrates a lukewarm acceptance and tolerance to differences.  Reason that tolerates differences or reason that is based on common beliefs is a question that must be addressed in nations that are witnessing rapid changes in their cultural landscape.

 

Should a growing community of Chinese immigrants be forcefully influenced by the western code of conduct so that deliberations would be based on common understanding, or should their views be respected and untouched but not taken into account on the premises of ‘majority rules’. What is more important, preserving culture or exerting influence?

 

The collective identity of any society is destined to metamorphose, owing to changes in its composition and to the developing religious, ideological and intellectual bases. However, if this change is witnessed uniformly across a homogenous society, political deliberations would be successful and public reasoning would be void of individualistic considerations. The picture is not quite the same when it concerns a society that is composed of a segregated society that favours political marginalisation to an identity loss.

 

As an immigrant/expat myself, I still do not know whether reason or heart should decide on this.

Derek Barker (2017) Deliberative Justice and Collective Identity: A Virtues-Centred Perspective, Political Theory, 2017, Vol. 45 (1) 116-136

تعليق: لا للمنطق

نسخ من مقال نشر في صحيفة الغد

'كانت جملة رجال الدين المسيحي والإسلامي في العصور الوسطى يعتقدون أن الفلسفة والمنطق عدوان للدين، وأن تعلمهما يجعل الفرد يشك في صحته، أو يكفر به ويرتد عنه. وقد شبه رجال الدين المسلمون في حينه تعلم المنطق بتعلم الزندقة، فقالوا: "من تمنطق فقد تزندق". غير أنه لما كان غير ممكن منع التفلسف والتمنطق بحكم الدهشة وحب الاستطلاع والمعرفة عند الإنسان، فقد اضطر رجال الدين إلى تعلّم الفلسفة والمنطق وتعليمهما، للدفاع عن الدين والتصدي للمجدفين والمهرطقين والمارقين.
ولما بلغت الحضارة العربية الإسلامية أوجها في القرن الرابع الهجري؛ نتيجة انهيار السلطة المركزية وتفشي الانقسام السياسي، وتنافس الدويلات المسلمة المستقلة على رعاية الفلسفة والآداب والعلوم والفنون، رأيت الفلسفة والمنطق يزدهران، والمناظرات بين الفلاسفة تنتشر في كل مكان، ما اضطرهم إلى وضع قواعد للمناظرة: "اجتمع متكلمان (فيلسوفان إسلاميان) فقال أحدهما للآخر: هل لك في المناظرة؟ فقال: على شرائط: أن لا تغضب، ولا تعجب، ولا تشغب، ولا تحكم، ولا تقبل على غيري وأنا أكلمك، ولا تجعل الدعوى دليلاً، ولا تجوز لنفسك تأويل آية على مذهبك إلا جوزت لي تأويلها على مذهبي، وعلى أن تؤثر التصادق، وتنقاد للتعارف، وعلى أن كلاً منا يبني مناظرته على أن الحق ضالته، والرشد غايته".

ولأن انتشار الفلسفة والمنطق زاد على حده في نظر الإمام أبي حامد الغزالي (المتوفى عام 505هـ)، فقد تحول إلى ضدهما، وألف كتابه المشهور "تهافت الفلاسفة" الذي وقف رجال الدين آنذاك بين مؤيد له ومعارض. ولما وقع كتاب الغزالي بين يدي فيلسوف الأندلس الأعظم أبو الوليد بن رشد، المولود بعد وفاة الغزالي بخمس عشرة سنة، استفزه ما جاء فيه، فنهض للرد عليه؛ فقرة فقرة، وفكرة فكرة، بكتاب سماه "تهافت التهافت". كان هدف ابن رشد كهدف الغزالي؛ الدفاع عن الإسلام، ولكن بالفلسفة والمنطق والبرهان. كما ألف ابن رشد كتاباً آخر سماه "فصل المقال فيما بين الحكمة والشريعة من الاتصال"، للدفاع عن الدين بالفلسفة 

ونظراً لشهرة ابن رشد في الأندلس وأوروبا، وتقريب الأمير له، فقد حسدته البطانة وتآمرت مع رجال الدين السذج عليه، وحرضوا الأمير عليه، فحوكم في جامع قرطبة الكبير (عام 591هـ) بتهمة الكفر والزندقة. ولكنه دافع عن فكره ببسالة، إلا أن الحكم صدر بحرق جميع كتبه ما خلا ما له علاقة بالطب لحاجة البلاط إليه، وبالفلك والحساب لحاجة المسلمين إليها في المواقيت. ونُفي خارج قرطبة إلى قرية أليسانة اليهودية، فأشاع خصومه وأعداؤه أنه يهودي الأصل، كالعادة المتبعة إلى اليوم أو الموروثة عن الأسلاف عن اتهام بعض الزعماء العرب بذلك. ولما ضج بعض الناس احتجاجاً على المعاملة المذلة لابن رشد، أصدر الأمير بياناً متغطرساً يشرح فيه أسباب اضطهاد ابن رشد، وأنه للدفاع عن الدين الحنيف؛ الحجة القديمة الجديدة الدائمة كلما احتاجوا إلى اضطهاد مفكر أو فيلسوف.
لم تقتصر النقمة على ابن رشد، بل شملت كل المنشغلين بالفلسفة والمنطق الذين شردوا في الأفاق. لكن محنة ابن رشد لم تدم طويلاً، فقد عفا عنه الأمير لحاجته إليه لتعلّم الفلسفة والمنطق. لكن هذا الود لم يدم طويلاً، فقد نُفي ثانيةً ولكن إلى مراكش حيث مات بعيداً عن وطنه (عام 595هـ).

يذكرني حرق كتب ابن رشد في القرن الخامس الهجري بحرق التلاميذ والمعلمين والجمهور للكتب الإسلامية المدرسية في القرن الحادي والعشرين. فما أشبه الليلة بالبارحة؟ '

تعليق

ديفيد هيوم،  أحد الفلاسفة المرموقين في القرن الثامن عشر, أشار أن  المنطق وحده لا يمكن أن يكون الدافع لإرادة، بل المنطق هو "عبد الأهواء" حيث لا تستمد المواقف الأخلاقية من المنطق. إذا نظرنا حجته، يمكننا أن نستنتج أن المنطق -  كمفهوم مجرد - يتأثر بالضرورة بالقيم ، ويجعل المواقف أخلاقية وغير أخلاقية بناء على الفضيلة، وليس المنطق. وبالتالي، فإن المخاوف التي عبر عنها المحافظون حول التعاليم الفلسفية هي شهادة على حقيقة أن البوصلة الأخلاقية في العديد من الدول مبنية على أسس ضعيفة. الأخلاق أن يبررها القصاص بدلا من فضيلة يمكن أن تؤدي إلى تغذية المخاوف في العالم العربي من التعمق في الفلسفة.

Erdogan Abelhamid II

The Ottoman constitution of 1876 was the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, drafted by the Young Ottomans when Sultan Abedlahamid II acceded to the throne. However, Abdelhamid’s iron-fist rule meant that the Constitution was only in effect for two years, from 1876 to 1878 during the First Constitutional Era, and Empire’s hopes for political opening were shattered. For years, the Sultan exercised absolute power and controlled a ring of a ruling oligarchical elite. The Constitution was reinstated in 1908 following the Young Turk Revolution. The Constitution allowed for the respect of minorities and their right to be represented in regional assemblies, democratizing the Ottoman institutions and ceding representative rights to the disenfranchised. What Abdelhamid II planned to carry out with his absolute monarchy and autocratic rule by burying the Constitution was trumped by the courage, vision, and justice of the Yong Ottomans.

 

It is important to revert to this historical era of Turkey when it served as the centre of the Ottoman Empire, and underline the dichotomy between the actions taken by the young Sultan and their underlying reasons. The promulgation of a Constitution in 1876 under the Sultan’s nascent rein was hailed as an achievement and as a promise to political development and opening. Nations embedded in the Ottoman fabric of multi-confessional, multi-ethnic, and multi-continental Empire were thrilled to learn that their voice would be heard. Nonetheless, reality proved different, and nations were subject to further discrimination and control of freedoms.  

 

History seems to repeat itself. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’ ruling Justice and Development Party unveiled a proposed amendment to the Constitution which would change the political system, from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. The envisaged amendments include the abolishment of the prime minister's office and the cabinet; the appointment of the president as the head of the executive branch; and the preservation of the President’s ties with his (ruling) political party.

 

Presidential system and semi-presidential system has proven effective and democratic, taking the American and French systems as an example. However, the balance of powers and the accountability of the president and his team before the parliament are guaranteed in both systems, considering that the legislative body needs not be composed of a majority of the President’s party. Furthermore, the president is not necessarily the party’s leader but one of its figures, allowing therefore the party to oppose presidential positions and policies.

 

In other words, what the present Turkish constitutional amendment suggests is that the President will be elected by the public, who will simultaneously select the parliament. The party that will form the majority of the latter will logically and deductively be the party that backs the President. Consequently, the parliament, the president and his cabinet will be subject to the whims of one figure: the president.

 

So what Erdogan is proposing to do does not differ much from what Abdelhamid II did briefly back in the late 19^th century. However, while in the latter’s case the abolition of the Constitution lead to absolute monarchy, in the former’s case, the amendment of the Constitution will lead to a legalised autocracy. Time will only reveal what this ‘opening’ will lead to in the Turkish scene, and what it would mean for minorities and opposition powers.